licensing requirement (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

licensing requirement in California

57 California opinions name it 5 courts 1959–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (42)

CaseFollowedCited
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sonsgreen
cal · 1957 · cited in 5 California opinions naming this issue, 1969–1996
2 sentences

1996Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 147-151 [ 308 P.2d 713 ], the Supreme Court set forth rules for determining whether a licensing bar applies.

1996Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 147-151 [ 308 P.2d 713 ], the Supreme Court set forth rules for determining whether a licensing bar applies.

55
Davis Co. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1969 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1973–1985
2 sentences

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

34
Rushing v. Powellgreen
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1985
2 sentences

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

33
Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterparkgreen
cal · 1991 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2023
2 sentences

2023Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant did not comply with the licensing requirement Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (c) states: “A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act or contract was not a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of the act or contract.” This allows the court to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements “if it is show

2009The CSLL provides that contractors [6] performing construction work must be licensed unless exempt. (§§ 7026 et seq., 7040 et seq.) "The licensing requirements provide minimal assurance that all persons offering such services in California have the requisite skill and character, understand applicable local laws and codes, and know the rudiments of administering a contracting business. [Citations.]" ( Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 517 , 803 P.2d 370 ].) The licensing requirement and the penalties for violating that requirement are designed

24
Schantz v. Ellsworthgreen
calctapp · 1971 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–2010
2 sentences

2010The Statutory Scheme Governing Licensing of Real Estate Brokers Under California’s Real Estate Law (§ 10000 et seq.), “[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a real estate license . . . .” (§ 10130.) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.” (Schantz v. Ellsworth (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-293 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 7

2010The Statutory Scheme Governing Licensing of Real Estate Brokers Under California’s Real Estate Law (§ 10000 et seq.), “[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a real estate license . . . .” (§ 10130.) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.” (Schantz v. Ellsworth (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-293 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 7

23
Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc.green
calctapp · 1973 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–2005
2 sentences

2005Normally, a court will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement. [Citations.]” ( Vitek, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 , italics added.) The court reasoned that where, as here, the contract’s object is not inherently wrongful or contrary to sound public policy, it will be deemed void “only if it falls within the area which the Legislature intended as part of deterrence necessary to protect the public interest.” (Id., at p. 593, fn. omitted.) The court conceded that the CSLL’s purpose is “to protect the administration of the licensing law as well as to pro

2005Normally, a court will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement. [Citations.]” ( Vitek, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 , italics added.) The court reasoned that where, as here, the contract’s object is not inherently wrongful or contrary to sound public policy, it will be deemed void “only if it falls within the area which the Legislature intended as part of deterrence necessary to protect the public interest.” (Id., at p. 593, fn. omitted.) The court conceded that the CSLL’s purpose is “to protect the administration of the licensing law as well as to pro

23
Currie v. Stolowitzgreen
calctapp · 1959 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1996
2 sentences

1996It is settled that “section 7031 bars a suit for breach of contract as well as for the collection of compensation for performance of any act.” (Currie v. Stolowitz (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 810, 813 [ 338 P.2d 208 ].) “Properly construed, the term [compensation] embraces damages suffered by a contractor lacking the requisite license under the law for breach of a contractual obligation where either (1) the making of the contract or (2) the performance during which the breach occurs comes within the licensing requirement.” (General Ins.

1996It is settled that “section 7031 bars a suit for breach of contract as well as for the collection of compensation for performance of any act.” (Currie v. Stolowitz (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 810, 813 [ 338 P.2d 208 ].) “Properly construed, the term [compensation] embraces damages suffered by a contractor lacking the requisite license under the law for breach of a contractual obligation where either (1) the making of the contract or (2) the performance during which the breach occurs comes within the licensing requirement.” (General Ins.

22
Greenlake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLCgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2015
2 sentences

2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati

2013We disagree with Business Advisors's contention that the purpose of California's real estate licensing scheme would not be furthered by barring its recovery in this case because, according to Business Advisors, "There is no showing here that the rule barring the payment of an 19 illegal commission was intended to assist an escrow company that paid the wrong person." Numerous California cases have explained that, " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' [Citation.]" (Gre

13
City of Carson v. CITY OF LA MIRADAgreen
calctapp · 2004 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca

2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca

12
ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca

2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca

12
Owen v. Offgreen
cal · 1951 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1971–1987
2 sentences

1987(Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 208 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 359 P.2d 251 ]; Smith v. Bach (1920) 183 Cal. 259, 262-263 [ 191 P. 14 ]; Gruzen v. Henry (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 515, 518 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 573 ]; Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., supra, 29 Cal.2d 561, 568 .) In the context of licensing statutes, however, a contrary rule has been said to apply, namely, that when penalties are provided by statute, the courts “will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement.” (Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592

1987(Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 208 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 359 P.2d 251 ]; Smith v. Bach (1920) 183 Cal. 259, 262-263 [ 191 P. 14 ]; Gruzen v. Henry (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 515, 518 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 573 ]; Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., supra, 29 Cal.2d 561, 568 .) In the context of licensing statutes, however, a contrary rule has been said to apply, namely, that when penalties are provided by statute, the courts “will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement.” (Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592

12
Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin Countygreen
cal · 1966 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–1985
2 sentences

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

12
Bartkus v. Illinoisgreen
scotus · 1959 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020(Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 U.S. 121, 124 (Bartkus).) By analogy, defendant argues that the federal prosecution for the licensing violation was in fact a “sham” used to detain defendant while the state investigated Pamela’s murder.

11
Estate of Prietogreen
calctapp · 1966 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati

11
Consul Limited, Kenneth B. Wilson Dba Ken Wilson Associates v. Solide Enterprises, Inc., a Corporation, and Hrh Operating Company, a Corporationgreen
ca9 · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati

11
Wright v. ISSAKgreen
calctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
People v. Sargentgreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
People v. Jerry R.green
calctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Yoo v. Robigreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Park v. Deftonesgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.green
calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
In Re Blaneygreen
cal · 1947 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Styne v. Stevensgreen
cal · 2001 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
People v. NIROOMANDIgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
In Re Jenningsgreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Norman v. Normangreen
cal · 1898 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
In Re Estate of Shippgreen
· 1914 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
11
Morris v. Noguchigreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
11
In Re Pottergreen
cal · 1913 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co.green
cal · 1949 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc.green
nycivct · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collinsgreen
calctapp · 1945 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Mandel v. Liebmangreen
ny · 1951 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
11
Johnson v. Meadgreen
calctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallasgreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
Donohue v. State of Californiagreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Gruzen v. Henrygreen
calctapp · 1978 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
Reid v. Overland Machined Productsgreen
cal · 1961 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
Smith v. Bachgreen
cal · 1920 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (38)

CaseCitedYears
Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc. green
cal · 1946
2 sentences

2017The *851 court found "substantial compliance" with section 7031 under circumstances that are now covered by an express exception to the licensing requirement. ( Id. at pp. 689-690, 166 P.2d 265 ; see §§ 7029, 7031, subd. (a).) Moreover, as the court noted in WSS , the judicial substantial compliance doctrine as described in Gatti is "no longer the law" in light of legislative changes to codify the doctrine strictly.

1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the

31966–2017
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. green
cal · 2005
2 sentences

2023Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant did not comply with the licensing requirement Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (c) states: “A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act or contract was not a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of the act or contract.” This allows the court to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements “if it is show

2011Bernards contends, even if Pacific’s class A license was sufficient, that license was suspended and expired during suspension while Pacific was performing its work, with the result that Pacific is precluded from recovering on its subcontract because it was not duly licensed “at all times during the performance of’ the subcontract as required by section 7031, subdivision (a) and MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th 412.

22011–2023
Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange green
calctapp · 1969
2 sentences

2022(See Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 299, 302 .) Under the circumstances, defendant has not established that an instruction on the section 7053 exemption was warranted.

1973(City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 276 [ 339 P.2d 851 , 73 A.L.R.2d 1420 ]; and see S & Q Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization, 179 Cal.App.2d 364 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ] (allowed the unlicensed contractor to use his claim under the “illegal” contract as an offset); Davis Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 156 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ] (allowed recovery by unlicensed contractor as a sale of goods independent of the “illegal” contract); Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34 (allowed the unlicensed contractor to use fraud in *593 the execution of the “illega

21973–2022
Citizens State Bank v. Gentry green
calctapp · 1937
2 sentences

2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned.

2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned.

21966–2017
Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital green
cal · 2016
2 sentences

2017Thus, the court declined to adopt a narrow rule limiting "professional services" to only those tasks requiring medical skill and training. ( Id. at p. 85, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 P.3d 229 .) The Supreme Court also rejected, as too broad, a proposed rule that "professional services" include all acts associated with the provision of medical care, including, e.g., because an act merely violates a licensing requirement: "Such a rule would collapse the first ('a negligent act or omission ... in the rendering of professional services') and third ('within the scope of services for which the [health

2017Thus, the court declined to adopt a narrow rule limiting "professional services" to only those tasks requiring medical skill and training. ( Id. at p. 85, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 P.3d 229 .) The Supreme Court also rejected, as too broad, a proposed rule that "professional services" include all acts associated with the provision of medical care, including, e.g., because an act merely violates a licensing requirement: "Such a rule would collapse the first ('a negligent act or omission ... in the rendering of professional services') and third ('within the scope of services for which the [health

22017–2017
Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros. green
calctapp · 2011
2 sentences

2015(Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 685 .) However, because that class A license was suspended for a two-month period, Pacific was not licensed “at all times” during performance of the subcontract and so we remanded the case for trial on whether Pacific nonetheless substantially complied with the licensing requirement pursuant to section 7031, subdivision (e) so as to be entitled to recover from Bernards despite the lapse in licensure.

2015(Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 685 .) However, because that Class A license was 1 All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code. 2 suspended for a two-month period, Pacific was not licensed “at all times” during performance of the subcontract and so we remanded the case for trial on whether Pacific nonetheless substantially complied with the licensing requirement pursuant to section 7031, subdivision (e) so as to be entitled to recover from Bernards despite the lapse in licensure.

22015–2015
Grant v. Weatherholt green
calctapp · 1954
2 sentences

1969Code, § 7031.) The term “compensation” as used in the statute “denotes sums claimed as an agreed price, fee or percentage earned by performance, and also sums claimed as the reasonable value of work done under implied contract.” (Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 43 .) The illegality attendant upon engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without a license attaches only to transactions or contracts for construction and similar work described in Business and Professions Code sections 7026 and 7026.3, which define the activities of a person as a contractor

1969(Cf. Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 43 .) The situation is not within the scope of the purpose of the licensing requirement.

21969–1973
Soni v. Wellmike Enterprise Co. green
calctapp · 2014
1 sentence

2024Zuma further contends Kitson aided and abetted Williamson’s unauthorized practice of law and so is not entitled to attorney fees either. “[W]here ‘the facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether a person’s conduct amounts to practicing law without a license.’ ” (Altizer v. Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331 , 337.) 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code. 8 “As for any disputed factual issues, the trial court’s findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence rule and must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.” (Soni, supra, 224 Cal.App

12024–2024
Tyrone v. Kelley green
cal · 1973
1 sentence

2022Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by the finder’s exception to the real estate licensing laws.” (Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) “The line between brokers and finders is based on whether the person in question has engaged in any negotiating to consummate the transaction. . . . ‘If the broker takes any part in the negotiations, no matter how slight, he is not a middleman but a broker.’” (Preach, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 .) GLG does not argue for application of the finder’s exception on appeal.

12022–2022
Preach v. Monter Rainbow green
calctapp · 1993
1 sentence

2022Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by the finder’s exception to the real estate licensing laws.” (Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) “The line between brokers and finders is based on whether the person in question has engaged in any negotiating to consummate the transaction. . . . ‘If the broker takes any part in the negotiations, no matter how slight, he is not a middleman but a broker.’” (Preach, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 .) GLG does not argue for application of the finder’s exception on appeal.

12022–2022
People v. Holt green
cal · 1997
1 sentence

2022(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 ; Strickland, at p. 687.) Here, defendant’s trial counsel may have determined that a section 7053 instruction was not warranted by the evidence presented, and defendant cannot establish prejudice, i.e., that had his trial counsel requested a section 7053 instruction, the jury would have found that he was an employee and, thus, not subject to the licensing requirement.

12022–2022
WSS Industrial Construction, Inc. v. Great West Contractors, Inc. green
calctapp · 2008
2 sentences

2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned.

2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned.

12017–2017
Estate of Baldwin green
calctapp · 1973
2 sentences

2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati

2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati

12015–2015
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. green
calctapp · 2006
1 sentence

2013“A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies its burden of showing a claim lacks merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established because the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence necessary to establish the claim, or a complete defense to that cause of action exists. [Citations.] If this burden of production is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material issue of fact.” (Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. (2

12013–2013
Capitelli v. Sawamura green
calctapp · 1954
1 sentence

2011Capitelli v. Sawamura, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 169 does not stand for the proposition that a joint venturer selling its own produce pursuant to a valid joint venture agreement is required to obtain a license as a produce dealer.

12011–2011
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. green
scotus · 1992
12009–2009
Los Carneros Community Associates v. Penfield & Smith Engineers Inc. green
cal · 1999
12007–2007
Nationwide Investment Corp. v. California Funeral Service, Inc. green
calctapp · 1974
12007–2007
Ferdig v. State Personnel Board green
cal · 1969
12007–2007
Asdourian v. Araj green
cal · 1985
12005–2005
Gaines v. Eastern Pacific green
calctapp · 1982
12005–2005
Nelson v. Marshall green
moctapp · 1993
12002–2002
B. C. Cotton, Inc. v. Voss green
calctapp · 1995
11995–1995
Raden v. Laurie green
calctapp · 1953
11995–1995
Buchwald v. Superior Court of S.F. green
calctapp · 1967
11995–1995
Trewin v. State of California green
calctapp · 1984
11993–1993
People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1986
11991–1991
In Re Williamson green
cal · 1954
11991–1991
Fall River Joint Unified School District v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1988
11990–1990
Nelson v. State of California green
calctapp · 1982
11990–1990
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's, Inc. green
ca8 · 1938
11989–1989
Marshall v. Von Zumwalt green
calctapp · 1953
11987–1987
Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co. green
cal · 1947
11987–1987
Barrett v. United States Customs Service & the Department of Treasury neutral
laed · 1980
11986–1986
Marschner v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ETC. green
ctd · 1979
11986–1986
Eddie David Cox v. United States Department of Justice green
cadc · 1979
11986–1986
Weeks v. Merritt Building & Construction Co. green
calctapp · 1974
11985–1985
People v. Katrinak green
calctapp · 1982
11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Business and Professions Code § 7031 (3) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1598 (3) CA § Cal. Civil Code § 1599 (3) CA § Cal. Labor Code § 1700 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 64 (1962–2026) CA 57 (1959–2024) IL 40 (1943–2024) MD 30 (1969–2025) TX 15 (1972–2023) GA 14 (1978–2019) NJ 14 (1951–2026) CT 12 (1979–2026) PA 12 (1988–2025) MI 11 (1974–2021) WA 10 (1989–2026) NM 9 (1999–2016) AZ 9 (1992–2025) UT 9 (1992–2024) AL 8 (1981–2009) OH 8 (1997–2018) NC 7 (1973–2020) KS 7 (1984–2021) DC 7 (1980–2024) MN 6 (1969–2015) MA 6 (1965–2026) CO 5 (1979–2018) OR 5 (1999–2023) IN 5 (1973–2019) WI 4 (1992–2019) VT 4 (1995–2012) ME 3 (1975–1982) SC 3 (1999–2019) FL 3 (1992–2016) RI 3 (1993–2012) MO 3 (1989–2002) NV 3 (2009–2013) AK 3 (1975–2012) VA 3 (1977–2024) AR 2 (1999–1999) IA 2 (1975–1985) LA 2 (2003–2011) NE 2 (1985–1995) TN 2 (1956–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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