14 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dickerson v. Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2006The review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, see Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986); Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 83-84 (1985), although we have recognized that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution . . . .” Goodridge v. Department of Pub. 1988Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Hanrightgreen1 sentence2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Zinsergreen1 sentence2016We quote the term when so used, noting that the word, by contrast to “gay” or “same sex,” may carry a negative connotation for some. 18 Although we disfavor claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal of a defendant’s conviction, there is a narrow exception for a “claim of ineffective assistance [which] may be resolved on direct appeal . . . when the factual basis of the claim appears indisputably on the trial record.” Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006) (quotation and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smithkline Beecham Corporation v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen1 sentence2016Cf. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th Cir. 2014) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation under the Federal equal protection clause). 17 The word “homosexual” was used by counsel and the judge at trial. | 1 | 1 |
Opinion of the Justices to the Senategreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. King, supra ; Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 883, 886 (1977). 2011See Commonwealth v. King, supra; Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 883, 886 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kinggreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. King, supra ; Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 883, 886 (1977). 2011See Commonwealth v. King, supra; Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 883, 886 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Pfz Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez, Etc.green1 sentence2009This procedure allowed the plaintiff to present evidence on her behalf, and the plaintiff conceded at trial that the MIAA did not “curtail [her] presentation in any way.” The plaintiff’s complaints about the procedures employed by the MIAA, see note 18, supra, are not indicative of the kind of “egregious procedural irregularities or abuse of power . . . conceivably rising to the level of a federal equal protection violation.” PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Zeller v. Cantugreen1 sentence2006The review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, see Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986); Zeller v. Cantu, 395 Mass. 76, 83-84 (1985), although we have recognized that “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution . . . .” Goodridge v. Department of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Thomsongreen1 sentence2002Although the plaintiffs’ alternative plan meets Federal equal protection requirements, Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (less than 10% maximum deviation), art. 101’s requirement that the Legislature achieve population equality “as nearly as may be” leaves the Legislature with considerable discretion to seek closer approximation to population equality than is required by the Federal equal protection clause. | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. COMMR. OF THE DEPT. OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTSgreen1 sentence1997Accidents, 415 Mass. 218, 226 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 165 (1994) (stating that the Federal equal protection clause “essentially mandates that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,’ ” quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 [1985]). | 1 | 1 |
Sinn v. Board of Selectmen of Actongreen1 sentence1997Sinn v. Selectmen of Acton, 357 Mass. 606, 611 (1970) (“The equal protection requirement precludes irrational treatment of people similarly situated”). | 1 | 1 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.green1 sentence1997Accidents, 415 Mass. 218, 226 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 165 (1994) (stating that the Federal equal protection clause “essentially mandates that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,’ ” quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 [1985]). | 1 | 1 |
Hortencia Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Indianagreen2 sentences1987It has been said that the central purpose of the Federal equal protection clause, "made clear by its wording, is to *697 prevent states from withdrawing legal protection from minorities." Bohen v. East Chicago, supra at 1190 (Posner, J., concurring). 1987It has been said that the central purpose of the Federal equal protection clause, “made clear by its wording, is to prevent states from withdrawing legal protection from minorities.” Bohen v. East Chicago, supra at 1190 (Posner, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bastarachegreen1 sentence1981See Commonwealth v. Bastarache, supra at 96 . 12 If geographical groups are not distinct *330 enough for those broader Sixth Amendment challenges, surely they are also insufficiently distinct as a basis for the Federal equal protection challenge here. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Castaneda v. Partida
green
2 sentences1984The defendants satisfied the second and final prerequisite of a prima facie case under a Federal equal protection claim, the judge held, because stipulations and evidence presented by the Commonwealth conclusively showed that the Essex County grand jury selection procedure was “susceptible of abuse or . . . not racially neutral.” See Castaneda v. Partida, supra at 494 . 1982Castaneda, supra at 494 . | 2 | 1982–1984 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Garrison v. Dougherty
green
1 sentence2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Freeman
green
1 sentence2024"Our 'review of an equal protection claim under the Massachusetts Constitution is generally the same as the review of a Federal equal protection claim, . . . although we have recognized that the Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution.'" Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81 , 86 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 472 Mass. 503 , 505 n.5, (2015). 18 S.C., 486 Mass. 801 (2021). "'The effect of the felony-murder rule,' both for principals and accomplices, '[was] to substitute the intent to commit the underly | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Graham v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2011This court has twice, in noting the existence of an overlap between art. 106 and the Federal equal protection clause, included citation to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ( Graham ), where the United States Supreme Court held alienage to be a suspect classification. 2011This court has twice, in noting the existence of an overlap between art. 106 and the Federal equal protection clause, included citation to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Graham), where the United States Supreme Court held alienage to be a suspect classification. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Murphy v. COMMR. OF THE DEPT. OF INDUS. ACCIDENTS
green
1 sentence1997Accidents, 415 Mass. 218, 226 (1993), S.C., 418 Mass. 165 (1994) (stating that the Federal equal protection clause “essentially mandates that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,’ ” quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 [1985]). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Snowden v. Hughes
green
1 sentence1996The reference in Snowden to the requirement of an “element of intentional or purposeful discrimination,” id. at 8 , which the plaintiff quotes in his brief, in context refers to actions that evidence some constitutionally improper classification, as in racially based exclusions from a jury or “a systematic under-valuation of the property of some taxpayers and systematic overvaluation of the property of others, so that the practical effect of the official breach of law is the same as though the discrimination were incorporated in and proclaimed by the statute” (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Tregor v. Board of Assessors of Boston
green
1 sentence1980For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the municipal average limitation on property tax abatements and its retroactive application, as limited to abatement proceedings for fiscal year 1980, evidence a constitutionally permissible legislative response to the potential erosion of municipal revenues mandated by the most favored class remedy of Tregor v. Assessors of Boston, 377 Mass. 602 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979), and to a need for a more stable distribution of local property tax burdens pending Statewide revaluation of real property to full and fair cash value. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Gabauer v. Woodcock
green
1 sentence1980For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the municipal average limitation on property tax abatements and its retroactive application, as limited to abatement proceedings for fiscal year 1980, evidence a constitutionally permissible legislative response to the potential erosion of municipal revenues mandated by the most favored class remedy of Tregor v. Assessors of Boston, 377 Mass. 602 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979), and to a need for a more stable distribution of local property tax burdens pending Statewide revaluation of real property to full and fair cash value. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.