78 California opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2025 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2024The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ [Citations.] ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’ ” (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189 , 195 (Jackson).) “To succeed on an equal protection claim, [Munoz] must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 195 2022The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ [Citations.] ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’” (People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189 , 195 (Jackson).) “To succeed on an equal protection claim, appellants must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 1 | 3 | 9 |
Manduley v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2023The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’ (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .)” (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) Thus, the first prong of an equal protection analysis requires us to determine whether “‘“‘the state has ad 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 2 | 8 |
People v. Chatmangreen2 sentences2024In this case, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were 3 “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 ; Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p, 287 [“Though [our Supreme Court’s] analysis of state constitutional requirements sometimes deviates from how comparable federal requirements are analyzed, [its] precedent has not distinguished the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences associated with different 2023The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’ (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .)” (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) Thus, the first prong of an equal protection analysis requires us to determine whether “‘“‘the state has ad | 2 | 7 |
People v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 2 | 3 |
People v. Turnagegreen2 sentences2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 2 | 3 |
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.green2 sentences2016(See Hi-Voltage, at p. 567.) Like the plurality in Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469 , however, we held out the possibility that the federal equal protection clause might sometimes require race-conscious remedies to remedy intentional discrimination. 2016(Coral Construction, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 332, 335.) With respect to remand on the federal compulsion issue, the Court offered the following comments: “While the parties have not brought to our attention any decision ordering a governmental entity to adopt race-conscious public contracting policies under the compulsion of the federal equal protection clause, the relevant decisions hold open the possibility that race-conscious measures might be required as a remedy for purposeful discrimination in public contracting. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568 [‘Where the state or a political | 2 | 3 |
Clark v. Jetergreen2 sentences2013(Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 ; Orr v. Orr (1979) 440 U.S. 268, 279 .) To withstand intermediate scrutiny under the federal equal protection clause, 13 “‘“The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 531 .) Therefore, “‘[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more simil 2008Under these circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine "`whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.'" ( People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ].) [55] As we noted in Hernandez, supra, 41 Cal.4th 279, 299 , footnote 12: "In applying the federal equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a third standard `intermediate scrutiny'`to discriminatory clas | 2 | 3 |
Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doegreen2 sentences2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 2 | 2 |
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2016(Coral Construction, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 332, 335.) With respect to remand on the federal compulsion issue, the Court offered the following comments: “While the parties have not brought to our attention any decision ordering a governmental entity to adopt race-conscious public contracting policies under the compulsion of the federal equal protection clause, the relevant decisions hold open the possibility that race-conscious measures might be required as a remedy for purposeful discrimination in public contracting. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568 [‘Where the state or a political 2016(Coral Construction, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 332, 335.) With respect to remand on the federal compulsion issue, the Court offered the following comments: “While the parties have not brought to our attention any decision ordering a governmental entity to adopt race-conscious public contracting policies under the compulsion of the federal equal protection clause, the relevant decisions hold open the possibility that race-conscious measures might be required as a remedy for purposeful discrimination in public contracting. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568 [‘Where the state or a political | 2 | 2 |
Michael M. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013(Clark v. Jeter (1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461 ; Orr v. Orr (1979) 440 U.S. 268, 279 .) To withstand intermediate scrutiny under the federal equal protection clause, 13 “‘“The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 531 .) Therefore, “‘[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more simil 2008Appeals Bd. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 395, 400 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 293 , 563 P.2d 849 ]; Michael M. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 608, 610-611 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 340 , 601 P.2d 572 ]; Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 527, 564 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 85 P.3d 67 ]), and have not applied an intermediate scrutiny standard under equal protection principles in any case involving a suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification. [56] At the time the Gay Law Students decision was rendered, the applicable California statute prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of s | 2 | 2 |
Bowens v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011As against a full-on attack based on the federal equal protection clause, the Bowens majority reasoned that the matter was reviewable under a rational basis standard, and, on such a standard, the denial of preliminary hearings to indicted defendants was quite reasonable, including (as we ourselves have noted above) the state’s legitimate interests in protecting the privacy of innocent persons and deterring flight from the jurisdiction. ( 1 Cal.4th at p. 43, fn. 3 .) As against a sideways argument to the effect that, despite the plain language of California Constitution article 1, section 14.1, 2008In Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 42 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 , 820 P.2d 600 ], in discussing the factors that are relevant under the federal equal protection clause to the issue of suspect classification, the court explained: “The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether ‘[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness | 2 | 2 |
Frontiero v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2008In Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 42 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 , 820 P.2d 600 ], in discussing the factors that are relevant under the federal equal protection clause to the issue of suspect classification, the court explained: “The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether ‘[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness 2008In Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 42 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 , 820 P.2d 600 ], in discussing the factors that are relevant under the federal equal protection clause to the issue of suspect classification, the court explained: “The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether ‘[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness | 2 | 2 |
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirbygreen2 sentences2008Under these circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine “ ‘whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.’ ” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ].) As we noted in Hernandez, supra, 41 Cal.4th 279, 299 , footnote 12: “In applying the federal equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a third standard—■ ‘intermediate scrutiny’—‘to discriminatory classif 2008Under these circumstances, there is no question but that these two categories of individuals are sufficiently similar to bring into play equal protection principles that require a court to determine "`whether distinctions between the two groups justify the unequal treatment.'" ( People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1200 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 , 129 P.3d 29 ].) [55] As we noted in Hernandez, supra, 41 Cal.4th 279, 299 , footnote 12: "In applying the federal equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a third standard `intermediate scrutiny'`to discriminatory clas | 2 | 2 |
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2008In Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 42 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 , 820 P.2d 600 ], in discussing the factors that are relevant under the federal equal protection clause to the issue of suspect classification, the court explained: “The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether ‘[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness 2008In Bowens v. Superior Court (1991) 1 Cal.4th 36, 42 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 376 , 820 P.2d 600 ], in discussing the factors that are relevant under the federal equal protection clause to the issue of suspect classification, the court explained: “The determination of whether a suspect class exists focuses on whether ‘[t]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have [any] of the traditional indicia of suspectness: [such as a class] saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Fuentesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Serrano v. Priestgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 1 | 9 |
People v. Lairdgreen2 sentences2024In this case, the trial court found that consecutive sentences were 3 “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 ; Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p, 287 [“Though [our Supreme Court’s] analysis of state constitutional requirements sometimes deviates from how comparable federal requirements are analyzed, [its] precedent has not distinguished the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences associated with different 2023The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when ‘the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.’ (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; see Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) ‘The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.’ (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .)” (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) Thus, the first prong of an equal protection analysis requires us to determine whether “‘“‘the state has ad | 1 | 9 |
Johnson v. Department of Justicegreen2 sentences2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t 2021The right to equal protection of the laws is violated when “the government . . . treat[s] a [similarly situated] group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 ; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 .) “ ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects t | 1 | 3 |
Powers v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1994(See also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] [peremptory challenges based solely on race violated the federal equal protection clause where defendant is member of race being challenged]; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 411 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 ] [defendant, regardless of race, has standing to object to racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges].) “We begin with the proposition that in any given instance the presumption must be that a party exercising a peremptory challenge is doing so on a constitutionally permissible ground.” (Peop 1994(See also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] [peremptory challenges based solely on race violated the federal equal protection clause where defendant is member of race being challenged]; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 411 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 ] [defendant, regardless of race, has standing to object to racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges].) “We begin with the proposition that in any given instance the presumption must be that a party exercising a peremptory challenge is doing so on a constitutionally permissible ground.” (Peop | 1 | 3 |
Las Lomas Land Company, LLC v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2023I, § 7, subd. (a)) provide that persons 32 who are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of a law must be treated alike under the law.” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 857 (Las Lomas).) Although “[e]qual protection challenges typically involve claims of discrimination against an identifiable class or group of persons[,] . . . a plaintiff who does not allege membership in a class or group may state a claim as a ‘ “class of one.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562, 564 .) A “class of one” claim r 2015Equal Protection “The federal equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) . . . provide[s] that persons who are similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of a law must be treated alike under the law.” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 857 .) An equal protection claim is sufficient if the plaintiff alleges: (1) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from other similarly situated persons; and (2) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Mohigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Regents of the University of California v. Bakkegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Brown v. Merlogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| CORAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. City and County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clements v. Fashinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peterson v. City of San Diegogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Calderon v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| LEGAL SERVICES FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN v. Bowengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Orr v. Orrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rundlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2014In People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , our Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross- section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79 reached the same 13 conclusion based on the federal equal protection clause. 2014In People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , our Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross- section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79 reached the same 13 conclusion based on the federal equal protection clause. | 8 | 1986–2014 |
People v. Wheeler
green
2 sentences2015In Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , our Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Batson reached the same conclusion based on the federal equal protection clause. 2015In Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258 , our Supreme Court stated, “[w]e conclude that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Batson reached the same conclusion based on the federal equal protection clause. | 7 | 1984–2015 |
California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 , citing California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208 .) “The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause.” (People v. Laird, at p. 469.) “The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment. [Citation.] ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification th 2020(People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 , citing California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208 .) California’s equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. | 4 | 2018–2020 |
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech
green
2 sentences2007While valid zoning regulations may affect competition and have other economic effects, a city does not have carte blanche to exclude a retail merchant that it, or some of its residents, do not like.” ( 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 .) Nothing in Friends of Davis *298 suggests that a city may not use its zoning power to limit a particular type of commercial activity in one or more parts of the city in order to protect and preserve the economic viability of the city’s downtown commercial district. 12 In applying the federal equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a third 2007While valid zoning regulations may affect competition and have other economic effects, a city does not have carte blanche to exclude a retail merchant that it, or some of its residents, do not like.” ( 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 .) Nothing in Friends of Davis *298 suggests that a city may not use its zoning power to limit a particular type of commercial activity in one or more parts of the city in order to protect and preserve the economic viability of the city’s downtown commercial district. 12 In applying the federal equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied a third | 3 | 2007–2023 |
People v. Huggins
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 226 .) When a defendant asserts at trial the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges violates the federal Constitution because they are based on race, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. 2015(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 226 .) When a defendant asserts at trial the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges violates the federal Constitution because they are based on gender, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. | 3 | 2014–2015 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
2 sentences2025One Person, One Vote In addition to prohibiting racially motivated district boundaries, the federal equal protection clause also embodies the concept that “ ‘the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters’ ” and the related idea that “ ‘every voter is equal to every other voter in his [or her] State.’ ” (Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 558 .) Under the principle of one person, one vote, states and local governments must be “apportioned substantially on an equal basis for the purpose of electing legislative representatives.” (Griswold v. County of San Diego (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 2012The most obvious problem with the 2001 map concerns the principle of “one person, one vote,” under both the federal equal protection clause (as construed in, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 506 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 ]) and under California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d)(1). | 2 | 2012–2025 |
People v. JEHA
green
2 sentences2022The Legislature may make reasonable classifications of persons and other activities, provided the classifications are based upon some legitimate object to be accomplished.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jeha (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073 .) “ ‘The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated equally.’ ” (People v. Valencia 4 Stuckey does not differentiate between the state and federal Constitutions or suggest the equal protection analysis under either should differ. 2022The Legislature may make reasonable classifications of persons and other activities, provided the classifications are based upon some legitimate object to be accomplished.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jeha (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073 .) “ ‘The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate purposes must be treated equally.’ ” (People v. Valencia 4 Stuckey does not differentiate between the state and federal Constitutions or suggest the equal protection analysis under either should differ. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Martinez
green
2 sentences2018We review an equal protection claim de novo. ( California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 .) The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 571-572, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) For a successful equal protection claim, Laird must show the state classifies two similarly situated groups in an unequal way. ( Harris, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 60 .) We consider whether the identified groups are sim 2018We review an equal protection claim de novo. ( California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 .) The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 571-572, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) For a successful equal protection claim, Laird must show the state classifies two similarly situated groups in an unequal way. ( Harris, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 60 .) We consider whether the identified groups are sim | 2 | 2015–2018 |
Cooley v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018We review an equal protection claim de novo. ( California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 .) The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 571-572, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) For a successful equal protection claim, Laird must show the state classifies two similarly situated groups in an unequal way. ( Harris, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 60 .) We consider whether the identified groups are sim 2018We review an equal protection claim de novo. ( California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177 , 208, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 , 254 P.3d 1019 .) The California equal protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection clause. ( Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537 , 571-572, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168 , 41 P.3d 3 .) For a successful equal protection claim, Laird must show the state classifies two similarly situated groups in an unequal way. ( Harris, supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 60 .) We consider whether the identified groups are sim | 2 | 2013–2018 |
Associated General Contractors Of California, Inc. v. City And County Of San Francisco
green
2 sentences2016(Associated General Contractors of California v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 922 , 944.) Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court determined that Richmond, Virginia’s MBE set-asides violated equal protection. 2010In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the City's 1984 ordinance violated the federal equal protection clause (U.S. *321 Const., 14th Amend.) in giving preferences based on race, and that it also violated the City's own charter in several respects. ( Associated General Contractors of California v. City & County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 922 , 944.) Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court determined that Richmond, Virginia's MBE set-asides violated equal protection. ( Richmond v. J. | 2 | 2010–2016 |
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
green
2 sentences2016No. 1 (1982) 458 U.S. 457 (the political structure doctrine) and (3) given the City’s pervasive past discrimination in public contracting, the Ordinance was a remedial measure required by the federal equal protection clause and thus exempt from the mandate of section 31. 2010Section 31 declares that the state, including its political subdivisions, "shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." (§ 31, subd. (a).) The next year, the Ninth Circuit held section 31 did not violate the federal equal protection clause, as interpreted in the political structure cases (e.g., Seattle, supra, 458 U.S. 457 & Hunter, supra, 393 U.S. 385 ), and vacated a preliminary injunction against secti | 2 | 2010–2016 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.