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11 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gentry v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences2013Those cases, particularly Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d 1241 (Ala.1993), adopted the viability distinction, at least in part, because of a misplaced deference to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). 2012Many state appellate courts have recognized that, except in the case of abortion, Roe does not limit state criminal or civil protection of the unborn child. 14 Justice Maddox explained this distinction in his dissent in Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d 1241,1247 (Ala.1993): “Roe and its progeny address the potential conflicts between a woman’s right to an abortion and the State’s interest in the woman’s health and the fetus’s life. | 1 | 2 |
Hamilton v. Scottgreen2 sentences2014In my special concurrence in Hamilton, 97 So.3d at 737-47 (Parker, J., concurring specially, joined by Stuart, Bo-lin, and Wise, JJ.), I explained why the viability standard is arbitrary 19 and should be abandoned altogether. 2014See Hamilton, 97 So.3d at 742-47 (Parker, J., concurring specially), for a discussion of why the viability standard delineated in Roe was, and remains, unsupportable. . | 1 | 1 |
Ankrom v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Ankrom, 152 So.3d at 405 . | 1 | 1 |
Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgangreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan , 601 So.2d 442 (Ala. 1992); S.S. 1997See, e.g., Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan, 601 So.2d 442 (Ala.1992); S.S. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Centergreen2 sentences1993See Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 203 Ill.App.3d 465 , 148 Ill.Dec. 567 , 560 N.E.2d 1164 (1990) (discussing Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 70, par. 2.2 as amended in 1980). 1993See Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 203 Ill.App.3d 465 , 148 Ill.Dec. 567 , 560 N.E.2d 1164 (1990) (discussing Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 70, par. 2.2 as amended in 1980). | 1 | 1 |
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shoresgreen2 sentences1993To allow recovery to the one born alive, who subsequently dies, and to deny recovery to the stillborn who was injured in the same accident is obviously ludicrous." 293 Ala. at 99 , 300 So.2d at 357 (citations omitted.) Contrary to the contention that the Eich-Wolfe-Huskey trilogy abrogated the viability requirement, a close reading of these cases reveals that viability was the commonindeed, the decisiveconsideration, in each case. 1993To allow recovery to the one born alive, who subsequently dies, and to deny recovery to the stillborn who was injured in the same accident is obviously ludicrous." 293 Ala. at 99 , 300 So.2d at 357 (citations omitted.) Contrary to the contention that the Eich-Wolfe-Huskey trilogy abrogated the viability requirement, a close reading of these cases reveals that viability was the commonindeed, the decisiveconsideration, in each case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wyeth, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama
green
2 sentences2018In Wyeth , supra, we clarified that the focus of an inquiry into standing is not on the ultimate viability of a claim, but on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the action. 42 So.3d at 1220 . 2018In Wyeth , supra, we clarified that the focus of an inquiry into standing is not on the ultimate viability of a claim, but on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the action. 42 So.3d at 1220 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bonbrest v. Kotz
green
2 sentences2012The viability standard was introduced into American law by Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C.1946), the first case to recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries. 2011For example, one commentator has noted that the viability standard, like the born-alive test, has outlived its usefulness: “While not every jurisdiction has stopped using the born-alive test first set out in Bonbrest [v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C.1946) ], most have abandoned the born alive rule, finding it stringent and unjust. | 2 | 2011–2012 |
MacK v. Carmack, 1091040 (Ala. 9-9-2011)
green
1 sentence2014In Mack , this Court expressed its recognition of the separate and distinct existence of unborn children by quoting Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327 , 280 So.2d 758 (1973): “ ‘ “[M]edical authority has recognized ... that the child is in existence from the moment of conception....’”” Mack, 79 So.3d at 602 (quoting Wolfe, 291 Ala. at 330 , 280 So.2d at 760 , quoting in turn Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 336 (4th ed.1971)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wolfe v. Isbell
green
2 sentences2014In Mack , this Court expressed its recognition of the separate and distinct existence of unborn children by quoting Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327 , 280 So.2d 758 (1973): “ ‘ “[M]edical authority has recognized ... that the child is in existence from the moment of conception....’”” Mack, 79 So.3d at 602 (quoting Wolfe, 291 Ala. at 330 , 280 So.2d at 760 , quoting in turn Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 336 (4th ed.1971)). 2014In Mack , this Court expressed its recognition of the separate and distinct existence of unborn children by quoting Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327 , 280 So.2d 758 (1973): “ ‘ “[M]edical authority has recognized ... that the child is in existence from the moment of conception....’”” Mack, 79 So.3d at 602 (quoting Wolfe, 291 Ala. at 330 , 280 So.2d at 760 , quoting in turn Prosser, Law of Torts, p. 336 (4th ed.1971)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences2013Those cases, particularly Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d 1241 (Ala.1993), adopted the viability distinction, at least in part, because of a misplaced deference to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). 2013Those cases, particularly Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So.2d 1241 (Ala.1993), adopted the viability distinction, at least in part, because of a misplaced deference to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
red
2 sentences2012Justice White explained the lack of foundation for the viability standard in his dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794-95 , 106 S.Ct. 2169 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting): “A second, equally basic error infects the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. 2012Justice White explained the lack of foundation for the viability standard in his dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794-95 , 106 S.Ct. 2169 , 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting): “A second, equally basic error infects the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pino v. United States
green
2 sentences2011The Pino court observed that maintaining the viability rule “would create the anomalous result of allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability for causing the death of a nonviable fetus while subjecting to liability the tortfeasor whose acts caused a nonfatal injury.” Pino, 183 P.3d at 1005 . 2011The Pino court also emphasized that interpreting Oklahoma’s wrongful-death statute as allowing causes of action for nonviable fetuses “is in keeping with the focus being placed not on a fetus’s status but on the tortious conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Minster
green
2 sentences2003The legislature may hold hearings on this matter; [it] can listen to the testimony of medical experts; and [it] may determine the viability of this rule in modern times." *Page 1063 Minster , 302 Md. at 245 -46 , 486 A.2d at 1199 -1200 . 2003The legislature may hold hearings on this matter; [it] can listen to the testimony of medical experts; and [it] may determine the viability of this rule in modern times." *Page 1063 Minster , 302 Md. at 245 -46 , 486 A.2d at 1199 -1200 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ex Parte Harris
green
2 sentences2002However, in Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co., 234 Ala. 313 , 174 So. 530 (1937), abrogation by statute on other grounds recognized, Ex parte Harris, 590 So.2d 285 (Ala.1991), the Court found the plaintiff's claim not covered by the Act, and yet upheld the injured employee's right to sue under a count described as asserting the "common-law duty to furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work." 234 Ala. at 315 , 174 So. at 531 . 2002However, in Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co ., 234 Ala. 313 , 174 So. 530 (1937), abrogation by statute on other grounds recognized , Ex parte Harris , 590 So.2d 285 (Ala. 1991), the Court found the plaintiff's claim not covered by the Act, and yet upheld the injured employee's right to sue under a count described as asserting the "common-law duty to furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work." 234 Ala. at 315 , 174 So. at 531 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences2002However, in Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co ., 234 Ala. 313 , 174 So. 530 (1937), abrogation by statute on other grounds recognized , Ex parte Harris , 590 So.2d 285 (Ala. 1991), the Court found the plaintiff's claim not covered by the Act, and yet upheld the injured employee's right to sue under a count described as asserting the "common-law duty to furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work." 234 Ala. at 315 , 174 So. at 531 . 2002However, in Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co ., 234 Ala. 313 , 174 So. 530 (1937), abrogation by statute on other grounds recognized , Ex parte Harris , 590 So.2d 285 (Ala. 1991), the Court found the plaintiff's claim not covered by the Act, and yet upheld the injured employee's right to sue under a count described as asserting the "common-law duty to furnish the plaintiff with a safe place to work." 234 Ala. at 315 , 174 So. at 531 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jordan v. Ala. Great Southern Railroad
neutral
2 sentences1997The Alabama Supreme Court first recognized that a corporation could be liable for malicious prosecution, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, in Jordan v. Alabama G.S.R.R. , 74 Ala. 85 (1883), and it has continued to recognize the viability of this claim. 1997The Alabama Supreme Court first recognized that a corporation could be liable for malicious prosecution, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, in Jordan v. Alabama G.S.R.R., 74 Ala. 85 (1883), and it has continued to recognize the viability of this claim. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Chupp v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1985In Chupp v. Henderson , 134 Ga. App. 808 , 216 S.E.2d 366 (1975), it was held that evidence of a driving record would be prejudicial and irrelevant in the resolution of issues presented on a claim based on respondeat superior, but that such evidence was not only relevant but essential to the viability of a claim of negligent entrustment. 1985In Chupp v. Henderson , 134 Ga. App. 808 , 216 S.E.2d 366 (1975), it was held that evidence of a driving record would be prejudicial and irrelevant in the resolution of issues presented on a claim based on respondeat superior, but that such evidence was not only relevant but essential to the viability of a claim of negligent entrustment. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.