viability claim in Connecticut

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

1993The leading cases in Connecticut which address the viability of a claim by a bystander for emotional distress are Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714 , 156 A.2d 149 (1959), Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80 , 438 A.2d 6 (1980), and Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 545 A.2d 1059 (1988).

2025In State v. Raguseo, supra, 225 Conn. 114 , the defendant invoked the 11 See footnote 14 of this opinion. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 23 0 Conn. 1 ,0 25 State v. Parris extreme emotional disturbance defense after he had stabbed and killed the victim because ‘‘he was tired of people parking in his parking space.’’ (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Id., 118 .

2017This court previously has recognized the viability of a claim by an employer against its employee for a breach of the duty of loyalty, which is grounded in agency principles. 9 See Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans , 150 Conn. 314 , 317-18, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) (employee breached duty of loyalty by soliciting employer's customers for his own competing business while still working for employer); Breen v. Larson College , 137 Conn. 152 , 153-55, 157, 75 A.2d 39 (1950) (academic dean breached duty of loyalty to college by secretly undermining administration's position as to poten

2017This court previously has recognized the viability of a claim by an employer against its employee for a breach of the duty of loyalty, which is grounded in agency principles. 9 See Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans , 150 Conn. 314 , 317-18, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) (employee breached duty of loyalty by soliciting employer's customers for his own competing business while still working for employer); Breen v. Larson College , 137 Conn. 152 , 153-55, 157, 75 A.2d 39 (1950) (academic dean breached duty of loyalty to college by secretly undermining administration's position as to poten

2017Co. v. Holloway , 51 Conn. 310 , 314-15 (1884) (insurance agent breached duty of loyalty to insurer by failing to remit premium payments as previously agreed).

2017Because we presume that the legislature was aware of the common-law Taylor rule and only altered the rule in some respects rather than making sweeping changes to it, and did so after the Supreme Court in Sheriff reaffirmed the viability of the rule, we recognize "only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice [on] which the common law is founded should be perpetuated." State v. Courchesne , 296 Conn. 622 , 669, 998 A.2d 1 (2010).

2017Because we presume that the legislature was aware of the common-law Taylor rule and only altered the rule in some respects rather than making sweeping changes to it, and did so after the Supreme Court in Sheriff reaffirmed the viability of the rule, we recognize "only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice [on] which the common law is founded should be perpetuated." State v. Courchesne , 296 Conn. 622 , 669, 998 A.2d 1 (2010).

2017This court previously has recognized the viability of a claim by an employer against its employee for a breach of the duty of loyalty, which is grounded in agency principles. 9 See Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans , 150 Conn. 314 , 317-18, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) (employee breached duty of loyalty by soliciting employer's customers for his own competing business while still working for employer); Breen v. Larson College , 137 Conn. 152 , 153-55, 157, 75 A.2d 39 (1950) (academic dean breached duty of loyalty to college by secretly undermining administration's position as to poten

2017This court previously has recognized the viability of a claim by an employer against its employee for a breach of the duty of loyalty, which is grounded in agency principles. 9 See Town & Country House & Homes Service, Inc. v. Evans , 150 Conn. 314 , 317-18, 189 A.2d 390 (1963) (employee breached duty of loyalty by soliciting employer's customers for his own competing business while still working for employer); Breen v. Larson College , 137 Conn. 152 , 153-55, 157, 75 A.2d 39 (1950) (academic dean breached duty of loyalty to college by secretly undermining administration's position as to poten

2010Sakal, P.C., 217 Conn. 361, 365 , 585 A.2d 1210 (1991). [29] The majority, in one instance of looking to extrajurisdictional jurisprudence for guidance, observes that "numerous other appellate courts have recognized the born alive rule and deemed it applicable to the then pending case solely on the basis of English common-law authority, other state cases, the writings of legal commentators or a combination thereof." What the majority declines to state, however, is that in three of the five cases cited, the rule was applied to absolve a defendant of criminal liability for the death of an unborn

2010Sakal, P.C., 217 Conn. 361, 365 , 585 A.2d 1210 (1991). [29] The majority, in one instance of looking to extrajurisdictional jurisprudence for guidance, observes that "numerous other appellate courts have recognized the born alive rule and deemed it applicable to the then pending case solely on the basis of English common-law authority, other state cases, the writings of legal commentators or a combination thereof." What the majority declines to state, however, is that in three of the five cases cited, the rule was applied to absolve a defendant of criminal liability for the death of an unborn

2010In fact, a report on P.A. 03-21 prepared by the legislature's office of legislative research indicates that the legislature, in making its determination, was well aware of the trial court's express reliance on the born alive rule in the present case, as well as the application of the rule by the court in State v. Anonymous (1986-1), supra, 40 Conn.Supp. at 498 , 516 A.2d 156 . [55] See Office of Legislative Research, Research *57 Report No. 2003-R-0488, "Assault of a Pregnant Woman and Murder" (June 30, 2003) (discussing present case and Anonymous , and specifically referring to fact that born

2010Hereinafter, all references to the fetal homicide bill are to Raised House Bill No. 5747. [31] As I previously discussed, the majority makes conflicting assertions with respect to this issue. [32] The majority's assertion that the legislature rejected the possibility of "abolishing the born alive rule and adopting a viability rule instead" because a report on the aggravated assault statute prepared by the office of legislative research "indicates that the legislature, in making its determination, was well aware of the trial court's express reliance on the born alive rule in the present case, a

2010See People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103 , 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226 , 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), cert. denied, 417 Mich. 1006 , 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87 , 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).

2010See People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103 , 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226 , 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), cert. denied, 417 Mich. 1006 , 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87 , 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).

2010See People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103 , 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226 , 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), cert. denied, 417 Mich. 1006 , 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87 , 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).

2010See People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103 , 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226 , 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), cert. denied, 417 Mich. 1006 , 334 N.W.2d 616 (1983); State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87 , 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989).

2009We agree with the Appellate Court majority's interpretation of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. at 429 n. 16, 820 A.2d 258 , in which we addressed the viability of the doctrine of superseding cause and specifically limited our abolishment of the doctrine "to the situation in cases ... wherein a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence." We made clear that "[o]ur conclusion does not necessarily affect those cases where the defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force o

2009We agree with the Appellate Court majority's interpretation of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. at 429 n. 16, 820 A.2d 258 , in which we addressed the viability of the doctrine of superseding cause and specifically limited our abolishment of the doctrine "to the situation in cases ... wherein a defendant claims that its tortious conduct is superseded by a subsequent negligent act or there are multiple acts of negligence." We made clear that "[o]ur conclusion does not necessarily affect those cases where the defendant claims that an unforeseeable intentional tort, force o

2003See, e.g., Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134,165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558-59 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 623-25 .

2003See, e.g., Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134,165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558-59 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 623-25 .

2003See, e.g., Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134,165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558-59 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 623-25 .

2003See, e.g., Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134,165 , 749 A.2d 1147 (2000); Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558-59 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Horton v. Meskill, supra, 623-25 .

1999"It is the general rule that a case resolves only those issues explicitly decided in the case." State v. Ouellette, 190 Conn. 84 , 91 , 459 A.2d 1005 (1983).

1999"It is the general rule that a case resolves only those issues explicitly decided in the case." State v. Ouellette, 190 Conn. 84 , 91 , 459 A.2d 1005 (1983).

1994Ed. 2d 371 (1991); and in State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1994), we determined that any error in this regard is not constitutional in nature.

1994Ed. 2d 371 (1991); and in State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529 , 643 A.2d 1213 (1994), we determined that any error in this regard is not constitutional in nature.

1977D.C.), and the further trend away from the viability threshold for recovery by children for prenatal injuries, observing (p. 561) that “seventeen jurisdictions now permit an action to be maintained for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries without regard to viability, and no jurisdiction which first seemed to limit recovery to those *147 instances involving a viable fetus has later denied recovery to a child who survived an injury suffered before it became viable.” The court’s statement confirming the two-step abandonment of the viability requirement by various jurisdictions was similarly ma