licensing requirement in New York

2025Corp. v Aronshtein</i>, 89 AD3d 676, 677 [2d Dept 2011]).</p> <p>Code § 863.313(1) requires home improvement contractors to be licensed by the County of Westchester by providing that "[n]o person shall maintain, conduct, advertise, operate, or engage in the home improvement business within the County of Westchester, or hold himself or herself out as being able to do so, unless such person is licensed pursuant to this Article" (Code § 863.313[1]).

2025Corp. v Aronshtein , 89 AD3d 676, 677 [2d Dept 2011]).

2018Corp. v Aronshtein , 89 AD3d 676, 677 ; see Holistic Homes, LLC v Greenfield , 138 AD3d 689, 690 ; Westchester Stone, Sand & Gravel v Marcella , 262 AD2d 403, 404 ).

2011Pursuant to CPLR 3015 (e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover in quantum meruit for home improvement services is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement (see CPLR 3015 [e]; Epic Pool Corp. v Fontecchio, 67 AD3d 858 [2009]; Flax v Hommel, 40 AD3d 809, 810 [2007]; Westchester Stone, Sand & Gravel v Marcella, 262 AD2d 403, 404 [1999]).

2013We decline to consider defendant’s argument raised for the first time in a surreply that, even if arguendo the date for requiring a license was plaintiff partnership’s May 2008 deadline for giving notice that it would not be exercising its option to terminate the lease early, the license held by a partner at that time did not satisfy the partnership’s licensing requirement (see Ostrov v Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 155 [1st Dept 2012]).

2013We decline to consider defendant’s argument raised for the first time in a surreply that, even if arguendo the date for requiring a license was plaintiff partnership’s May 2008 deadline for giving notice that it would not be exercising its option to terminate the lease early, the license held by a partner at that time did not satisfy the partnership’s licensing requirement (see Ostrov v Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 155 [1st Dept 2012]).

2013The obligation to pay the commission arose from the lease (cf. Thorne Real Estate v Nezelek, 100 AD2d 651 , 652 [3d Dept 1984]), which plaintiff partnership was entitled to enforce (see Joseph P. Day Realty Corp. v Chera, 308 AD2d 148, 152 [1st Dept 2003]).

2013The obligation to pay the commission arose from the lease (cf. Thorne Real Estate v Nezelek, 100 AD2d 651 , 652 [3d Dept 1984]), which plaintiff partnership was entitled to enforce (see Joseph P. Day Realty Corp. v Chera, 308 AD2d 148, 152 [1st Dept 2003]).

2009In reaching its conclusion, the court opined that visual art was “entitled to full First Amendment protection” (Bery, 97 F3d at 695), and concluded that the licensing requirement did not satisfy constitutional criteria for a permissible time, place or manner restriction on speech (see id. at 697-698).

2009In reaching its conclusion, the court opined that visual art was “entitled to full First Amendment protection” (Bery, 97 F3d at 695), and concluded that the licensing requirement did not satisfy constitutional criteria for a permissible time, place or manner restriction on speech (see id. at 697-698).

2010The legislative purpose of the licensing requirement under the Real Property Law is to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of fraud (Kavian v Vernah Homes Co., 19 AD3d 649, 650 [2d Dept 2005]).

2007The intent of the licensing requirement under the Real Property Law, i.e., “to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of fraud” (Kavian v Vernah Homes Co., 19 AD3d 649, 650 [2005]), would be undermined if such cobrokerage agreements were enforceable, even in part.

1995Corp. v Liebig, supra, at 694; Primo Constr. v Stahl, supra).

1993Corp. v Liebig, 76 NY2d 689, 692 [1990].) In furtherance of that purpose the Department, which licenses home improvement contractors, has promulgated various rules and regulations and requires home improvement contractors to furnish it with a bond conditioned on, inter alia, compliance with those rules and regulations (see, 6 RCNY 2-225).

2005The purpose of the licensing requirement under the Real Property Law is to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of fraud (see Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v 40th & 3rd Corp., supra at 362-363; Kreuter v Tsucalas, supra at 54-55 ; Rogovin v Bach Realty, 147 AD2d 364, 365 [1989]; Eaton Assoc. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603, 604 [1981]; Dodge v Richmond, 5 AD2d 593, 595 [1958]).

2001The licensing requirement serves to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of frauds (see, Eaton Assocs. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603, 604 ; Dodge v Richmond, 5 AD2d 593 ).

2026On appeal, the Second Department in Vitanza affirmed the lower court's decision and held that contractors must be properly licensed to recover under a contract to do plumbing work, and the licensing requirement may not be satisfied by "employing" or "subletting" the plumbing work to a licensed plumber. (48 AD2d at 44-45).

2026On appeal, the Second Department in Vitanza affirmed the lower court's decision and held that contractors must be properly licensed to recover under a contract to do plumbing work, and the licensing requirement may not be satisfied by "employing" or "subletting" the plumbing work to a licensed plumber. ( 48 AD2d at 44-45 ).

2026Although an exception may be made where the plumbing work may be considered "the mere incident of a larger work," that exception did not apply where the contract exceeded the balance of $50,000 ( id. at 45, quoting Bronold v Engler , 194 NY 323, 325 [1909]).

2026Although an exception may be made where the plumbing work may be considered "the mere incident of a larger work," that exception did not apply where the contract exceeded the balance of $50,000 ( id. at 45 , quoting Bronold v Engler , 194 NY 323, 325 [1909]).

2025The failure of the plaintiff to comply with this subdivision will permit the defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of rule thirty-two hundred eleven of this chapter (CPLR 3015[e]).</blockquote><p>"'Pursuant to CPLR 3015(e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover in quantum meruit for home improvement services is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a) (7) if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement'" (<i>Cunningham v Nolte</i>, 188 AD3d 806 , 807 [2d Dept 2020], <i>quoting EN

2025The failure of the plaintiff to comply with this subdivision will permit the defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of rule thirty-two hundred eleven of this chapter (CPLR 3015[e]). "'Pursuant to CPLR 3015(e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover in quantum meruit for home improvement services is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a) (7) if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement'" ( Cunningham v Nolte , 188 AD3d 806, 807 [2d Dept 2020], quoting ENKO Constr.

2024Rather, the residency requirement pertains to "tenants" of the property: a tenant who enters into an agreement with a contractor for the performance of a home improvement is entitled to the protections of the home improvement contractor's licensing requirement if the "work is to be performed in, to or upon the residence or dwelling unit of such tenant" (Administrative Code § 20-386[6]; see Ayres v Dunhill Interiors , 138 AD2d 303 [1st Dept 1988] [applying residency requirement to tenant]).

2000In Ayres {supra) the unlicensed contractor contended that the plaintiff lived in a different apartment from the one it had worked on and, thus, the plaintiff could not invoke the licensing requirement to defeat the unlicensed contractor’s defense.

2013(See Flax v Hommel, 40 AD3d 809 [2d Dept 2007].) There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff did not possess a home improvement license either from Suffolk County or from the Town of Shelter Island at the time it performed both landscaping work and driveway work for the defendants.

2011Pursuant to CPLR 3015 (e), a complaint that seeks to recover damages for breach of a home improvement contract or to recover in quantum meruit for home improvement services is subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) if it does not allege compliance with the licensing requirement (see CPLR 3015 [e]; Epic Pool Corp. v Fontecchio, 67 AD3d 858 [2009]; Flax v Hommel, 40 AD3d 809, 810 [2007]; Westchester Stone, Sand & Gravel v Marcella, 262 AD2d 403, 404 [1999]).

2012As such, he was required to possess a home improvement license, and his failure to adhere to this licensing requirement precluded him from collecting amounts allegedly owed by the defendants and entitled the defendants to sum mary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action sounding in breach of contract and quantum meruit (see generally Vatco Contr., Ltd. v Kirschenbaum, 73 AD3d at 1164 ; Racwell Constr., LLC v Manfredi, 61 AD3d at 732-733 ; J.G.

2011Contrary to the plaintiffs further contention, although the licensing requirement only applies where improvements are made to buildings “used as a private residence or dwelling place” (Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-11.1 [3]), the defendant’s home fell within that category notwithstanding the fact that the defendant homeowner moved out of the house temporarily while the renovations were being performed (see Racwell Constr., LLC v Manfredi, 61 AD3d 731, 733 [2009]).

2005The purpose of the licensing requirement under the Real Property Law is to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of fraud (see Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v 40th & 3rd Corp., supra at 362-363; Kreuter v Tsucalas, supra at 54-55 ; Rogovin v Bach Realty, 147 AD2d 364, 365 [1989]; Eaton Assoc. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603, 604 [1981]; Dodge v Richmond, 5 AD2d 593, 595 [1958]).

2001The licensing requirement serves to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of frauds (see, Eaton Assocs. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603, 604 ; Dodge v Richmond, 5 AD2d 593 ).

2005The purpose of the licensing requirement under the Real Property Law is to protect the public from inept, inexperienced, or dishonest persons who might perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of fraud (see Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v 40th & 3rd Corp., supra at 362-363; Kreuter v Tsucalas, supra at 54-55 ; Rogovin v Bach Realty, 147 AD2d 364, 365 [1989]; Eaton Assoc. v Highland Broadcasting Corp., 81 AD2d 603, 604 [1981]; Dodge v Richmond, 5 AD2d 593, 595 [1958]).

1992The licensing requirement for real estate brokers is intended to protect the public from inept, inexperienced or dishonest persons, not to permit others to take advantage of a violation of the statute to escape their obligations (Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v 40th & 3rd Corp., 19 NY2d 354, 362-363 ; Bendell v De Dominicis, 251 NY 305, 310 ).

1988Commn., 447 US 530 [1980]; Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205 [1975]; Schad v Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61 [1981]; Hynes v Mayor of Oradell, 425 US 610 [1976].) There is, then, no First Amendment bar to the licensing requirement for artwork.

1986(Schad v Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61, 65-66 [1981].) In Merco Props. v Guggenheimer ( 395 F Supp 1322 [US Dist Ct, SDNY 1975]), which involved an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the New York City cabaret licensing system by a corporation which had been denied a cabaret and catering license, the court stated that the licensing requirement implicates 1st Amendment rights to the extent that musical entertainment, singing and dancing are considered communicative forms of expression as opposed to unprivileged conduct.

2025However, the Code "does not say that a violator is barred from bringing suit under a contract entered into under the wrong name" (<i>Marraccini</i>, 17 NY3d at 86 ).</p> <p>Here, A&amp;J was not licensed in its own name at the time the services in question were rendered and failed to plead compliance with the licensing requirement in the Complaint.

2025However, accepting all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, A&J not being licensed in its own name is a technical and harmless violation of the Code, and "forfeiture of the right to be paid for work done is an excessive penalty" for such a violation ( Marraccini , 17 NY3d at 86).

2025Corp. v Staiger</i>, 77 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2010] ["[S]ince corporations function only through the agency of others . . . [the] defendants failed to make [a] prima facie showing that [the] license did not encompass the plaintiff, as well as its principal"]).</p> <p>To dismiss the Complaint under these facts would be to put form over substance of the Code's licensing requirement (<i>Best Quality Swimming Pool Serv., Inc.</i>, 54 Misc 3d 919 ).</p> <p>Turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, "[l]eave to amend a pleading . . . should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably i

2025Turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, "[l]eave to amend a pleading . . . should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, or unless prejudice or surprise to the opposing party results directly from the delay in seeking leave to amend " ( Kruger v EMFT, LLC , 87 AD3d 717, 718 [2d Dept 2011]). "'A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court's broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed'" ( Thomson v Watchtower Bible Tract Socy. of NY, Inc ., 198 AD3d 996, 997-998 [2d De

2025Corp. v Staiger</i>, 77 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2010] ["[S]ince corporations function only through the agency of others . . . [the] defendants failed to make [a] prima facie showing that [the] license did not encompass the plaintiff, as well as its principal"]).</p> <p>To dismiss the Complaint under these facts would be to put form over substance of the Code's licensing requirement (<i>Best Quality Swimming Pool Serv., Inc.</i>, 54 Misc 3d 919 ).</p> <p>Turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, "[l]eave to amend a pleading . . . should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably i

2025Corp. v Staiger</i>, 77 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2010] ["[S]ince corporations function only through the agency of others . . . [the] defendants failed to make [a] prima facie showing that [the] license did not encompass the plaintiff, as well as its principal"]).</p> <p>To dismiss the Complaint under these facts would be to put form over substance of the Code's licensing requirement (<i>Best Quality Swimming Pool Serv., Inc.</i>, 54 Misc 3d 919 ).</p> <p>Turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, "[l]eave to amend a pleading . . . should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably i

2025Turning to Plaintiff's motion to amend, "[l]eave to amend a pleading . . . should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, or unless prejudice or surprise to the opposing party results directly from the delay in seeking leave to amend " ( Kruger v EMFT, LLC , 87 AD3d 717, 718 [2d Dept 2011]). "'A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court's broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed'" ( Thomson v Watchtower Bible Tract Socy. of NY, Inc ., 198 AD3d 996, 997-998 [2d De