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14 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1951–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosigreen1 sentence2026The Board considered Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 117 N.J. 421, 423 (1990), in which the Court determined a group of ten unrelated college students living together and sharing chores and a common fund to pay expenses constituted a "family." Specifically, the Board noted the CSLR's differing features from those in Vallorosi, including the CSLR's licensing requirement, full-time operator, paid staffing, resident rules and lack of resident discretion over admissions and removals, individual resident leases, lack of communal funding for food or other expenses, prohibition on visitors, and no | 1 | 1 |
Cherry Hill Tp. v. Oxford Housegreen1 sentence2026The Board also found the approved single-family residence in Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford House, Inc., 263 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Malloy v. Stategreen1 sentence2021A-4339-18 29 Immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-5 "is pervasive and applies to all phases of the licensing function, whether the governmental acts be classified as discretionary or ministerial." Malloy v. State, 76 N.J. 515, 520 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahwaygreen1 sentence2019Contrary to defendants' contention that that argument is not cognizable because Swan did not file a cross-appeal, we review orders, not decisions, Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001) ("[I]t is well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."), and based on the settled law, we affirm. | 1 | 1 |
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BARTHOLOMEW P. MCINERNEY(08-10-2334, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)green1 sentence2019See State v. McInerney, 450 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Seamangreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Bersani v. Basset, 184 A.D.2d 996 , 585 N.Y.S.2d 245 , 246 (1992) (“The licensing requirement for real estate brokers is intended to protect the public from inept, inexperienced or dishonest persons, not to permit others to take advantage of a violation of the statute to escape their obligations.” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3rd Corp.green2 sentences1997See also Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th and 3rd Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 354 , 280 N.Y.2d 126 , 131-32, 227 N.E.2d 30, 34 (1967). 1997See also Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th and 3rd Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 354 , 280 N.Y.2d 126 , 131-32, 227 N.E.2d 30, 34 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Californiagreen2 sentences1986Whatever room for doubt there may once have been on this score was removed by Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed. 2d 205 *141 (1959). 1986Whatever room for doubt there may once have been on this score was removed by Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed. 2d 205 *141 (1959). | 1 | 1 |
Div. of the NJ Real Estate Comm. v. Ponsigreen1 sentence1982Real Estate Comm'n Div. v. Ponsi, 39 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Moyant v. Borough of Paramusgreen1 sentence1981In Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 552-553 (1959), a licensing standard requiring a finding of such "business and moral character" as deemed "necessary for the protection of the public good" was held to be sufficiently definite. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rosenthalgreen1 sentence1981And see State v. Rosenthal, 559 P. 2d 830, 835 (Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977), app. dism. 434 U.S. 803 , 98 S.Ct. 32 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 61 (1977), in which the Supreme Court of Nevada, reversing a lower court which had overturned a gaming commission ruling, held that if the statutory standards were "inadequate legislative expressions," *347 implementing regulations "would serve to cure the defect." Over 20 years ago our Supreme Court acknowledged constitutional readjustment whereby ... [I]n recent days we have attached greater significance to the presence of procedural and judicial safeguards against unreasona | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. DIR., DIV. OF TAX.
green
2 sentences2014Licensing based its motion, in part, on the “limiting interpretation” given to the Throw-Out Rule by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 208 N.J. 141, 177 , 26 A.3d 446 (2011). 2014Licensing based its motion, in part, on the “limiting interpretation” given to the Throw-Out Rule by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 208 N.J. 141, 177 , 26 A.3d 446 (2011). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.
green
2 sentences2005Gade, supra, however, is of limited value here because, in that case, a state legislature enacted a licensing requirement in an affirmative and direct attempt to regulate the training of hazardous waste workers. 505 U.S. at 93 , 112 S.Ct. at 2380 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 81 . 2005Gade, supra, however, is of limited value here because, in that case, a state legislature enacted a licensing requirement in an affirmative and direct attempt to regulate the training of hazardous waste workers. 505 U.S. at 93 , 112 S.Ct. at 2380 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 81 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation
green
2 sentences2005Stated differently, because the Gade licensing statute was “a positive enactment setting occupational standards,” rather than a common law duty, the Act’s “saving clause was virtually irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s pre-emption analysis.” Welding Fume, supra, 364 F.Supp.2d at 687 . 2005Stated differently, because the Gade licensing statute was "a positive enactment setting occupational standards," rather than a common law duty, the Act's "saving clause was virtually irrelevant to the Supreme Court's pre-emption analysis." Welding Fume, supra, 364 F.Supp. 2d at 687 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Accountemps Division of Robert Half of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Birch Tree Group, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 627-28 , 560 A. 2d 663 . 2001Id. at 627-28 , 560 A. 2d 663 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
First Family Mortg. Corp. of Florida v. Durham
green
2 sentences1987It rejected the commerce clause challenge, noting that the reporting requirement, unlike a licensing requirement, does “not require a foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce to consent to being sued in that state as the price of doing business there.” Id. at 255 . 1987It rejected the commerce clause challenge, noting that the reporting requirement, unlike a licensing requirement, does "not require a foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce to consent to being sued in that state as the price of doing business there." Id. at 255 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
David Wulp v. John H. Corcoran, City Manager, City of Cambridge, Massachusetts
green
1 sentence1986Such a contention was considered and rejected by the Court in Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F. 2d 826 (1st Cir.1972), a decision which invalidated an ordinance of the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, establishing a licensing requirement for newspaper vendors on the city streets: "it can no longer be seriously contended that the mere fact that newspapers such as those which plaintiffs wish to distribute are offered for sale rather than distributed free of charge dilutes the protection otherwise afforded by the First Amendment. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Delguidice v. Division of New Jersey Racing Commission
green
1 sentence1985We granted certification, 99 N.J. 175 (1984), to determine whether the New Jersey Racing Commission can consider, in a licensing hearing, evidence obtained by law-enforcement officials through illegal means. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Smith v. Board of Governors
green
1 sentence1981And see State v. Rosenthal, 559 P. 2d 830, 835 (Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977), app. dism. 434 U.S. 803 , 98 S.Ct. 32 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 61 (1977), in which the Supreme Court of Nevada, reversing a lower court which had overturned a gaming commission ruling, held that if the statutory standards were "inadequate legislative expressions," *347 implementing regulations "would serve to cure the defect." Over 20 years ago our Supreme Court acknowledged constitutional readjustment whereby ... [I]n recent days we have attached greater significance to the presence of procedural and judicial safeguards against unreasona | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stephenson v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services
green
1 sentence1981And see State v. Rosenthal, 559 P. 2d 830, 835 (Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977), app. dism. 434 U.S. 803 , 98 S.Ct. 32 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 61 (1977), in which the Supreme Court of Nevada, reversing a lower court which had overturned a gaming commission ruling, held that if the statutory standards were "inadequate legislative expressions," *347 implementing regulations "would serve to cure the defect." Over 20 years ago our Supreme Court acknowledged constitutional readjustment whereby ... [I]n recent days we have attached greater significance to the presence of procedural and judicial safeguards against unreasona | 1 | 1981–1981 |
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance v. Brady
green
1 sentence1981And see State v. Rosenthal, 559 P. 2d 830, 835 (Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977), app. dism. 434 U.S. 803 , 98 S.Ct. 32 , 54 L.Ed. 2d 61 (1977), in which the Supreme Court of Nevada, reversing a lower court which had overturned a gaming commission ruling, held that if the statutory standards were "inadequate legislative expressions," *347 implementing regulations "would serve to cure the defect." Over 20 years ago our Supreme Court acknowledged constitutional readjustment whereby ... [I]n recent days we have attached greater significance to the presence of procedural and judicial safeguards against unreasona | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc.
green
2 sentences1951Cf. Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc., 243 N.Y. 113 , 152 N.E. 693 (1926), with Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Cal. App. 498 , 271 Pac. 555 (1928), rehearing denied 272 Pac. 309 ( Cal. App. 1928). 1951Cf. Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc., 243 N.Y. 113 , 152 N.E. 693 (1926), with Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Cal. App. 498 , 271 Pac. 555 (1928), rehearing denied 272 Pac. 309 ( Cal. App. 1928). | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1951Cf. Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc., 243 N.Y. 113 , 152 N.E. 693 (1926), with Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Cal. App. 498 , 271 Pac. 555 (1928), rehearing denied 272 Pac. 309 ( Cal. App. 1928). 1951Cf. Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, Inc., 243 N.Y. 113 , 152 N.E. 693 (1926), with Nittler v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Cal. App. 498 , 271 Pac. 555 (1928), rehearing denied 272 Pac. 309 ( Cal. App. 1928). | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.