indictment violation in Louisiana

2016Since the opinion in Ashe , however, it appears the courts have been more inclined to employ the term "collateral estoppel.” State v. Duplechin, 05-726 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/31/06) , 922 So.2d 655, 657 , writ denied, 06-0475 (La.9/22/06), 937 So.2d 378 . , The exceptions to the rule that dismissal of an indictment does not bar a subsequent prosecution are as follows: (1) A dismissal entered without the defendant’s consent after the first witness is sworn at the trial on the merits, shall operate as an acquittal and bar a subsequent prosecution for the charge dismissed; and (2) A dismissal entered

2016Since the opinion in Ashe , however, it appears the courts have been more inclined to employ the term "collateral estoppel.” State v. Duplechin, 05-726 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/31/06) , 922 So.2d 655, 657 , writ denied, 06-0475 (La.9/22/06), 937 So.2d 378 . , The exceptions to the rule that dismissal of an indictment does not bar a subsequent prosecution are as follows: (1) A dismissal entered without the defendant’s consent after the first witness is sworn at the trial on the merits, shall operate as an acquittal and bar a subsequent prosecution for the charge dismissed; and (2) A dismissal entered

2007See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921; United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 315-316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1008 , 122 S.Ct. 492 , 151 L.Ed.2d 404 (2001) (Apprendi errors subject to harmless error analysis).

2007See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921; United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 315-316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1008 , 122 S.Ct. 492 , 151 L.Ed.2d 404 (2001) (Apprendi errors subject to harmless error analysis).

2006In State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817 (La. 1992), the district court quashed the defendant's indictment for violation of LSA-R.S. 14:202, declaring the statute unconstitutional.

2006The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling and upheld the validity of the statutory provisions, stating, "[T]he conflicting penalty provisions of Section 202 do not render the statute unconstitutional, but may be construed together so as to give effect to both provisions, resolving any conflict in favor of the person on whom the penalty is imposed by applying the lesser penalty." Id. at 818 . [3] The court further noted, "The present case does not involve a conflict in the portion of the criminal statute which defines the conduct that will be considered criminal, but rath

2006State v. Walker, 567 So.2d 581 (La.1990) (providing that a defendant generally has no right to challenge *166 an indictment for illegality of evidence; harmless-error analysis is used in determining whether to quash an indictment based on prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury).

2006The prosecution also points out that, in Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 106 S.Ct. 938 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 , the United States Supreme Court refused to quash an indictment for violation of grand jury secrecy when two witnesses testified in tandem before the grand jury.

2006The prosecution also points out that, in Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 , 106 S.Ct. 938 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 , the United States Supreme Court refused to quash an indictment for violation of grand jury secrecy when two witnesses testified in tandem before the grand jury.

2003In Hubbell , where the government could not prove that it would have been able to obtain an indictment of the witness without the compelled testimony, the court held: Kastigar requires that respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment on immunity grounds be granted unless the Government proves that the evidence it used in obtaining the indictment and proposed to use at trial was derived from legitimate sources “wholly independent” of the testimonial aspect of respondent’s immunized conduct .... 530 U.S. at 45 , 120 S.Ct. at 2048 .

2003In Hubbell , where the government could not prove that it would have been able to obtain an indictment of the witness without the compelled testimony, the court held: Kastigar requires that respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment on immunity grounds be granted unless the Government proves that the evidence it used in obtaining the indictment and proposed to use at trial was derived from legitimate sources “wholly independent” of the testimonial aspect of respondent’s immunized conduct .... 530 U.S. at 45 , 120 S.Ct. at 2048 .

1987State v. Jackson, 480 So.2d 263, 268-269 (La.1985); State v. Narcisse, 486 So.2d 349 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986).

1985State v. Buttner, 411 So.2d 35 (La.1982).

1972State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017 , 245 So.2d 159 (1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705 , 198 So.2d 897 (1967).

1972State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017 , 245 So.2d 159 (1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705 , 198 So.2d 897 (1967).

1972State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017 , 245 So.2d 159 (1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705 , 198 So.2d 897 (1967).

1972State v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017 , 245 So.2d 159 (1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705 , 198 So.2d 897 (1967).

1916In State v. Sullivan, 125 La. 56 , 51 South. 588 , citing Cyc. 296, the indictment being for the violation of section 880 of the Revised Statutes, denouncing as a crime bribing or attempting to bribe a witness or preventing a witness from making an affidavit for a warrant of arrest or from testifying as a witness in a criminal prosecution, by force or threat or intimidation or persuasion, it was observed that the statute denounced disjunctively several offenses, connected with the same transaction, and it was held that an indictment or information for the violation of such a statute must not c