viability rule in California

2025By doing so, both the public’s interest and the individual’s interest may adequately be protected.” (Ibid.) The court in Lovercamp “place[d] rigid limitations on the viability of the defense [for an escape charge] in order to insure that the rights and interests of society will not be impinged upon.” (Lovercamp, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at p. 827 .) Specifically, the defense is available only if the following conditions are satisfied: “(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; [¶] (2) There is no time for

2025Even if the defendant were acting in protection of another, the relevant question would still involve “looking to all the choices available to the defendant and then determining whether the act of escape was the only viable and reasonable choice available.” (Lovercamp, supra, 43 Cal.App.3d at p. 827 .) And the same “rigid limitations on the viability of the defense” would be necessary “to insure that the rights and interests of society will not be impinged upon.” (Ibid.) We therefore conclude that any escape necessity defense for the protection of a third party would be subject to the Lovercam

2023In other words, Edelweiss could not plead falsity by alleging only the failure of an implied obligation based on its interpretation of those agreements; namely, that defendants were required to reset the rates of each California VRDO “individually.” 10Given the “very close similarity” of the CFCA to the federal False Claims Act, “it is appropriate to turn to federal cases for guidance in interpreting the [CFCA].” (Pomona, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 802 .) 16 We begin by observing that the implied certification claim in Contreras involved an alleged failure to comply with express contractual t

2023In other words, Edelweiss could not plead falsity by alleging only the failure of an implied obligation based on its interpretation of those agreements; namely, that defendants were required to reset the rates of each California VRDO “individually.” 10Given the “very close similarity” of the CFCA to the federal False Claims Act, “it is appropriate to turn to federal cases for guidance in interpreting the [CFCA].” (Pomona, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 802 .) 16 We begin by observing that the implied certification claim in Contreras involved an alleged failure to comply with express contractual t

2023(Contreras, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 443 .) But Contreras explained that liability under the CFCA is distinguished from liability for any run-of-the-mill breach of contract insofar as not every breach of a “material” contract term will be material to the government’s decision to pay.

2023(Contreras, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 443 .) But Contreras explained that liability under the CFCA is distinguished from liability for any run-of-the-mill breach of contract insofar as not every breach of a “material” contract term will be material to the government’s decision to pay.

1982The viability of this exception was also discussed in Hocharian: “In Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ], this court recognized another implied exception to section 581a in holding that a *229 defendant may be estopped from seeking dismissal if his conduct or assertions induce detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiff who thereby fails to serve and return summons within the three-year period.” (Hocharian v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 721, fn. 4 .) Unfortunately, this contention, like appellant’s first contention, was

1982The viability of this exception was also discussed in Hocharian: “In Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 ], this court recognized another implied exception to section 581a in holding that a *229 defendant may be estopped from seeking dismissal if his conduct or assertions induce detrimental reliance on the part of the plaintiff who thereby fails to serve and return summons within the three-year period.” (Hocharian v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 721, fn. 4 .) Unfortunately, this contention, like appellant’s first contention, was

2024It held that a waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum impermissibly “disable[s] one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and “harm[s] the state’s interests in ... receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used to deter violations,” which violates state public policy. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) The Iskanian court also rejected an argument that a predispute arbitration agreement may be enforced so long as it “prohibits only [non- 11 individual PAGA] claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Is

2024It held that a waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum impermissibly “disable[s] one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and “harm[s] the state’s interests in ... receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used to deter violations,” which violates state public policy. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) The Iskanian court also rejected an argument that a predispute arbitration agreement may be enforced so long as it “prohibits only [non- 11 individual PAGA] claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Is

2024It held that a waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum impermissibly “disable[s] one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and “harm[s] the state’s interests in ... receiving the proceeds of civil penalties used to deter violations,” which violates state public policy. ( Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) The Iskanian court also rejected an argument that a predispute arbitration agreement may be enforced so long as it “prohibits only [non- 11 individual PAGA] claims, not individual PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.” (Is

2023The distinction between the statutory claim based on menace and the common law claim 10 discussed in Fuhrman and Leeper also explains why we are not persuaded by Nguyen’s contention that a claim for civil extortion requires falsity because it “‘is essentially a . . . form of fraud.’” (Citing Fuhrman, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 426 , italics added.) Under Civil Code section 1567, “[m]enace” is distinguished from fraud, which constitutes a distinct basis for seeking rescission of a transaction. 3.

2023(Ibid.) A court tasked with an anti-SLAPP motion “does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 .) However, where, as here, the relevant representation in connection with the collection of the debt (i.e., the collection action complaint) is not subject to conflicting factual claims and the viability of the claim is evaluated according to an independent, objective standard of review, the court can properly ascertain the plaintiff’s showing at the second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure without weighing the evidence or resolving factu

2022Applicable Law “In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294.” (Turman, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 63 .) Section 3294, subdivision (a) provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant

2021(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 .) After examining the record, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect on defendant’s case of two newly enacted pieces of legislation: Assembly Bill No. 1618 (Assembly Bill 1618), which created Penal Code section 1016.8 (statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code) regarding the viability of a waiver clause in a plea agreement with respect to future changes in the law, and Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136), which amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit the underlying offenses that qualify for a prior

2021And Agindotan has not articulated why the same facts would support an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim notwithstanding the litigation privilege.6 6 We note the Hagberg court did not resolve “whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act notwithstanding the provisions of section 47(b).” (Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 376 .) Because Agindotan fails substantively to brief the viability of this claim, we do not reach it.

2020This need is particularly acute here because, even post-Masterpiece, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [ 138 S.Ct. 1719 ] (which had not been decided prior to the preliminary injunction order in this case), the First Amendment jurisprudence in this area remains unsettled, and it is not a foregone legal proposition that factual disputes about the customization of the wedding cake are immaterial—i.e., that any type of wedding cake, baked under any scenario, is expressive conduct for purposes of the First Amendment.

2019(Compare Sims v. AT & T Mobility Services LLC (E.D.Cal. 2013) 955 F.Supp.2d 1110 , 1118-1120 [recognizing conversion claim for unpaid wages under California law]; Rodriguez v. Cleansource, Inc. (S.D.Cal.

2015(Nardizzi v. Harbor Chrysler Plymouth Sales, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414 .) Causation is an essential element of negligence.

2014(Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 44 .) Gill fares no better with her theory of continuous accrual.

2014(County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 313 .) The City characterized its nuisance and trespass claims as being based on a products liability theory.

2013(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 423 ; see California Trust Co. v. Cohn (1932) 214 Cal. 619, 627 [ 7 P.2d 297 ]; Fleury v. Ramacciotti, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 662 ; Lynch v. Cruttenden & Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 802, 807 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, §'301, pp. 327-328.) Here as well we need not explore the degree to which failure to read the contract affects the viability of a claim of fraud in the inducement.

2013(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 423 ; see California Trust Co. v. Cohn (1932) 214 Cal. 619, 627 [ 7 P.2d 297 ]; Fleury v. Ramacciotti, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 662 ; Lynch v. Cruttenden & Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 802, 807 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, §'301, pp. 327-328.) Here as well we need not explore the degree to which failure to read the contract affects the viability of a claim of fraud in the inducement.

2009In light of our decision in this matter, we have no need to reach or discuss that issue in this opinion. 18 In reciting this commitment by Great American, we assume that it is based upon the understanding that the trial of the first phase of the underlying action will indeed begin on October 13, 2009, or a date reasonably close thereto. 19 In Ringler Associates, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ], the court concluded that “there is no particular requirement that an insurer ask the permission of a trial court before withdrawing from a defense, once t

2009In light of our decision in this matter, we have no need to reach or discuss that issue in this opinion. 18 In reciting this commitment by Great American, we assume that it is based upon the understanding that the trial of the first phase of the underlying action will indeed begin on October 13, 2009, or a date reasonably close thereto. 19 In Ringler Associates, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1165 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 ], the court concluded that “there is no particular requirement that an insurer ask the permission of a trial court before withdrawing from a defense, once t

2008To “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance” (§ 425.16, subd. (a)), the anti-SLAPP statute “protects] defendants from having to expend resources defending against frivolous SLAPP suits unless and until a plaintiff establishes the viability of its claim by a prima facie showing” (Britts v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th *1349 1112, 1124 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 ] (Britts); see also Sipple v. Foundation for Nat.

2007The court expressly noted that neither party was pressing such an approach and both parties operated on the assumption that it didn't apply, ( California-Nevada, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ["The parties here also appear to agree that the neutral principles of law theory is applicable in California, or at least that the hierarchical and implied trust theories do not apply."].) It is clear from the opinion, though, that the California-Nevada court took it for granted that the "hierarchical theory" had been discredited, because that assumption played a role in its ratio

2007The court expressly noted that neither party was pressing such an approach and both parties operated on the assumption that it didn't apply, ( California-Nevada, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 , 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ["The parties here also appear to agree that the neutral principles of law theory is applicable in California, or at least that the hierarchical and implied trust theories do not apply."].) It is clear from the opinion, though, that the California-Nevada court took it for granted that the "hierarchical theory" had been discredited, because that assumption played a role in its ratio

2006(Crystal R. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 703 , 714—715 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 414 ] (Crystal R.).) In California, there is a split in the appellate districts and the viability of the doctrine is not settled.

2006(Crystal R. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 703 , 714—715 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 414 ] (Crystal R.).) In California, there is a split in the appellate districts and the viability of the doctrine is not settled.

2006The Sixth Appellate District (Crystal R., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718-724) and divisions of the Second (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 ] (Div. Three) and In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ] (Div. Two)) and Fourth (In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ] (Div. Three)) Appellate Districts have adopted the doctrine.

2006The Sixth Appellate District (Crystal R., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718-724) and divisions of the Second (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 ] (Div. Three) and In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ] (Div. Two)) and Fourth (In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ] (Div. Three)) Appellate Districts have adopted the doctrine.

2006The Sixth Appellate District (Crystal R., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718-724) and divisions of the Second (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 ] (Div. Three) and In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ] (Div. Two)) and Fourth (In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ] (Div. Three)) Appellate Districts have adopted the doctrine.

2006The Sixth Appellate District (Crystal R., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718-724) and divisions of the Second (In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 ] (Div. Three) and In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692 ] (Div. Two)) and Fourth (In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 ] (Div. Three)) Appellate Districts have adopted the doctrine.