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48 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1883–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490 , 493-94(1)– (2) ( 659 SE2d 875 ) (2008) (a challenge to the validity of an indictment is a challenge to the ensuing conviction); Planet Ins. 2026See Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490 , 493-94(1)– (2) ( 659 SE2d 875 ) (2008) (a challenge to the validity of an indictment is a challenge to the ensuing conviction); Planet Ins. | 12 | 12 |
Planet Insurance v. Ferrellgreen2 sentences2026Co. v. Ferrell, 228 Ga. App. 264, 266 ( 491 SE2d 471 ) (1997) (pleadings, motions, and orders must be “construed according to their substance and function and not merely as to their nomenclature”). 2026Co. v. Ferrell, 228 Ga. App. 264, 266 ( 491 SE2d 471 ) (1997) (pleadings, motions, and orders must be “construed according to their substance and function and not merely as to their nomenclature”). | 2 | 2 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 149 (3) ( 816 SE2d 646 ) (2018); Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490, 494 (2) ( 659 SE2d 875 ) (2008). 2024See Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 149 (3) ( 816 SE2d 646 ) (2018); Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490, 494 (2) ( 659 SE2d 875 ) (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Hardrickgreen2 sentences2016Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 54-55 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 2016Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 54-55 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2024On sufficiency review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to defend against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (II) (136 SCt 709, 193 LE2d 639) (2016) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-15; other cita- tion and punctuation omitted). 37 Here, the State elected to allege in Count 1 of the indictment that in violation of OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), McCullum “did with malice aforethought cause the death 2024On sufficiency review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to defend” against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (II) ( 136 SCt 709 , 193 LE2d 639) (2016) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-15 (III) (A)) (ci- tation and punctuation omitted). 37 Here, the State elected to allege in Count 1 of the indictment that in violation of OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), McCullum “did with malice aforethought cause t | 1 | 3 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2011Higgen-bottom filed a notice of appeal on May 12, 2010, and on January 10, 2011, this Court vacated the judgment of the superior court denying *200 the motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial on the basis that the superior court’s order contained insufficient findings for appellate review, and remanded the case to the superior court for its entry of an order including findings in accordance with Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972). 2011See also Doggett, 505 U. S. at 650, 653 (treating Doggett’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy trial right, without mention of any demand for trial, as an assertion of the right); Barker, 407 U. S. at 528 (rejecting the view that a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial entirely by failing to file a formal demand for trial or for the period before such a demand if one is eventually filed). | 1 | 2 |
Musacchio v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024On sufficiency review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to defend against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (II) (136 SCt 709, 193 LE2d 639) (2016) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-15; other cita- tion and punctuation omitted). 37 Here, the State elected to allege in Count 1 of the indictment that in violation of OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), McCullum “did with malice aforethought cause the death 2024On sufficiency review, a reviewing court makes a limited inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to defend against the charge against him and a jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (II) (136 SCt 709, 193 LE2d 639) (2016) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314-15; other cita- tion and punctuation omitted). 37 Here, the State elected to allege in Count 1 of the indictment that in violation of OCGA § 16-5-1 (a), McCullum “did with malice aforethought cause the death | 1 | 1 |
State v. Heathgreen2 sentences2023Indeed, with special demurrers (which must be brought before jeopardy attaches), the State can “usually re-indict before trial unless the statute of limitations for the crimes with which the defendant was charged bars the prosecution . . . or the re-indictment is prohibited under OCGA § 17-7-53.1, which disallows prosecution after two indictments charging the same offenses have been quashed.” State. v. Heath, 308 Ga. 836, 840 ( 843 SE2d 801 ) (2020). 10 2023Indeed, with special demurrers (which must be brought before jeopardy attaches), the State can “usually re-indict before trial unless the statute of limitations for the crimes with which the defendant was charged bars the prosecution . . . or the re-indictment is prohibited under OCGA § 17-7-53.1, which disallows prosecution after two indictments charging the same offenses have been quashed.” State. v. Heath, 308 Ga. 836, 840 ( 843 SE2d 801 ) (2020). 10 | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Ga. July 16, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for bill of particulars with regard to firearm-possession count of indictment when defendant could not explain how indictment failed “to provide sufficient factual detail to enable him to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for a subsequent prosecution of the same offense, as the indictment clearly identifies each firearm by make, model, type, and serial number”); see supra note 12 & accompanying text. 19 The quashing of an indictment “merely bars trial on the flawed indictment; 2023Ga. July 16, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for bill of particulars with regard to firearm-possession count of indictment when defendant could not explain how indictment failed “to provide sufficient factual detail to enable him to rely upon a judgment under the indictment as a bar against double jeopardy for a subsequent prosecution of the same offense, as the indictment clearly identifies each firearm by make, model, type, and serial number”); see supra note 12 & accompanying text. 19 The quashing of an indictment “merely bars trial on the flawed indictment; | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. the Stategreen2 sentences2020This Court expressly rejected this indictment framework in Hunt v. State, concluding that the defendant’s sentences must merge where, as in the present case, the crimes occurred within a certain range of dates and the State was unable to make the date a material averment because the specific dates were unknown. 336 Ga. App. 821, 825 (1) ( 783 SE2d 456 ) (2016). 2020This Court expressly rejected this indictment framework in Hunt v. State, concluding that the defendant’s sentences must merge where, as in the present case, the crimes occurred within a certain range of dates and the State was unable to make the date a material averment because the specific dates were unknown. 336 Ga. App. 821, 825 (1) ( 783 SE2d 456 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
The State v. Harlachergreen2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corhengreen2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
The State v. Garleppgreen2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Stategreen1 sentence2017But agreeing to attend drug court is not a ‘sentence.’ It is a pre-trial intervention contract in which the defendant agrees to attend drug court in exchange for the opportunity to avoid having a conviction on his record.”); Armstrong, 281 Ga. App. at 298-99 (affirming denial of plea in bar and holding that because superior court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute offense without an indictment or waiver of indictment, subsequent prosecution for that offense in a court of competent jurisdiction was “not barred on the basis of double jeopardy or prior prosecution” because jeopardy had not attached | 1 | 1 |
Dominick v. Bowdoingreen1 sentence2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 876 ( 287 SE2d 7 ) (1982) (holding that denial of timely filed plea of double jeopardy *656 is appealable without resort to interlocutory appeal procedures). 2017See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 876 ( 287 SE2d 7 ) (1982) (holding that denial of timely filed plea of double jeopardy *656 is appealable without resort to interlocutory appeal procedures). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Horsleygreen2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nwobugreen1 sentence2017But agreeing to attend drug court is not a ‘sentence.’ It is a pre-trial intervention contract in which the defendant agrees to attend drug court in exchange for the opportunity to avoid having a conviction on his record.”); Armstrong, 281 Ga. App. at 298-99 (affirming denial of plea in bar and holding that because superior court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute offense without an indictment or waiver of indictment, subsequent prosecution for that offense in a court of competent jurisdiction was “not barred on the basis of double jeopardy or prior prosecution” because jeopardy had not attached | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brannangreen2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc.green2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 759, 760 (1) ( 652 SE2d 836 ) (2007). 2015See Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 759, 760 (1) ( 652 SE2d 836 ) (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Gillespie v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Gillespie v. State, 311 Ga. App. 442, 444-445 (3) ( 715 SE2d 832 ) (2011). 2013See Gillespie v. State, 311 Ga. App. 442, 444-445 (3) ( 715 SE2d 832 ) (2011). | 1 | 1 |
Beard v. Stategreen2 sentences2013A rational trier of fact could find from the stipulated facts that despite Jenkins’s testimony that his payment to Kenerly concerning the Grayson Hill/Silver Oaks property was unrelated to the Rabbit Hill property (in essence, that the money was not given to influence Kenerly’s official action before the BOC regarding the Rabbit Hill property), Kenerly in fact received, accepted, or agreed to receive $1 million to arrange for the purchase of the Rabbit Hill property to Jenkins’s benefit.28 And since the existence, execution, and timing of the agreement were unknown to the state before February 2013A rational trier of fact could find from the stipulated facts that despite Jenkins’s testimony that his payment to Kenerly concerning the Grayson Hill/Silver Oaks property was unrelated to the Rabbit Hill property (in essence, that the money was not given to influence Kenerly’s official action before the BOC regarding the Rabbit Hill property), Kenerly in fact received, accepted, or agreed to receive $1 million to arrange for the purchase of the Rabbit Hill property to Jenkins’s benefit.28 And since the existence, execution, and timing of the agreement were unknown to the state before February | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011See also Doggett, 505 U. S. at 650, 653 (treating Doggett’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy trial right, without mention of any demand for trial, as an assertion of the right); Barker, 407 U. S. at 528 (rejecting the view that a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial entirely by failing to file a formal demand for trial or for the period before such a demand if one is eventually filed). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Matthewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brinkley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cash v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Sauvinetgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hurtado v. Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mangham v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stonaker
green
2 sentences1982In State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976), we held that if the accused made a request to charge on a lesser offense included in the crime charged in the indictment it is error for the court to fail to so charge where the evidence warrants such a charge. 1982In State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 ( 222 SE2d 354 ) (1976), we held that if the accused made a request to charge on a lesser offense included in the crime charged in the indictment it is error for the court to fail to so charge where the evidence warrants such a charge. | 2 | 1976–1982 |
Hudson v. State
neutral
2 sentences1955Hudson v. State, 91 Ga. 553 ( 18 S. E. 432 ).” The Supreme Court in Maher v. State, 53 Ga. 448 (21 Am. 1912Hudson v. State, 91 Ga. 553 ( 18 S. E. 432 ). | 2 | 1912–1955 |
Schuman v. State
green
2 sentences2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( 2017GACDL and the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia (“DAAG”) both did so, and we express our sincere appreciation to both associations for their thoughtful and scholarly submissions. 6 See State v. Corhen, 306 Ga. App. 495, 496 ( 700 SE2d 912 ) (2010). 7 Id. at 496-97 (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. 9, 10 ( 783 SE2d 411 ) (2016). 8 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Harlacher, 336 Ga. App. at 10 . 9 State v. Horsley, 310 Ga. App. 324, 325 (2) ( 714 SE2d 1 ) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 10 Id. (punctuation omitted). 11 See State v. Brannan, 267 Ga. 315, 317, n.4 ( | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Neuman v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 501-510 . 2 that the defendant “be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” and the Fifth Amendment’s indictment requirement ensuring that a grand jury return an indictment only when it finds probable cause to support all the essential elements of the offense. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Higgenbottom v. State
green
2 sentences2011Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429 ( 704 SE2d 786 ) (2011). 2011Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429 ( 704 SE2d 786 ) (2011). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Lively
green
2 sentences2011The Court of Appeals properly stated that his fugitive time did not count against the State, but it did not address whether that delay should be weighed heavily against Porter or whether the facts regarding his fugitive status might allow the trial court to attribute less weight to the issue. (3) Assertion of the Right to Speedy Trial Relying on State v. Lively, 155 Ga. App. 402 ( 270 SE2d 812 ) (1980), the State contends that Porter never properly asserted his right to a speedy trial, because a motion to dismiss an indictment for violation of speedy trial rights, absent a demand for trial, sh 2011The Court of Appeals properly stated that his fugitive time did not count against the State, but it did not address whether that delay should be weighed heavily against Porter or whether the facts regarding his fugitive status might allow the trial court to attribute less weight to the issue. (3) Assertion of the Right to Speedy Trial Relying on State v. Lively, 155 Ga. App. 402 ( 270 SE2d 812 ) (1980), the State contends that Porter never properly asserted his right to a speedy trial, because a motion to dismiss an indictment for violation of speedy trial rights, absent a demand for trial, sh | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Moss v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Woods v. State green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| McCane v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Morgan v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Gould v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Campbell v. State neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Whitus v. Georgia green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Norris v. Alabama green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Patton v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Pierre v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Hill v. Texas green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Chambers v. Florida green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Crumb v. State green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Finnegan v. State green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Jackson v. Denno green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Waller v. State neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Nalls v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Maher v. State green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Cole v. State green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Haney v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Cohen v. State green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Flint v. State green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Sarah v. State green | 1 | 1883–1883 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.