viability claim in Georgia

1999“Regardless of the belief of this court as to the viability of that defense, and regardless of what the trial judge thought of the credibility of [McBurnette’s] defense, the jurors are the exclusive finders of fact and judges of credibility of witnesses.” Kimbrell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 302, 305 ( 250 SE2d 883 ) (1978).

1999“Regardless of the belief of this court as to the viability of that defense, and regardless of what the trial judge thought of the credibility of [McBurnette’s] defense, the jurors are the exclusive finders of fact and judges of credibility of witnesses.” Kimbrell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 302, 305 ( 250 SE2d 883 ) (1978).

2025That the gift or transfer “was not fully 13 executed does not negate the viability of the claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (1) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008), disapproved of on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2025That the gift or transfer “was not fully 13 executed does not negate the viability of the claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (1) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008), disapproved of on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2025That the gift or transfer “was not fully 13 executed does not negate the viability of the claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (1) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008), disapproved of on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2025That the gift or transfer “was not fully 13 executed does not negate the viability of the claim.” Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 113 (1) ( 663 SE2d 714 ) (2008), disapproved of on other grounds, Gilliam v. State, 312 Ga. 60, 63 ( 860 SE2d 543 ) (2021).

2024Co. v. Stallings, 235 Ga. App. 212, 214 (b) ( 508 SE2d 688 ) (1998) (affirming dismissal of declaratory judgment action where insurer merely sought “a 9 declaration of the viability of its defense to both the main action and any future action that may be filed by the insured for its failure to settle the claim”).

2024Co. v. Stallings, 235 Ga. App. 212, 214 (b) ( 508 SE2d 688 ) (1998) (affirming dismissal of declaratory judgment action where insurer merely sought “a 9 declaration of the viability of its defense to both the main action and any future action that may be filed by the insured for its failure to settle the claim”).

2023Accordingly, to the extent Think Development still asserts a claim for breach of an administrative fee agreement, Cloudious is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 17 omitted); Estate of Crook v. Foster, 333 Ga. App. 36, 39 (1) ( 775 SE2d 286 ) (2015). (“Unjust enrichment is an equitable concept and applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract, but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensate for.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see als

2023Accordingly, to the extent Think Development still asserts a claim for breach of an administrative fee agreement, Cloudious is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 17 omitted); Estate of Crook v. Foster, 333 Ga. App. 36, 39 (1) ( 775 SE2d 286 ) (2015). (“Unjust enrichment is an equitable concept and applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract, but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensate for.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see als

2008Svcs. v. Vickery, 274 Ga. App. at 425-427 (1) (affirming trial court’s determination that a jury issue existed regarding the date of denial of a crop insurance claim based, in part, on language in a letter purporting to deny the claim that reflected an ongoing dialogue between the parties about the viability of the claim); Commercial Union Ins.

1998“A declaratory judgment is not available to a party merely to test the viability of its defenses.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Chattahoochee Bancorp v. Roberts, 203 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 416 SE2d 875 ) (1992).

1998“A declaratory judgment is not available to a party merely to test the viability of its defenses.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Chattahoochee Bancorp v. Roberts, 203 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 416 SE2d 875 ) (1992).

1996Although Patton has the strength of stare decisis behind it as a reason for maintaining the viability of its exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, stare decisis is not a particularly compelling reason here given the conflict with modern trial practice and the fact that the precedent in issue does not involve statutory interpretation, compare, e.g., Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga.App. 344, 348 , 306 S.E.2d 404 (1983), and does not implicate one of those areas where the "settled rule of law" is especially desirable, e.g., cases involving vested property rights, the security of contracts,

1996Although Patton has the strength of stare decisis behind it as a reason for maintaining the viability of its exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, stare decisis is not a particularly compelling reason here given the conflict with modern trial practice and the fact that the precedent in issue does not involve statutory interpretation, compare, e.g., Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga.App. 344, 348 , 306 S.E.2d 404 (1983), and does not implicate one of those areas where the "settled rule of law" is especially desirable, e.g., cases involving vested property rights, the security of contracts,

1996See Robinson v. Colonial Discount Co., 106 Ga.App. 274, 276 , 126 S.E.2d 824 (1962).

1996See Robinson v. Colonial Discount Co., 106 Ga.App. 274, 276 , 126 S.E.2d 824 (1962).

1994Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 608 (4) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987). [2] In determining the scope of this statutory privilege, we must "look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly." OCGA § 1-3-1.

1994Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 608 (4) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987). [2] In determining the scope of this statutory privilege, we must "look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly." OCGA § 1-3-1.

1988“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, who is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all reasonable inferences. [Cit.]” Blount v. Seckinger Realty Co., 167 Ga. App. 778, 779 (1) ( 307 SE2d 683 ) (1983).

1988“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, who is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all reasonable inferences. [Cit.]” Blount v. Seckinger Realty Co., 167 Ga. App. 778, 779 (1) ( 307 SE2d 683 ) (1983).

1986Compare Williams v. Dykes, 170 Ga. App. 665 ( 317 SE2d 661 ) (1984).

1986Compare Williams v. Dykes, 170 Ga. App. 665 ( 317 SE2d 661 ) (1984).