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14 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Izzogreen2 sentences2004Regardless of the State's assertion of the *524 proper test for a facial vagueness challenge, the trial court's order did not discuss or acknowledge the first amendment facial vagueness standard, nor did it find the statute "incapable of any valid application" (see In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 299, 253 Ill.Dec. 699 , 745 N.E.2d 1233 ; Izzo, 195 Ill.2d at 112 , 253 Ill.Dec. 425 , 745 N.E.2d 548 ). 2004Regardless of the State's assertion of the *524 proper test for a facial vagueness challenge, the trial court's order did not discuss or acknowledge the first amendment facial vagueness standard, nor did it find the statute "incapable of any valid application" (see In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 299, 253 Ill.Dec. 699 , 745 N.E.2d 1233 ; Izzo, 195 Ill.2d at 112 , 253 Ill.Dec. 425 , 745 N.E.2d 548 ). | 3 | 5 |
City of Chicago v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2024The Wilson court also noted that: “The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties and specifically those without a scienter requirement because the consequences of imprecision are more severe. [Citation.] In order to succeed in a facial vagueness challenge, as opposed to an as-applied challenge, the vagueness must ‘permeate[ ] the text of such a law.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)). ¶ 135 Defendant here asserts that section 11-23 2018The Wilson court also noted: “The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties and specifically those without a scienter requirement because the consequences of imprecision are more severe. [Citation.] In order to succeed in a facial vagueness challenge, as opposed to an as- applied challenge, the vagueness must ‘permeate[ ] the text of such a law.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)) . ¶ 30 The plaintiffs have challenged the Ethics Ord | 3 | 4 |
People v. Holtgreen2 sentences2004See People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 112 (2001) (a defendant cannot challenge facial vagueness of statute not impheating first amendment freedoms unless statute is incapable of any valid application); Holt, 271 Ill. 2004See People v. Izzo, 195 Ill.2d 109, 112 , 253 Ill.Dec. 425 , 745 N.E.2d 548 (2001) (a defendant cannot challenge facial vagueness of statute not implicating first amendment freedoms unless statute is incapable of any valid application); Holt, 271 Ill.App.3d at 1026 , 208 Ill.Dec. 515 , 649 N.E.2d 571 (it is only when such statute is incapable of any valid application that it is unconstitutionally vague). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Einodergreen2 sentences2020People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004); cf. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555, 2557-58, 2561 (2015) (finding that, regardless of whether the statute was vague in all applications, it was unconstitutionally vague where it required courts to consider how a crime is ordinarily committed, rather than the specific facts of the crime or the elements of the crime); see also United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding “Johnson did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot be the on 2020People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004); cf. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 593, 596-98, 603 (2015) (finding that regardless of whether the statute was vague in all applications, it was unconstitutionally vague where it required courts to consider how a crime is ordinarily committed, rather than the specific facts of the crime or the elements of the crime); see also United States v. Cook, 2020 WL 4782067 , * at 3, 5, 7, __ F.3d. __, __ (7th Cir. 2020) (finding “Johnson did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot be the | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004); cf. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555, 2557-58, 2561 (2015) (finding that, regardless of whether the statute was vague in all applications, it was unconstitutionally vague where it required courts to consider how a crime is ordinarily committed, rather than the specific facts of the crime or the elements of the crime); see also United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding “Johnson did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot be the on 2020People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004); cf. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 593, 596-98, 603 (2015) (finding that regardless of whether the statute was vague in all applications, it was unconstitutionally vague where it required courts to consider how a crime is ordinarily committed, rather than the specific facts of the crime or the elements of the crime); see also United States v. Cook, 2020 WL 4782067 , * at 3, 5, 7, __ F.3d. __, __ (7th Cir. 2020) (finding “Johnson did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot be the | 2 | 2 |
In Re RCgreen2 sentences2004Regardless of the State's assertion of the *524 proper test for a facial vagueness challenge, the trial court's order did not discuss or acknowledge the first amendment facial vagueness standard, nor did it find the statute "incapable of any valid application" (see In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 299, 253 Ill.Dec. 699 , 745 N.E.2d 1233 ; Izzo, 195 Ill.2d at 112 , 253 Ill.Dec. 425 , 745 N.E.2d 548 ). 2004Regardless of the State's assertion of the *524 proper test for a facial vagueness challenge, the trial court's order did not discuss or acknowledge the first amendment facial vagueness standard, nor did it find the statute "incapable of any valid application" (see In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 299, 253 Ill.Dec. 699 , 745 N.E.2d 1233 ; Izzo, 195 Ill.2d at 112 , 253 Ill.Dec. 425 , 745 N.E.2d 548 ). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Blair Cookgreen1 sentence2020People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004); cf. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555, 2557-58, 2561 (2015) (finding that, regardless of whether the statute was vague in all applications, it was unconstitutionally vague where it required courts to consider how a crime is ordinarily committed, rather than the specific facts of the crime or the elements of the crime); see also United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding “Johnson did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot be the on | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Curtis
green
2 sentences2020Curtis, 407 Ill. 2020Curtis, 407 Ill. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences2012Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill.2d at 492 , 328 Ill.Dec. 892 , 905 N.E.2d 781 . 2012Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., 232 Ill.2d at 492 , 328 Ill.Dec. 892 , 905 N.E.2d 781 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Greco
green
2 sentences2004"In cases * * * that do not involve first amendment freedoms, due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute provides sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 416 , 274 Ill.Dec. 73 , 790 N.E.2d 846 . 2004"In cases * * * that do not involve first amendment freedoms, due process is satisfied if: (1) the statute's prohibitions are sufficiently definite, when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) the statute provides sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 416 , 274 Ill.Dec. 73 , 790 N.E.2d 846 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Normally, a facial vagueness challenge will be upheld only if the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. ( Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 489, 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 .) The United States Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that the standard of precision required of a statute is higher where, as here, the statute imposes criminal penalties. 1995Normally, a facial vagueness challenge will be upheld only if the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. ( Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 489, 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 .) The United States Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that the standard of precision required of a statute is higher where, as here, the statute imposes criminal penalties. | 2 | 1987–1995 |
Hill v. Colorado
green
1 sentence2024The Wilson court also noted that: “The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties and specifically those without a scienter requirement because the consequences of imprecision are more severe. [Citation.] In order to succeed in a facial vagueness challenge, as opposed to an as-applied challenge, the vagueness must ‘permeate[ ] the text of such a law.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)). ¶ 135 Defendant here asserts that section 11-23 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racism
green
1 sentence2018The Wilson court also noted: “The Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties and specifically those without a scienter requirement because the consequences of imprecision are more severe. [Citation.] In order to succeed in a facial vagueness challenge, as opposed to an as- applied challenge, the vagueness must ‘permeate[ ] the text of such a law.’ ” Id. ¶ 23 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)) . ¶ 30 The plaintiffs have challenged the Ethics Ord | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kolender v. Lawson
green
2 sentences1995That consideration has, at times, led the court "to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d at 910 n. 8. 1995That consideration has, at times, led the court "to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 359 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1859 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d at 910 n. 8. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Cartalino
green
2 sentences1993The defendant in People v. Cartalino (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 578 , 67 Ill.Dec. 426 , 444 N.E.2d 662 , made the same argument that defendant advances here, but the court rejected it, holding that: "Section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the Code * * * does not permit the court to impose a sentence of natural life solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense committed * * * without regard to a defendant's rehabilitative potential. [Citation omitted.] In determining a proper sentence for any felony, including murder, factors in aggravation and mitigation must be considered * * *." ( Cartalino, *1234 111 1993The defendant in People v. Cartalino (1982), 111 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Abernathy
green
1 sentence1993The defendant in People v. Cartalino (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 578 , 67 Ill.Dec. 426 , 444 N.E.2d 662 , made the same argument that defendant advances here, but the court rejected it, holding that: "Section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the Code * * * does not permit the court to impose a sentence of natural life solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense committed * * * without regard to a defendant's rehabilitative potential. [Citation omitted.] In determining a proper sentence for any felony, including murder, factors in aggravation and mitigation must be considered * * *." ( Cartalino, *1234 111 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.