federal equal protection clause in Washington

2014See Smith, 117 Wn.2d at 283 (Utter, J., concurring). ¶12 Despite the historical and textual differences, Washington courts often construed article I, section 12 consistent with the federal equal protection clause for most of the latter half of the previous century.

2014See, e.g., State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 281 , 814 P.2d 652 (1991).

2020In Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, we recognized that article I, section 12 is more protective than the federal equal protection clause and in certain situations, requires an independent analysis. 150 Wn.2d 791 , 805-12, 83 P.3d 419 (2004).

2014In Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 145 Wn.2d 702, 735 , 42 P.3d 394 (2002) (Grant County I), rev’d in part, 150 Wn.2d 791 , 812, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) (Grant County II), however, we also recognized that article I, section 12 differed from and was more protective than the federal equal protection clause and required a very different analysis in certain situations.

2003See Harris v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 120 Wn.2d 461 , 476 n.10, 843 P.2d 1056 (1993); Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wn.2d 167, 192 , 822 P.2d 162 (1991).

2003See Harris v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 120 Wn.2d 461 , 476 n.10, 843 P.2d 1056 (1993); Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wn.2d 167, 192 , 822 P.2d 162 (1991).

2008Id. at 94, 163 P.3d 757 . ś 54 We must determine whether the right to smoke in a private facility is a privilege or immunity protected by article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. [29] The privileges and immunities clause is concerned both with "`avoiding favoritism'" and "`preventing discrimination,'" the latter being the primary purpose of the federal equal protection clause. [30] Andersen, 158 Wash.2d at 14, 138 P.3d 963 (quoting Grant County II, 150 Wash.2d at 808, 83 P.3d 419 ).

2008Id. at 94 . ¶54 We must determine whether the right to smoke in a private facility is a privilege or immunity protected by article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. 29 The privileges and immunities clause is concerned both with “ ‘avoiding favoritism’ ” and “ ‘preventing discrimination,’ ” the latter being the primary purpose of the federal equal protection clause. 30 Andersen, 158 Wn.2d at 14 (quoting Grant County II, 150 Wn.2d at 808).

2014In Grant County Fire Protection District No.5 v. City ofMoses Lake, 145 Wn.2d 702,735 , 42 P.3d 394 (2002) (Grant County I), rev 'd in part by Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 812 , 83 P.3d 419 (2004) (Grant County II), however, we also recognized that article I, section 12 differed from and was more protective than the federal equal protection clause and required a very different .analysis in certain situations.

2014In Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 145 Wn.2d 702, 735 , 42 P.3d 394 (2002) (Grant County I), rev’d in part, 150 Wn.2d 791 , 812, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) (Grant County II), however, we also recognized that article I, section 12 differed from and was more protective than the federal equal protection clause and required a very different analysis in certain situations.

2008Id. at 94, 163 P.3d 757 . ś 54 We must determine whether the right to smoke in a private facility is a privilege or immunity protected by article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. [29] The privileges and immunities clause is concerned both with "`avoiding favoritism'" and "`preventing discrimination,'" the latter being the primary purpose of the federal equal protection clause. [30] Andersen, 158 Wash.2d at 14, 138 P.3d 963 (quoting Grant County II, 150 Wash.2d at 808, 83 P.3d 419 ).

2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91

2023See Coria, 120 Wn.2d at 169 (citing W ASH.

1993See Foley v. Department of Fisheries, 119 Wn.2d 783 , 837 P.2d 14 (1992) (citing Burlington Northern R.R. v. Ford, ___ U.S. ___, 119 L.Ed.2d 432 , 112 S.Ct. 2184, 2186 (1992)); see also State v. Coria, 120 Wn.2d 156, 171-72 , 839 P.2d 190 (1992)).

2011State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F.Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y.1967)). ¶ 8 Eugster does not make a federal equal protection claim.

2011But... ‘[t]he State judiciary, unlike the legislature, is not the organ responsible for achieving representative government.’ ” Id. at 455-56 (quoting N. Y State Ass’n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)). ¶8 Eugster does not make a federal equal protection claim.

2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91

2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91

2006“Ordinarily inconsistency with our ‘privileges and immunities’ clause implies inconsistency with the federal equal protection clause.” City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 114 Wn.2d 213, 233 , 787 P.2d 39 (1990).

2006“Ordinarily inconsistency with our ‘privileges and immunities’ clause implies inconsistency with the federal equal protection clause.” City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 114 Wn.2d 213, 233 , 787 P.2d 39 (1990).

2013A trial court denies equal protection if it administers a valid law '''in a manner that unjustly discriminates between similarly situated persons.'" State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 289 , 796 P.2d 1266 (1990) (quoting State v. Chelan County Sheriff's Oep't, 110 Wn.2d 806 , 811, 756 P.2d 736 (1988)); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S. Ct. 1064 , 30 L.

2013A trial court denies equal protection if it administers a valid law '''in a manner that unjustly discriminates between similarly situated persons.'" State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 289 , 796 P.2d 1266 (1990) (quoting State v. Chelan County Sheriff's Oep't, 110 Wn.2d 806 , 811, 756 P.2d 736 (1988)); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S. Ct. 1064 , 30 L.

1999In support of this assertion, the dissenting justice primarily relies upon the following sources: (1) dicta in Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wn.2d 58 , 922 P.2d 788 (1996); (2) a concurring opinion in State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263 , 814 P.2d 652 (1991); and (3) Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn.2d 859 , 540 P.2d 882 (1975).

1999In support of this assertion, the dissenting justice primarily relies upon the following sources: (1) dicta in Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wn.2d 58 , 922 P.2d 788 (1996); (2) a concurring opinion in State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263 , 814 P.2d 652 (1991); and (3) Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn.2d 859 , 540 P.2d 882 (1975).

2025However, we reiterated that while there are differences in the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause, “these differences do not require an independent state analysis; ʻthis court has repeatedly found these provisions substantially similar and treated them accordingly.ʼ” DeYoung, 136 Wn.2d 136 at 142 (quoting Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 788 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997)). 35 No. 103627-2 (cons. w/ No. 103673-6) (Mungia, J., dissenting) because “the miniscule number of claims subject to the repose provision renders the relationship of the classification too a

2000Co., 133 Wash.2d 954, 976 , 948 P.2d 1264 (1997), the court noted that although the textual differences between article 1, section 12 and the federal equal protection clause do not compel an independent state analysis, the differences "suggest we should not foreclose the possibility that there may be a context where the state privileges and immunities clause should be independently examined[.]" Accord DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 142 , 960 P.2d 919 .

2013A trial court denies equal protection if it administers a valid law '''in a manner that unjustly discriminates between similarly situated persons.'" State v. Handley, 115 Wn.2d 275, 289 , 796 P.2d 1266 (1990) (quoting State v. Chelan County Sheriff's Oep't, 110 Wn.2d 806 , 811, 756 P.2d 736 (1988)); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S. Ct. 1064 , 30 L.

2008Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 . [16] RCW 9.94A.010 (emphasis added). [17] Shilling, 77 Wash.App. at 175 n. 4, 889 P.2d 948 . [18] CONST. art.