licensing requirement in Ohio

1997Appellant argues that “[ajpplication of the prospective use rule should not be precluded when considering an application for exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B) by an applicant that is already licensed to operate a home for the aged, as defined in section 5701.13 of the Revised Code, on the same lot as that for which exemption is sought.” However, in Christian Benevolent Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d at 298-299 , 631 N.E.2d at 1036-1037, we considered a version of R.C. 5701.13 which is virtually identical to the version at issue here, and found that the statute’s licensing requirement precluded application

1997Appellant argues that “[a]pplication of the prospective use rule should not be precluded when considering an application for exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B) by an applicant that is already licensed to operate a home for the aged, as defined in section 5701.13 of the Revised Code, on the same lot as that for which exemption is sought.” However, in Christian Benevolent Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d at 298-299 , 631 N.E.2d at 1036-1037, we considered a version of R.C. 5701.13 which is virtually identical to the version at issue here, and found that the statute’s licensing requirement precluded application

2018See State v. Ross , 2017-Ohio-9400 , 103 N.E.3d 81 , ¶ 17 (4th Dist.) ; State v. Spaulding , 151 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2016-Ohio-8126 , 89 N.E.3d 554 , ¶ 179, quoting State v. Quarterman , 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034 , 19 N.E.3d 900 , ¶ 18. (" 'Appellate courts generally will not consider a new issue presented for the first time in a reply brief' ").

2018See State v. Ross , 2017-Ohio-9400 , 103 N.E.3d 81 , ¶ 17 (4th Dist.) ; State v. Spaulding , 151 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2016-Ohio-8126 , 89 N.E.3d 554 , ¶ 179, quoting State v. Quarterman , 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034 , 19 N.E.3d 900 , ¶ 18. (" 'Appellate courts generally will not consider a new issue presented for the first time in a reply brief' ").

2018See State v. Ross , 2017-Ohio-9400 , 103 N.E.3d 81 , ¶ 17 (4th Dist.) ; State v. Spaulding , 151 Ohio St.3d 378 , 2016-Ohio-8126 , 89 N.E.3d 554 , ¶ 179, quoting State v. Quarterman , 140 Ohio St.3d 464 , 2014-Ohio-4034 , 19 N.E.3d 900 , ¶ 18. (" 'Appellate courts generally will not consider a new issue presented for the first time in a reply brief' ").

2012Respondent filed a lawsuit on Second Amendment grounds, seeking "to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a LIcking County, Case No. 12-CA-27 4 license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of 'functional firearms within the home.' " Id. at 576 .

2011In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations[;] * * * in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with [Equal Protection].” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) City of New Orleans v. Dukes (1976), 427 U.S. 297, 303-304 . {¶47} The legislature could have reasonably determined that it would further public health and safety to subject Manna to the licensing requirement for retail food establishments.

2006Springfield, Inc. v. Hogan (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 764 , 621 N.E.2d 1253 , in support of its contention that maintaining an action is separate from initiating an action, and that a corporation may initiate an action and then remedy the lack of licensure in order to maintain that action.

2006Springfield, Inc. v. Hogan (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 764 , 621 N.E.2d 1253 , in support of its contention that maintaining an action is separate from initiating an action, and that a corporation may initiate an action and then remedy the lack of licensure in order to maintain that action.

2005An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312 , 28 O.O. 270 , 55 N.E.2d 413 , paragraph five of the syllabus.

2005An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312 , 28 O.O. 270 , 55 N.E.2d 413 , paragraph five of the syllabus.

2002In rejecting plaintiff's equal protection challenge to R.C. 4517.02 (A)(6), the court in North Dixie discussed the purpose of the licensing requirement, noting that "with a flea market, one of Plaintiff's patrons will sell his or her car and be gone," while "Plaintiff is the only long-term presence to whom a customer may be able to look." Id. at 1348 .

2002Thus, the court noted, "the State of Ohio requires a licensing of the party to each lease arrangement who will be available for the purchaser of a car to look for satisfaction." Id.