facial vagueness challenge in Ohio

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022The vagueness doctrine is premised on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and “bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Id., quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 , 117 S.Ct. 1219 , 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). {¶15} Two requirements must be met to withstand a facial vagueness challenge: the ordinance must be sufficiently definite to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with adequate notice of the conduc

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2022Id. at ¶ 19. {¶16} In support of her facial challenge, Ms. Hammock relies on State v. Bielski, 2013-Ohio-5571 , 5 N.E.3d 1037 (7th Dist.), where the appellant was cited under a rubbish ordinance that read “[a]ll exterior property and premises, and the interior of every structure, shall be free from any accumulation of rubbish or garbage.” Id. at ¶ 15.

2022Id. {¶24} Ohio’s wiretapping statute is codified in R.C. 2933.51 et seq.

2022Id.

2006Ibid. {¶ 67} Though the Slagle court found that no custodial relationship existed in that case, it did leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could establish the existence of such a relationship upon "proof that the employer voluntarily assumed the additional responsibilities of a custodian towards the child." Ibid. {¶ 68} In the case of State v. Hayes (1987), 31 Ohio App.3d 40 , 31 OBR 56, 507 N.E.2d 1176 , the First Appellate District was confronted with a facial vagueness challenge to R.C. 2907.03 (A)(5).

2006Ibid. {¶ 67} Though the Slagle court found that no custodial relationship existed in that case, it did leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could establish the existence of such a relationship upon "proof that the employer voluntarily assumed the additional responsibilities of a custodian towards the child." Ibid. {¶ 68} In the case of State v. Hayes (1987), 31 Ohio App.3d 40 , 31 OBR 56, 507 N.E.2d 1176 , the First Appellate District was confronted with a facial vagueness challenge to R.C. 2907.03 (A)(5).

2002See Chicago v. Morales (1999), 527 U.S. 41 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 ; U.S. v. Powell (1975), 423 U.S. 87 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 . {¶ 17} At trial, the appellant's lawyer argued that CSZO 1488.02 was impermissibly vague when read in conjunction with CSZO 674.01 and 674.02, and such an argument might have been successful had the appellant in fact relied on the May 2000 letter when he cleared his property in July of 2000.

2002See Chicago v. Morales (1999), 527 U.S. 41 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 , 144 L.Ed.2d 67 ; U.S. v. Powell (1975), 423 U.S. 87 , 96 S.Ct. 316 , 46 L.Ed.2d 228 . {¶ 17} At trial, the appellant's lawyer argued that CSZO 1488.02 was impermissibly vague when read in conjunction with CSZO 674.01 and 674.02, and such an argument might have been successful had the appellant in fact relied on the May 2000 letter when he cleared his property in July of 2000.

1998To survive a facial vagueness challenge, the language of the law must clearly “ ‘delineate its reach in words of common understanding.’ ” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 , 92 S.Ct. at 2301 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 230 , quoting Cameron v. Johnson (1968), 390 U.S. 611, 616 , 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 , 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 187 .

1998To survive a facial vagueness challenge, the language of the law must clearly “ ‘delineate its reach in words of common understanding.’ ” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 , 92 S.Ct. at 2301 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 230 , quoting Cameron v. Johnson (1968), 390 U.S. 611, 616 , 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 , 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 187 .

1998To survive a facial vagueness challenge, the language of the law must clearly “ ‘delineate its reach in words of common understanding.’ ” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 , 92 S.Ct. at 2301 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 230 , quoting Cameron v. Johnson (1968), 390 U.S. 611, 616 , 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 , 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 187 .

1998To survive a facial vagueness challenge, the language of the law must clearly “ ‘delineate its reach in words of common understanding.’ ” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 , 92 S.Ct. at 2301 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 230 , quoting Cameron v. Johnson (1968), 390 U.S. 611, 616 , 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338 , 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 187 .