indictment violation in Missouri

1982State v. Macone, 593 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.App.1980), State v. Crossman, 464 S.W.2d 36 (Mo.1971).

1982State v. Macone, 593 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.App.1980), State v. Crossman, 464 S.W.2d 36 (Mo.1971).

1972This contention is ruled by Morgan v. State, Mo., 472 S.W.2d 373 . (d) The reading of the informations was expressly waived by appellant in open court. (e) The record does not affirmatively show a reading of the indictment or a waiver of the reading thereof at the time the plea of guilty was entered.

1967State v. Feasel, Mo., 344 S.W.2d 1 . c. 45.

1936These facts are not like those in State v. Barr, 326 Mo. 1095, 1101 , 34 S. W. (2d) 477, 479 , where it was held the erroneous substitution of an information for an indictment was error on the face of the record proper and need not be preserved *310 in the bill of exceptions.

1936These facts are not like those in State v. Barr, 326 Mo. 1095, 1101 , 34 S. W. (2d) 477, 479 , where it was held the erroneous substitution of an information for an indictment was error on the face of the record proper and need not be preserved *310 in the bill of exceptions.

1912In the case of State v. Quinn, 94 Mo. App. 1 . c. 66, 67 S. W. 974 , it is said: “It is a general rule of procedure that if one is indicted under one section of' a statute and the evidence shows that he is not guilty of a violation of that section but is guilty of the violation of another section, he may be convicted of a violation under the section of which the evidence shows-, him guilty, provided the indictment is broad enough to include the offense within its allegation.” This case was certified to the Supreme Court and was sustained ( 170 Mo. 176 , 70 S. W. 1117 ).

1912In the case of State v. Quinn, 94 Mo. App. 1 . c. 66, 67 S. W. 974 , it is said: “It is a general rule of procedure that if one is indicted under one section of' a statute and the evidence shows that he is not guilty of a violation of that section but is guilty of the violation of another section, he may be convicted of a violation under the section of which the evidence shows-, him guilty, provided the indictment is broad enough to include the offense within its allegation.” This case was certified to the Supreme Court and was sustained ( 170 Mo. 176 , 70 S. W. 1117 ).

1912In the case of State v. Quinn, 94 Mo. App. 1 . c. 66, 67 S. W. 974 , it is said: “It is a general rule of procedure that if one is indicted under one section of' a statute and the evidence shows that he is not guilty of a violation of that section but is guilty of the violation of another section, he may be convicted of a violation under the section of which the evidence shows-, him guilty, provided the indictment is broad enough to include the offense within its allegation.” This case was certified to the Supreme Court and was sustained ( 170 Mo. 176 , 70 S. W. 1117 ).

1912In the case of State v. Quinn, 94 Mo. App. 1 . c. 66, 67 S. W. 974 , it is said: “It is a general rule of procedure that if one is indicted under one section of' a statute and the evidence shows that he is not guilty of a violation of that section but is guilty of the violation of another section, he may be convicted of a violation under the section of which the evidence shows-, him guilty, provided the indictment is broad enough to include the offense within its allegation.” This case was certified to the Supreme Court and was sustained ( 170 Mo. 176 , 70 S. W. 1117 ).

1910As the indictment with the exception of the name of the defendant is practically a rescript of the indictments approved in State v. Cummings, 206 Mo. l. c. 616, 623, and State v. Tiernan, 223 Mo. 142 , it is deemed unnecessary to reproduce it in this opinion, besides the indictment is not challenged by counsel for the defendant.

1909The indictment does not in so many words allege that the law was adopted by the people of the county, but it does allege that defendant “did then and there in violation of article 3 of chapter 22 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, commonly called the Local Option Law, which law was legally approved by the people of Dallas county and went into force and effect in said county on the 15th day of June, 1906, which law has been in effect from and since said date and is at this time in force . . . did then and there unlawfully sell,” etc. It is held that “An indictment for the violation of act of Legi

1909The indictment does not in so many words allege that the law was adopted by the people of the county, but it does allege that defendant “did then and there in violation of article 3 of chapter 22 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, commonly called the Local Option Law, which law was legally approved by the people of Dallas county and went into force and effect in said county on the 15th day of June, 1906, which law has been in effect from and since said date and is at this time in force . . . did then and there unlawfully sell,” etc. It is held that “An indictment for the violation of act of Legi

1905In State v. Heckler, 81 Mo. 417 , it was ruled that under an indictment for a violation of the dramshop act prohibiting the sale of spiritous liquors on Sunday by a dramshop-keeper, if the evidence failed to show that he had a license as a dramshop-keeper, he might nevertheless'be convicted under section 2243, supra (then section 1581, Revised Statutes 1879).

1905A like ruling was made in State v. Kurtz, 64 Mo. App. 123 .

1904As that section specifically defines the persons, .the embezzle- * ment of whose money, goods, and rights in action shall constitute an offense under that section, it has been held that it is necessary to allege if the property belongs to a partnership, the membership of the partnership, and if a corporation, that it is a corporation. [State v. Patterson, 159 Mo. 98 ; State v. Jones, 168 Mo. 398 ; State v. Horned, 178 Mo. 59 .] But this indictment is drawn under section 1918 which makes it embezzlement for any officer or member of any benevolent organization to convert to his own use in any ma

1904As that section specifically defines the persons, .the embezzle- * ment of whose money, goods, and rights in action shall constitute an offense under that section, it has been held that it is necessary to allege if the property belongs to a partnership, the membership of the partnership, and if a corporation, that it is a corporation. [State v. Patterson, 159 Mo. 98 ; State v. Jones, 168 Mo. 398 ; State v. Horned, 178 Mo. 59 .] But this indictment is drawn under section 1918 which makes it embezzlement for any officer or member of any benevolent organization to convert to his own use in any ma

1904As that section specifically defines the persons, .the embezzle- * ment of whose money, goods, and rights in action shall constitute an offense under that section, it has been held that it is necessary to allege if the property belongs to a partnership, the membership of the partnership, and if a corporation, that it is a corporation. [State v. Patterson, 159 Mo. 98 ; State v. Jones, 168 Mo. 398 ; State v. Horned, 178 Mo. 59 .] But this indictment is drawn under section 1918 which makes it embezzlement for any officer or member of any benevolent organization to convert to his own use in any ma

1903In State v. Krueger, 134 Mo. 262 , where the indictment was for a violation of section 374, Revised Statutes 1889, of the election law, a felony, the court held that an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient only where all the facts which constitute the offense are set forth in the statute.

1895In refusing the instruction asked, the circuit court-was governed, doubtless, by the cases of State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78 , and State v. Searcy, 46 Mo. App.421, which, hold that, where the defense to an indictment for a violation of the dramshop law is that the intoxicant was sold by the defendant in the capacity of a druggist or pharmacist, it devolves on the accused to show that the sale was made in compliance with the requirements of the druggist law (Chapter 58, Revised Statutes, 1889), that is, for medical purposes and under a prescription issued by a registered and practicing physician, H

1895In refusing the instruction asked, the circuit court-was governed, doubtless, by the cases of State v. Moore, 107 Mo. 78 , and State v. Searcy, 46 Mo. App.421, which, hold that, where the defense to an indictment for a violation of the dramshop law is that the intoxicant was sold by the defendant in the capacity of a druggist or pharmacist, it devolves on the accused to show that the sale was made in compliance with the requirements of the druggist law (Chapter 58, Revised Statutes, 1889), that is, for medical purposes and under a prescription issued by a registered and practicing physician, H