indictment violation in California

1968Persons already incarcerated in prison will not suffer imprisonment during delay.” And in People v. Aguirre (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 577 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 477 ] (which involved a prisoner at San Quentin) it was held that a delay of one year between the commission of the offense and the issuance of the indictment was not a violation of due process or of article I, section 13 of the state Constitution since the rights of a person in custody to a speedy trial were governed by section 1381 of the Penal Code.

1968Persons already incarcerated in prison will not suffer imprisonment during delay.” And in People v. Aguirre (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 577 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 477 ] (which involved a prisoner at San Quentin) it was held that a delay of one year between the commission of the offense and the issuance of the indictment was not a violation of due process or of article I, section 13 of the state Constitution since the rights of a person in custody to a speedy trial were governed by section 1381 of the Penal Code.

2016Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of the bar against multiple prosecutions set forth in Penal Code section 654 and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 409 P.2d 206 ] (Kellett).

2016Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as a violation of the bar against multiple prosecutions set forth in Penal Code section 654 and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett).

1968(See also People v. Ragsdale (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 676 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 640 ].) As the record here indicates that at all times defendant was a prisoner and in custodia legis, he was not “arrested” within the meaning of Penal Code sections 821, 825 and 851.5. (.People v. Graham, (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 617, 621 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 134 ]; People v. Goss (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 720, 724 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 569 ].) Since defendant’s rights were governed solely by section 1381 of the Penal Code, his contention that he was denied the right to be taken before a magistrate without undue delay is also without merit.

1968(See also People v. Ragsdale (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 676 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 640 ].) As the record here indicates that at all times defendant was a prisoner and in custodia legis, he was not “arrested” within the meaning of Penal Code sections 821, 825 and 851.5. (.People v. Graham, (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 617, 621 [ 18 Cal. Rptr. 134 ]; People v. Goss (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 720, 724 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 569 ].) Since defendant’s rights were governed solely by section 1381 of the Penal Code, his contention that he was denied the right to be taken before a magistrate without undue delay is also without merit.

1963In People v. Huerta, 148 Cal.App.2d 272 [ 306 P.2d 505 ], an indictment for violation of section 11500, Health and Safety Code, as it then read, was amended during the course of trial by striking the narcotic therein described, which was marijuana, and substituting the words “a preparation of heroin.” In sustaining the right to make this amendment the court stated (p. 275) : “Where the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged or prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights, it is permitted. [Citation.] ” In People v. O’Moore, 83 Cal.App.2d 586 [ 189 P.2d 554 ], the indictmen

1963In People v. Huerta, 148 Cal.App.2d 272 [ 306 P.2d 505 ], an indictment for violation of section 11500, Health and Safety Code, as it then read, was amended during the course of trial by striking the narcotic therein described, which was marijuana, and substituting the words “a preparation of heroin.” In sustaining the right to make this amendment the court stated (p. 275) : “Where the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged or prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights, it is permitted. [Citation.] ” In People v. O’Moore, 83 Cal.App.2d 586 [ 189 P.2d 554 ], the indictmen

1963In People v. Huerta, 148 Cal.App.2d 272 [ 306 P.2d 505 ], an indictment for violation of section 11500, Health and Safety Code, as it then read, was amended during the course of trial by striking the narcotic therein described, which was marijuana, and substituting the words “a preparation of heroin.” In sustaining the right to make this amendment the court stated (p. 275) : “Where the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged or prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights, it is permitted. [Citation.] ” In People v. O’Moore, 83 Cal.App.2d 586 [ 189 P.2d 554 ], the indictmen

1963In People v. Huerta, 148 Cal.App.2d 272 [ 306 P.2d 505 ], an indictment for violation of section 11500, Health and Safety Code, as it then read, was amended during the course of trial by striking the narcotic therein described, which was marijuana, and substituting the words “a preparation of heroin.” In sustaining the right to make this amendment the court stated (p. 275) : “Where the amendment does not change the nature of the offense charged or prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights, it is permitted. [Citation.] ” In People v. O’Moore, 83 Cal.App.2d 586 [ 189 P.2d 554 ], the indictmen

1995(Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine may also apply to sentencing statutes. “[V]ague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [Citations.]” (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114 , 123 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 ].) For example, in United States v. Evans (1948) 333 U.S. 483 [ 92 L.Ed. 823 , 68 S.Ct. 634 ], the United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for violation of the Immigration Act for concealing and harboring illegal aliens due to t

1995(Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine may also apply to sentencing statutes. “[V]ague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [Citations.]” (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114 , 123 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 ].) For example, in United States v. Evans (1948) 333 U.S. 483 [ 92 L.Ed. 823 , 68 S.Ct. 634 ], the United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for violation of the Immigration Act for concealing and harboring illegal aliens due to t

1995(Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine may also apply to sentencing statutes. “[V]ague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [Citations.]” (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114 , 123 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 ].) For example, in United States v. Evans (1948) 333 U.S. 483 [ 92 L.Ed. 823 , 68 S.Ct. 634 ], the United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for violation of the Immigration Act for concealing and harboring illegal aliens due to t

1995(Ibid.) The vagueness doctrine may also apply to sentencing statutes. “[V]ague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [Citations.]” (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114 , 123 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 755, 764 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 ].) For example, in United States v. Evans (1948) 333 U.S. 483 [ 92 L.Ed. 823 , 68 S.Ct. 634 ], the United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment for violation of the Immigration Act for concealing and harboring illegal aliens due to t

1983That may be true, but his chances of learning of his mistake before the statute of limitations had run would have been far greater if the answer on behalf of Sanitary District had never been filed in the first place. *248 Our holding is not an indictment of defense counsel who by fortuitous circumstances had the opportunity to represent his client in a manner sanctioned by Wright v. Redwood Theatres, Inc., supra, 49 Cal.App.2d 403 .

1978Appellant initially contends that the district attorney made several improper comments to the grand jury during the indictment hearing, which violated appellant’s rights under Penal Code section 939.7 and his Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ].

1978Appellant initially contends that the district attorney made several improper comments to the grand jury during the indictment hearing, which violated appellant’s rights under Penal Code section 939.7 and his Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 ].

1974(Cf., People v. Provencher, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 546, 550 .) The amendment of the indictment was an error favorable to defendant because of the lesser potential maximum added sentence under section 12022.

1972(United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 324 [ 30 L.Ed.2d at p. 481 , 92 S.Ct. at p. 465 ].) The court stated “[t]o accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case.” (United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 325 [ 30 L.Ed.2d at p. 481 , 92 S.Ct. at pp, 465-466].) In People v. Gilmore, 239 Cal.App.2d 125, 129 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 449 ], the court adopted the due process test for pre-arrest delay enunciated in Powell v. United States 3 (1965) 352 F.2d 705, 70

1972(United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 324 [ 30 L.Ed.2d at p. 481 , 92 S.Ct. at p. 465 ].) The court stated “[t]o accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case.” (United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 325 [ 30 L.Ed.2d at p. 481 , 92 S.Ct. at pp, 465-466].) In People v. Gilmore, 239 Cal.App.2d 125, 129 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 449 ], the court adopted the due process test for pre-arrest delay enunciated in Powell v. United States 3 (1965) 352 F.2d 705, 70

1970Our opinion (Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 500 ]) was filed on July 17, 1970.

1970Our opinion (Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 675 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 500 ]) was filed on July 17, 1970.

1967In United States v. Luros, 243 P.Supp. 160 (cert, denied, *929 382 U.S. 956 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 433 ]), the court indicated that the sole function of the motion to dismiss the indictment is to test the sufficiency of the indictment to charge an offense, that the sufficiency of the indictment must be determined from the words of the indictment, that the court is not free to consider evidence not appearing on the face of the indictment and that all well pleaded facts are taken to be true.

1967In United States v. Luros, 243 P.Supp. 160 (cert, denied, *929 382 U.S. 956 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 433 ]), the court indicated that the sole function of the motion to dismiss the indictment is to test the sufficiency of the indictment to charge an offense, that the sufficiency of the indictment must be determined from the words of the indictment, that the court is not free to consider evidence not appearing on the face of the indictment and that all well pleaded facts are taken to be true.

1967In United States v. Luros, 243 P.Supp. 160 (cert, denied, *929 382 U.S. 956 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 361 , 86 S.Ct. 433 ]), the court indicated that the sole function of the motion to dismiss the indictment is to test the sufficiency of the indictment to charge an offense, that the sufficiency of the indictment must be determined from the words of the indictment, that the court is not free to consider evidence not appearing on the face of the indictment and that all well pleaded facts are taken to be true.

1961The court pointed out that a person who was already in custody could not logically be arrested, as arrest means taking a person into custody, and that the rights of a person in custody to a speedy trial were governed by section 1381 of the Penal Code (Osmulski v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.2d 444 [ 337 P.2d 520 ]).

1961The court pointed out that a person who was already in custody could not logically be arrested, as arrest means taking a person into custody, and that the rights of a person in custody to a speedy trial were governed by section 1381 of the Penal Code (Osmulski v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.2d 444 [ 337 P.2d 520 ]).

1927In McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76 [ 41 L.

1927In McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76 [ 41 L.

1925It will be equivalent to a verdict of not guilty on such counts.” (Guenther v. People, 24 N. Y. 100 .) It follows, therefore, in the present action, that the appellant was not acquitted of the assignments of perjury set forth in the first indictment by the failure of the jury to render a verdict upon the charges contained therein.

1925(People v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 .) It is also contended by appellant that the court erred in permitting the reopening of the People’s case in chief for the purpose of recalling the prosecuting witness, after the district attorney had announced the close of his case in chief for the People and counsel for defendant had moved the court to advise the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. *654 This contention is wholly without merit.

1919(People v. Arras, 89 Cal. 223 , [ 26 Pac. 766 ].) [7] Section 954 of the Penal Code permits the charging. of different offenses in different counts of the same indictment, where the different offenses all relate to the same act, transaction, or event.

1919(People v. Arras, 89 Cal. 223 , [ 26 Pac. 766 ].) [7] Section 954 of the Penal Code permits the charging. of different offenses in different counts of the same indictment, where the different offenses all relate to the same act, transaction, or event.

1919(People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256 , [ 66 Pac. 229 ; People v. Handley, 100 Cal. 370 , [ 34 Pac. 853 ] ; People v. Newton, 11 Cal. App. 762 , [ 106 Pac. 247 ].) [6] Where the acquittal of the defendant under the indictment would be no bar to the further prosecution of the offense, a variance would be material, but where the discrepancy does not affect the validity of the indictment or prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant in his defense, the variance is immaterial.

1919(People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256 , [ 66 Pac. 229 ; People v. Handley, 100 Cal. 370 , [ 34 Pac. 853 ] ; People v. Newton, 11 Cal. App. 762 , [ 106 Pac. 247 ].) [6] Where the acquittal of the defendant under the indictment would be no bar to the further prosecution of the offense, a variance would be material, but where the discrepancy does not affect the validity of the indictment or prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant in his defense, the variance is immaterial.