7 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davignongreen2 sentences1994Cf. State v. Davignon, 152 Vt. 209, 222 , 565 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1989) (due to need to develop evidentiary record, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should first be brought in post-conviction relief proceedings, not as part of defendant’s direct appeal from conviction). 1994Cf. State v. Davignon, 152 Vt. 209, 222 , 565 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1989) (due to need to develop evidentiary record, ineffective assistance of counsel claims should first be brought in post-conviction relief proceedings, not as part of defendant’s direct appeal from conviction). | 2 | 2 |
Sabia v. Nevillegreen1 sentence2013“Of course, when we consider state tort liability, the ‘clearly established law’ is not limited to federal constitutional and statutory rights, but may include Vermont statutes, regulations and common law.” Sabia v. Neville, 165 Vt. 515, 521 (1996) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Jonathan v. Nallygreen1 sentence2013“The viability of this defense depends on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct in relation to settled, clearly-established law.” Hoffer v. Ancel, 2004 VT 38, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 630 (internal quotation omitted). “‘Clearly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity means that ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Sprague, 2005 VT 85, ¶ 5 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoffer v. Ancel
green
2 sentences2013“The viability of this defense depends on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct in relation to settled, clearly-established law.” Hoffer v. Ancel, 2004 VT 38, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 630 (internal quotation omitted). “‘Clearly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity means that ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Sprague, 2005 VT 85, ¶ 5 (citation omitted). 2013“The viability of this defense depends on the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct in relation to settled, clearly-established law.” Hoffer v. Ancel, 2004 VT 38, ¶ 12 , 176 Vt. 630 (internal quotation omitted). “‘Clearly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity means that ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Sprague, 2005 VT 85, ¶ 5 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2010–2013 |
In Re SW
green
1 sentence2012Although the issue is not new, we have not definitively resolved whether ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a civil termination proceeding, and we need not do so here.1 See, e.g., In re S.W., 2008 VT 38, ¶ 7 , 183 Vt. 610 (mem.) (holding that, because mother had failed to show that counsel was ineffective or that she was prejudiced, “we need not determine whether, or under what circumstances, a party may claim ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding”); In re M.B., 162 Vt. 229 , 233 n.3 (1994) (holding that father failed to demonstrate prejudice from counse | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re S.W.
green
1 sentence2012Although the issue is not new, we have not definitively resolved whether ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a civil termination proceeding, and we need not do so here.1 See, e.g., In re S.W., 2008 VT 38, ¶ 7 , 183 Vt. 610 (mem.) (holding that, because mother had failed to show that counsel was ineffective or that she was prejudiced, “we need not determine whether, or under what circumstances, a party may claim ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding”); In re M.B., 162 Vt. 229 , 233 n.3 (1994) (holding that father failed to demonstrate prejudice from counse | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re M.B.
green
1 sentence2012Although the issue is not new, we have not definitively resolved whether ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in a civil termination proceeding, and we need not do so here.1 See, e.g., In re S.W., 2008 VT 38, ¶ 7 , 183 Vt. 610 (mem.) (holding that, because mother had failed to show that counsel was ineffective or that she was prejudiced, “we need not determine whether, or under what circumstances, a party may claim ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding”); In re M.B., 162 Vt. 229 , 233 n.3 (1994) (holding that father failed to demonstrate prejudice from counse | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Joseph K. Orr v. Robert J. Sasseman
green
2 sentences1997Marra relied, in turn, upon Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956), another alienation of affections case in which the situs of the defendant's conduct, Georgia or Illinois, determined the choice of law, and the viability of the claim. 1997Marra relied, in turn, upon Orr v. Sasseman, 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956), another alienation of affections case in which the situs of the defendant’s conduct, Georgia or Illinois, determined the choice of law, and the viability of the claim. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Helen Marra v. Esther Bushee
green
2 sentences1997In affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the Sasseman court "expressly approved the trial court's [jury] instruction that if the loss of consortium occurred in Illinois, the verdict must be for the defendant; but if the claim arose in Georgia there could be a verdict for the plaintiff." Marra, 447 F.2d at 1284 . 1997In affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the Sasseman court “expressly approved the trial court’s [jury] instruction that if the loss of consortium occurred in Illinois, the verdict must be for the defendant; but if the claim arose in Georgia there could be a verdict for the plaintiff.” Marra, 447 F.2d at 1284 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stewart v. Darrow
green
2 sentences1985Stewart, supra, 141 Vt. at 249 n.1, 448 A.2d at 788 n.1. 1985Stewart, supra, 141 Vt. at 249 n.1, 448 A.2d at 788 n.1. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.