indictment waiver in South Carolina

2018State v. Smalls, 364 S.C. 343, 347 , 613 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2005).

2018State v. Smalls, 364 S.C. 343, 347 , 613 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2005).

2010See Gentry , 363 S.C. at 101 -02 n.6, 610 S.E.2d at 499 n.6 ("We note that a presentment of an indictment or a waiver of presentment is not needed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court.

2010See Gentry , 363 S.C. at 101 -02 n.6, 610 S.E.2d at 499 n.6 ("We note that a presentment of an indictment or a waiver of presentment is not needed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court.

2010However, an indictment is needed to give notice to the defendant of the charge(s) against him."); Evans v. State , 363 S.C. 495, 509 , 611 S.E.2d 510, 518 (2005) (citations omitted) ("A defendant has a constitutional right to demand that a grand jury which is properly established and constituted under the law consider the criminal allegations against him . . . . [However,] such a challenge does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court."); State v. Smalls , 364 S.C. 343, 346 , 613 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2005) ("Although an indictment does not confer subject matter jurisdicti

2010However, an indictment is needed to give notice to the defendant of the charge(s) against him."); Evans v. State , 363 S.C. 495, 509 , 611 S.E.2d 510, 518 (2005) (citations omitted) ("A defendant has a constitutional right to demand that a grand jury which is properly established and constituted under the law consider the criminal allegations against him . . . . [However,] such a challenge does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court."); State v. Smalls , 364 S.C. 343, 346 , 613 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2005) ("Although an indictment does not confer subject matter jurisdicti

2000See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533 , 466 S.E.2d 367 (1996) (vacating conviction where stalking statute was expressly repealed and new statute substituted in its place, and the repealing act did not contain a saving clause); State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965) (upholding the dismissal of an indictment for violation of obscenity statute where new obscenity statute became effective after alleged violation but before trial; act containing new statute did not contain saving clause and was broad enough in scope to repeal previous statute); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 355-56 , 181

2000See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533 , 466 S.E.2d 367 (1996) (vacating conviction where stalking statute was expressly repealed and new statute substituted in its place, and the repealing act did not contain a saving clause); State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965) (upholding the dismissal of an indictment for violation of obscenity statute where new obscenity statute became effective after alleged violation but before trial; act containing new statute did not contain saving clause and was broad enough in scope to repeal previous statute); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 355-56 , 181

2000Criminal Law § 29 (1989) (general rule is that repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause ends prosecution and punishment); see also Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316, 318-19 , 360 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1987) (stating in tort *147 case that “[t]he general rule is that the repeal of a statute operates retrospectively, and has the effect of blotting the statute out completely as if it had never existed and of putting an end to all proceedings under it which have not been prosecuted to final judgment”).

2000Criminal Law § 29 (1989) (general rule is that repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause ends prosecution and punishment); see also Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316, 318-19 , 360 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1987) (stating in tort *147 case that “[t]he general rule is that the repeal of a statute operates retrospectively, and has the effect of blotting the statute out completely as if it had never existed and of putting an end to all proceedings under it which have not been prosecuted to final judgment”).

2000See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533 , 466 S.E.2d 367 (1996) (vacating conviction where stalking statute was expressly repealed and new statute substituted in its place, and the repealing act did not contain a saving clause); State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965) (upholding the dismissal of an indictment for violation of obscenity statute where new obscenity statute became effective after alleged violation but before trial; act containing new statute did not contain saving clause and was broad enough in scope to repeal previous statute); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 355-56 , 181

2000See State v. Rider, 320 S.C. 533 , 466 S.E.2d 367 (1996) (vacating conviction where stalking statute was expressly repealed and new statute substituted in its place, and the repealing act did not contain a saving clause); State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555 , 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965) (upholding the dismissal of an indictment for violation of obscenity statute where new obscenity statute became effective after alleged violation but before trial; act containing new statute did not contain saving clause and was broad enough in scope to repeal previous statute); State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 355-56 , 181

1976The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offenses.” Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871); Accord, Callanan v. U. S., 364 U. S. 587 , 81 S. Ct. 321 , 5 L.

1976The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offenses.” Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871); Accord, Callanan v. U. S., 364 U. S. 587 , 81 S. Ct. 321 , 5 L.

1976The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offenses.” Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871); Accord, Callanan v. U. S., 364 U. S. 587 , 81 S. Ct. 321 , 5 L.