indictment bar in Texas

2005Cf. Sodipo, 815 S.W.2d at 556 (finding a defendant preserved his claim by specifically objecting to the indictment error).

2005Cf. Sodipo , 815 S.W.2d at 556 (finding a defendant preserved his claim by specifically objecting to the indictment error).

2002Bonner v. State, 15 S.W. at 821 (stating that though a prior indictment does not bar a subsequent one for the same offense, the accused can only be tried upon one).

2001Bonner v. State , 15 S.W. at 821 (stating that though a prior indictment does not bar a subsequent one for the same offense, the accused can only be tried upon one).

2003Butler v. State , 928 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).

2003Butler v. State, 928 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d).

2002The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a party to an offense may be charged with that offense without alleging in the indictment the facts that make him a party to the offense. (11) More recently Judge Keller stated, "an indictment authorizes conviction on the law of parties even though the indictment's wording indicates that the defendant personally committed the criminal acts alleged." Planter v. State , 9 S.W.3d 156, 162 (Tex. Crim.

2002The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a party to an offense may be charged with that offense without alleging in the indictment the facts that make him a party to the offense. 11 More recently Judge Keller stated, “an indictment authorizes conviction on the law of parties even though the indictment’s wording indicates that'the defendant personally committed the criminal acts alleged.” Planter v. State, 9 S.W.3d 156, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (Keller, J., dissenting).

1995Freeman v. State, 707 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

1995Freeman v. State, 707 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

2023Wright, 28 S.W.3d at 531–32 (“We need not determine whether the amendment to the indictment was indeed effective or whether the trial court erred in denying appellant ten days to prepare for trial [pursuant to article 28.10].

2014See Dukes v. State, 239 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d) (discussing Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526 , 531–32 (Tex. Crim.

2010Likewise, in Thomas v. State, 2 S.W.3d 640 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.), Thomas claimed the trial court's failure to delete a deadly weapon allegation from the indictment was error because the same allegation was used to raise the charged offense from misdemeanor assault to felony assault under Section 22.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. [6] In overruling this point of error, the court relied on the reasoning used in Martinez , finding it to be persuasive.

2010Likewise, in Thomas v. State, 2 S.W.3d 640 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.), Thomas claimed the trial court’s failure to delete a deadly weapon allegation from the indictment was error because the same allegation was used to raise the charged offense from misdemeanor assault to felony assault under Section 22.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. 6 In overruling this point of error, the court relied on the reasoning used in Martinez , finding it to be persuasive.

2024Id. at 941, 947 (recognizing that “[t]he statutes authorizing pretrial proceedings do not contemplate a “minitrial” on the merits of allegations made in the charging instrument”).

2018State v. Rosenbaum, 910 S.W.2d 934, 937-38 (Tex. Crim.

2022PROC. art. 28.05 (titled “Quashing indictment in felony” and addressing only a motion to set aside an indictment and an exception to the indictment); State v. Salinas, 982 S.W.2d 9, 11, n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (“The Code of Criminal Procedure uses the terminology ‘motion to set aside’ rather than ‘motion to quash’ and ‘motion to dismiss,’ even though these designations are common in practice.”).

2022PROC. art. 28.05 (titled “Quashing indictment in felony” and addressing only a motion to set aside an indictment and an exception to the indictment); State v. Salinas, 982 S.W.2d 9, 11, n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (“The Code of Criminal Procedure uses the terminology ‘motion to set aside’ rather than ‘motion to quash’ and ‘motion to dismiss,’ even though these designations are common in practice.”).

2008Metts v. State, 22 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (holding that in matters of evidence, the trial court’s decision can be upheld by any legitimate ground).

2008Metts v. State , 22 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (holding that in matters of evidence, the trial court’s decision can be upheld by any legitimate ground).

2003Ex parte Hunter , 604 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex. Crim.

2003Ex parte Hunter, 604 S.W.2d 188,190 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).

1999This is the first prong of the two-step analysis established by Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), required for the submission of a lesser included offense. 6 See also Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672-73 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919 , 114 S.Ct. 313 , 126 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (clarifying Royster as to the rational findings of the jury); Tex.Code Crim.

1999This is the first prong of the two-step analysis established by Royster v. State , 622 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. Crim.

2023Either way, the gist of his argument is the same: he does not claim that the charge misstated the law but rather that the law itself—the rule that the State was not bound to the dates alleged in the indictments and recited in the jury charges—resulted in Double Jeopardy violations. 35 Stephenson raises this as his third, fourth, and fifth issues—one for each of the counts of sexual assault—in cause numbers 02-22-00101-CR, 02-22-00103-CR, 02-22- 00105-CR, and 02-22-00106-CR. 36 Stephenson, too, indirectly acknowledges that the dates of his alleged offenses do not in fact overlap. 33 It is well

1999Relying on Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973), which stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution for the identical criminal act and not the same offense by name, and Walker v. State, 473 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971), which provided that Double Jeopardy bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial, we concluded that "trial upon an indictment does not bar every offense that could be prosecuted under its language; instead, trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial." Goodbread

2025On April 10th, the date jury selection had been scheduled, defense counsel filed a motion to set aside the indictment for a violation of Uhl’s speedy-trial right and argued during a pretrial hearing that there was a potential Brady issue concerning Father’s suicide, which “develop[ed] the possibility of an alternative perpetrator.” See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring State to disclose on request material evidence favorable to defendant). 5 In its order, the trial court noted that two civil jury trials were held during this period. 3 Counsel also argued that the State had v

2023Chapman v. Evans, 744 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. Crim.

2022Here, the State was unready for trial at the expiration of the 90-day period because Boyd had not yet been indicted. 6 See Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d at 927 (“Without an indictment, the State cannot be ready for trial under Article 17.151.”); Craft, 301 S.W.3d at 449 (observing that “without an indictment or waiver,” trial court lacks jurisdiction to try case and, therefore, “the State could not have been ready”).

2021Given Thetford’s decision not to file a reply brief or to request leave to file additional briefing on the issue, we decline to review the issue as unassigned error. 20 Procedure—“is not sufficient to bring [an indictment challenge] to the trial court’s attention.” Garcia v. State, 32 S.W.3d 328, 331 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding defendant’s written motion to quash failed to preserve his challenges to the indictment where motion was not brought to the trial court’s attention until after trial); see also Perry v. State, No. 02-13-00054-CR, 2014 WL 70107 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.— Fo

2020See Gonzalez v. Villarreal, 251 S.W.3d 763, 777 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, pet. dism’d). 4 directly before you?

2018United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 67 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2001).

2018While she admits to being put on notice that she was being charged with attempted arson, Alexander complains that “she was incorrectly told by the indictment that bringing a bottle of gasoline containing a soaked paper, and a lighter, to a habitation and then threatening to set it on fire, would amount to the offense of attempted arson.” Stated another way, she argues that the indictment should have stated that she attempted to start a fire, but admits that “the sufficiency of the indictment challenge was waived.” See Cody v. State, 605 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim.

2018United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 67 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636, 642 (5th Cir. 2001).

2016See id. -6- 04-16-00032-CR 2.