case out rule in Texas

1974A controverting plea supported by two affidavits was filed by the State, thus taking this case out of the rule of Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), which requires a motion for change of venue to be granted when the State does not file a controverting plea or present evidence.

1971Such failure takes this case out of the rule expressed in Wall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 417 S.W.2d 59 , and cases there cited. .

1918Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Tex. 475 [ 84 Am.

1894Munson v. Hallowell, 26 Texas, 475 ; Ripley v. Withee, 27 Texas, 17 ; Ransome v. Bearden, 50 Texas, 127 ; Calhoun v. Burton, 64 Texas, 515 ; Anding v. Perkins, 29 Texas, 348 ; Connoly v. Hammond, 58 Texas, 17 ; Brown v. Brown, 61 Texas, 45 .

1985This does not take the case out of the rule with reference to former jeopardy. 48 F.2d at 71 .

1979Downum, 372 U.S. at 737 , 83 S.Ct. at 1035 .

1979Downum, 372 U.S. at 737 , 83 S.Ct. at 1035 .

1973This additional evidence takes this case out of the rule expressed in Preston v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 79 , 178 S.W.2d 522 , and cases relied upon by appellant.

1973This additional evidence takes this case out of the rule expressed in Preston v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 79 , 178 S.W.2d 522 , and cases relied upon by appellant.

1967We think the proof was sufficient that the trees cut down on the Fant property had such value with reference to the land that their value as posts in comparison was too insubstantial to take this case out of the rule of Cummer-Graham Co. v. Maddox, supra. In Lucas v. Morrison, 286 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, no writ), the Court approved an exception to the general rule of measure of damages with regard to destruction of trees.

1966Much of the weight of his argument is destroyed when we look to appellant’s confession and there find the recitation “When I hit the car, I was thrown into the back seat and knocked out.” We find the facts sufficient to corroborate appellant’s confession that he was the driver at the time of the collision and to take this case out of the rule announced in Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 497 , 250 S.W.2d 200 , Spinks v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 418 , 243 S.W.2d 173 , and the other cases upon which he relies.

1966Much of the weight of his argument is destroyed when we look to appellant’s confession and there find the recitation “When I hit the car, I was thrown into the back seat and knocked out.” We find the facts sufficient to corroborate appellant’s confession that he was the driver at the time of the collision and to take this case out of the rule announced in Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 497 , 250 S.W.2d 200 , Spinks v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 418 , 243 S.W.2d 173 , and the other cases upon which he relies.

1966Much of the weight of his argument is destroyed when we look to appellant’s confession and there find the recitation “When I hit the car, I was thrown into the back seat and knocked out.” We find the facts sufficient to corroborate appellant’s confession that he was the driver at the time of the collision and to take this case out of the rule announced in Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 497 , 250 S.W.2d 200 , Spinks v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 418 , 243 S.W.2d 173 , and the other cases upon which he relies.

1966Much of the weight of his argument is destroyed when we look to appellant’s confession and there find the recitation “When I hit the car, I was thrown into the back seat and knocked out.” We find the facts sufficient to corroborate appellant’s confession that he was the driver at the time of the collision and to take this case out of the rule announced in Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 497 , 250 S.W.2d 200 , Spinks v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 418 , 243 S.W.2d 173 , and the other cases upon which he relies.

1966Bosquez v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 147 , 311 S.W.2d 855 , supports the conclusion that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to corroborate the confession.

1966Bosquez v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 147 , 311 S.W.2d 855 , supports the conclusion that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to corroborate the confession.

1964Pope v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 597 , 245 S.W.2d 245 .

1964Pope v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 597 , 245 S.W.2d 245 .

1963Reliance is had upon Lee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 214 S.W.2d 619 , which we had occasion to distinguish in Brothers v. State, supra. We have concluded that the aid which appellant gave his son by grabbing Brown by both arms and getting him off balance so that Brown's stomach would be vulnerable to his son's attack was sufficient to take this case out of the rule announced in Lee and bring it within the rule set forth in Brothers and the cases there cited.

1963Reliance is had upon Lee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 214 S.W.2d 619 , which we had occasion to distinguish in Brothers v. State, supra. We have concluded that the aid which appellant gave his son by grabbing Brown by both arms and getting him off balance so that Brown’s stomach would be vulnerable to his son’s attack was sufficient to take this case out of the rule announced in Lee and bring it within the rule set forth in Brothers and the cases there cited.

1957The checks bearing the appellant’s endorsement take this case out of the rule expressed in Devine v. State, 156 Texas Cr.

1957Rep. 530 , 244 S.W. 2d 232 , and the other cases relied upon by the appellant.

1947The city officials in selecting the superintendent of the hospital were acting as agents of the general public and the doctrine of re-spondeat superior does not apply.” (Citing authorities.) See City of Dallas v. Smith et ux., 130 Tex. 225 , 107 S.W.2d 872 , excerpt copied from column 1, page 879.

1947The city officials in selecting the superintendent of the hospital were acting as agents of the general public and the doctrine of re-spondeat superior does not apply.” (Citing authorities.) See City of Dallas v. Smith et ux., 130 Tex. 225 , 107 S.W.2d 872 , excerpt copied from column 1, page 879.

1944Consolidated Underwriters v. Saxon, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 447 , reversed on other grounds, Tex.Com.App., 265 S.W. 143 .

1944Consolidated Underwriters v. Saxon, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 447 , reversed on other grounds, Tex.Com.App., 265 S.W. 143 .

1931App.) 6 S.W. (2d) 430 , and places the case upon an equal footing with Spencer v. Pettit, 2 S.W.(2d) 422 , by the-Commission of Appeals, approved by the Supreme Court.

1931This case, in view of the allegations of trust estate, both by implication as well as by express agreement, take the case out of the rule laid down in Akin v. Jefferson, 65 Tex. 137 ; Pressley’s Heirs v. Robinson, 57 Tex. 453 , and Berkley v. Neely (Tex. Civ.

1931This case, in view of the allegations of trust estate, both by implication as well as by express agreement, take the case out of the rule laid down in Akin v. Jefferson, 65 Tex. 137 ; Pressley’s Heirs v. Robinson, 57 Tex. 453 , and Berkley v. Neely (Tex. Civ.

1931App.) 6 S.W. (2d) 430 , and places the case upon an equal footing with Spencer v. Pettit, 2 S.W.(2d) 422 , by the-Commission of Appeals, approved by the Supreme Court.

1923App.) 134 S. W. 781 , the court said: “It is the law in this state that neither fraud alone nor ignorance of its existence will prevent the statute of limitation from running.

1918Gaut v. State, 49 Texas Crim.

1914Railway Co. v. Russell, 48 Tex. Civ.

1911There is no element of estoppel shown in this case, such as was shown in Elijah Smith v. Blake Dupree, 140 S.W. 367 , decided by this court October 11, 1911, to prevent a suit, or any new promise based upon any consideration whatever in this record, that prevented appellant from timely suing, or that took the case out of the bar.

1911There is no element of estoppel shown in this case, such as was shown in Elijah Smith v. Blake Dupree, 140 S. W. 367 , decided by this court October 11, 1911, to prevent a suit, or any new promise based upon any consideration whatever in this record, that prevented appellant from timely suing, or that took the case out of the bar. [5] But appellant contends there is no limitation in this cause because the suit was instituted within two years after note was paid, and by agreement has brought up and had filed a verified copy of the original petition, which we shall now consider from the standpoi

1911Co. v. McKee Bros., 135 S. W. 658 , and the other cases cited in the opinion, which hold that, “when an appeal is properly taken from the judgment of a justice court, it operates to avoid the judgment, and a subsequent voluntary dismissal in the county court does not restore it to validity.

1910App. 475 , 33 S.W. 1028 , Railway Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213 , 30 S.E. 732 , 69 Am.St.Rep. 166 , and other cases which hold that a passenger having, by the terms of his contract, a right to be carried on his ticket, notwithstanding a failure to comply strictly with its conditions, due to the fault of the carrier, may assume that the carrier will do its duty until he learns to the contrary when he presents himself for transportation.

1910App. 475 , 33 S. W. 1028 , Railway Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213 , 30 S. E. 732 , 69 Am.

1910App. 475 , 33 S.W. 1028 , Railway Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213 , 30 S.E. 732 , 69 Am.St.Rep. 166 , and other cases which hold that a passenger having, by the terms of his contract, a right to be carried on his ticket, notwithstanding a failure to comply strictly with its conditions, due to the fault of the carrier, may assume that the carrier will do its duty until he learns to the contrary when he presents himself for transportation.

1910App. 475 , 33 S. W. 1028 , Railway Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213 , 30 S. E. 732 , 69 Am.

1910Cabrera v. State, 56 Texas Crim.

1910This circumstance takes this case out of the doctrine announced in Railway Co. v. Payne, supra, Railway Co. v. Halbrook, 12 Tex. Civ.

1910This circumstance takes this case out of the doctrine announced in Railway Co. v. Payne, supra, Railway Co. v. Halbrook, 12 Tex. Civ.