57 California opinions name it 5 courts 1959–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sonsgreen2 sentences1996Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 147-151 [ 308 P.2d 713 ], the Supreme Court set forth rules for determining whether a licensing bar applies. 1996Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 147-151 [ 308 P.2d 713 ], the Supreme Court set forth rules for determining whether a licensing bar applies. | 5 | 5 |
Davis Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the 1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the | 3 | 4 |
Rushing v. Powellgreen2 sentences1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the 1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the | 3 | 3 |
Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterparkgreen2 sentences2023Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant did not comply with the licensing requirement Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (c) states: “A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act or contract was not a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of the act or contract.” This allows the court to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements “if it is show 2009The CSLL provides that contractors [6] performing construction work must be licensed unless exempt. (§§ 7026 et seq., 7040 et seq.) "The licensing requirements provide minimal assurance that all persons offering such services in California have the requisite skill and character, understand applicable local laws and codes, and know the rudiments of administering a contracting business. [Citations.]" ( Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 517 , 803 P.2d 370 ].) The licensing requirement and the penalties for violating that requirement are designed | 2 | 4 |
Schantz v. Ellsworthgreen2 sentences2010The Statutory Scheme Governing Licensing of Real Estate Brokers Under California’s Real Estate Law (§ 10000 et seq.), “[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a real estate license . . . .” (§ 10130.) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.” (Schantz v. Ellsworth (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-293 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 7 2010The Statutory Scheme Governing Licensing of Real Estate Brokers Under California’s Real Estate Law (§ 10000 et seq.), “[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a real estate license . . . .” (§ 10130.) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.” (Schantz v. Ellsworth (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-293 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 7 | 2 | 3 |
Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc.green2 sentences2005Normally, a court will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement. [Citations.]” ( Vitek, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 , italics added.) The court reasoned that where, as here, the contract’s object is not inherently wrongful or contrary to sound public policy, it will be deemed void “only if it falls within the area which the Legislature intended as part of deterrence necessary to protect the public interest.” (Id., at p. 593, fn. omitted.) The court conceded that the CSLL’s purpose is “to protect the administration of the licensing law as well as to pro 2005Normally, a court will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement. [Citations.]” ( Vitek, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 , italics added.) The court reasoned that where, as here, the contract’s object is not inherently wrongful or contrary to sound public policy, it will be deemed void “only if it falls within the area which the Legislature intended as part of deterrence necessary to protect the public interest.” (Id., at p. 593, fn. omitted.) The court conceded that the CSLL’s purpose is “to protect the administration of the licensing law as well as to pro | 2 | 3 |
Currie v. Stolowitzgreen2 sentences1996It is settled that “section 7031 bars a suit for breach of contract as well as for the collection of compensation for performance of any act.” (Currie v. Stolowitz (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 810, 813 [ 338 P.2d 208 ].) “Properly construed, the term [compensation] embraces damages suffered by a contractor lacking the requisite license under the law for breach of a contractual obligation where either (1) the making of the contract or (2) the performance during which the breach occurs comes within the licensing requirement.” (General Ins. 1996It is settled that “section 7031 bars a suit for breach of contract as well as for the collection of compensation for performance of any act.” (Currie v. Stolowitz (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 810, 813 [ 338 P.2d 208 ].) “Properly construed, the term [compensation] embraces damages suffered by a contractor lacking the requisite license under the law for breach of a contractual obligation where either (1) the making of the contract or (2) the performance during which the breach occurs comes within the licensing requirement.” (General Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Greenlake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLCgreen2 sentences2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati 2013We disagree with Business Advisors's contention that the purpose of California's real estate licensing scheme would not be furthered by barring its recovery in this case because, according to Business Advisors, "There is no showing here that the rule barring the payment of an 19 illegal commission was intended to assist an escrow company that paid the wrong person." Numerous California cases have explained that, " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' [Citation.]" (Gre | 1 | 3 |
City of Carson v. CITY OF LA MIRADAgreen2 sentences2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca 2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca | 1 | 2 |
ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca 2015To bring itself within this exception, a contractor must show at an evidentiary hearing that, despite being unlicensed at some time during performance, the contractor “(1) had been duly licensed . . . prior to . . . performance . . . , (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure, (3) did not know or reasonably should not have known that he or she was not duly licensed when performance of the act or contract commenced, and (4) acted promptly and in good faith to reinstate his or her license upon learning it was invalid.” (§ 7031, subd. (e); Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Ca | 1 | 2 |
Owen v. Offgreen2 sentences1987(Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 208 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 359 P.2d 251 ]; Smith v. Bach (1920) 183 Cal. 259, 262-263 [ 191 P. 14 ]; Gruzen v. Henry (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 515, 518 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 573 ]; Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., supra, 29 Cal.2d 561, 568 .) In the context of licensing statutes, however, a contrary rule has been said to apply, namely, that when penalties are provided by statute, the courts “will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement.” (Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 1987(Reid v. Overland Machined Products (1961) 55 Cal.2d 203, 208 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 359 P.2d 251 ]; Smith v. Bach (1920) 183 Cal. 259, 262-263 [ 191 P. 14 ]; Gruzen v. Henry (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 515, 518 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 573 ]; Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., supra, 29 Cal.2d 561, 568 .) In the context of licensing statutes, however, a contrary rule has been said to apply, namely, that when penalties are provided by statute, the courts “will not impose additional penalties for noncompliance with the licensing requirement.” (Vitek, Inc. v. Alvarado Ice Palace, Inc. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 586, 592 | 1 | 2 |
Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin Countygreen2 sentences1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the 1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the | 1 | 2 |
Bartkus v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2020(Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 U.S. 121, 124 (Bartkus).) By analogy, defendant argues that the federal prosecution for the licensing violation was in fact a “sham” used to detain defendant while the state investigated Pamela’s murder. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Prietogreen1 sentence2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati | 1 | 1 |
Consul Limited, Kenneth B. Wilson Dba Ken Wilson Associates v. Solide Enterprises, Inc., a Corporation, and Hrh Operating Company, a Corporationgreen1 sentence2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati | 1 | 1 |
| Wright v. ISSAKgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sargentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jerry R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Yoo v. Robigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Park v. Deftonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Blaneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Styne v. Stevensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. NIROOMANDIgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Norman v. Normangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Shippgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morris v. Noguchigreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Pottergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mandel v. Liebmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Meadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donohue v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gruzen v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reid v. Overland Machined Productsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Bachgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017The *851 court found "substantial compliance" with section 7031 under circumstances that are now covered by an express exception to the licensing requirement. ( Id. at pp. 689-690, 166 P.2d 265 ; see §§ 7029, 7031, subd. (a).) Moreover, as the court noted in WSS , the judicial substantial compliance doctrine as described in Gatti is "no longer the law" in light of legislative changes to codify the doctrine strictly. 1985To allow defendant to prevail on a technicality would be to allow section 7031 to be used as a “ ‘shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. ’ ” (Latipac, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 281 ; Gatti, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 690 .) “The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors.” (Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 156, 158 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ]; see also Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 110 ]; Weeks, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 525 .) In this case, “the | 3 | 1966–2017 |
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.
green
2 sentences2023Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant did not comply with the licensing requirement Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (c) states: “A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act or contract was not a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of the act or contract.” This allows the court to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements “if it is show 2011Bernards contends, even if Pacific’s class A license was sufficient, that license was suspended and expired during suspension while Pacific was performing its work, with the result that Pacific is precluded from recovering on its subcontract because it was not duly licensed “at all times during the performance of’ the subcontract as required by section 7031, subdivision (a) and MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th 412. | 2 | 2011–2023 |
Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange
green
2 sentences2022(See Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 299, 302 .) Under the circumstances, defendant has not established that an instruction on the section 7053 exemption was warranted. 1973(City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 276 [ 339 P.2d 851 , 73 A.L.R.2d 1420 ]; and see S & Q Construction Co. v. Palma Ceia Development Organization, 179 Cal.App.2d 364 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 690 ] (allowed the unlicensed contractor to use his claim under the “illegal” contract as an offset); Davis Co. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 156 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 453 ] (allowed recovery by unlicensed contractor as a sale of goods independent of the “illegal” contract); Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34 (allowed the unlicensed contractor to use fraud in *593 the execution of the “illega | 2 | 1973–2022 |
Citizens State Bank v. Gentry
green
2 sentences2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned. 2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned. | 2 | 1966–2017 |
Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital
green
2 sentences2017Thus, the court declined to adopt a narrow rule limiting "professional services" to only those tasks requiring medical skill and training. ( Id. at p. 85, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 P.3d 229 .) The Supreme Court also rejected, as too broad, a proposed rule that "professional services" include all acts associated with the provision of medical care, including, e.g., because an act merely violates a licensing requirement: "Such a rule would collapse the first ('a negligent act or omission ... in the rendering of professional services') and third ('within the scope of services for which the [health 2017Thus, the court declined to adopt a narrow rule limiting "professional services" to only those tasks requiring medical skill and training. ( Id. at p. 85, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 , 369 P.3d 229 .) The Supreme Court also rejected, as too broad, a proposed rule that "professional services" include all acts associated with the provision of medical care, including, e.g., because an act merely violates a licensing requirement: "Such a rule would collapse the first ('a negligent act or omission ... in the rendering of professional services') and third ('within the scope of services for which the [health | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros.
green
2 sentences2015(Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 685 .) However, because that class A license was suspended for a two-month period, Pacific was not licensed “at all times” during performance of the subcontract and so we remanded the case for trial on whether Pacific nonetheless substantially complied with the licensing requirement pursuant to section 7031, subdivision (e) so as to be entitled to recover from Bernards despite the lapse in licensure. 2015(Pacific Caisson, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 685 .) However, because that Class A license was 1 All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code. 2 suspended for a two-month period, Pacific was not licensed “at all times” during performance of the subcontract and so we remanded the case for trial on whether Pacific nonetheless substantially complied with the licensing requirement pursuant to section 7031, subdivision (e) so as to be entitled to recover from Bernards despite the lapse in licensure. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Grant v. Weatherholt
green
2 sentences1969Code, § 7031.) The term “compensation” as used in the statute “denotes sums claimed as an agreed price, fee or percentage earned by performance, and also sums claimed as the reasonable value of work done under implied contract.” (Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 43 .) The illegality attendant upon engaging in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor without a license attaches only to transactions or contracts for construction and similar work described in Business and Professions Code sections 7026 and 7026.3, which define the activities of a person as a contractor 1969(Cf. Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 43 .) The situation is not within the scope of the purpose of the licensing requirement. | 2 | 1969–1973 |
Soni v. Wellmike Enterprise Co.
green
1 sentence2024Zuma further contends Kitson aided and abetted Williamson’s unauthorized practice of law and so is not entitled to attorney fees either. “[W]here ‘the facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether a person’s conduct amounts to practicing law without a license.’ ” (Altizer v. Highsmith (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 331 , 337.) 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code. 8 “As for any disputed factual issues, the trial court’s findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence rule and must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.” (Soni, supra, 224 Cal.App | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tyrone v. Kelley
green
1 sentence2022Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by the finder’s exception to the real estate licensing laws.” (Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) “The line between brokers and finders is based on whether the person in question has engaged in any negotiating to consummate the transaction. . . . ‘If the broker takes any part in the negotiations, no matter how slight, he is not a middleman but a broker.’” (Preach, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 .) GLG does not argue for application of the finder’s exception on appeal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Preach v. Monter Rainbow
green
1 sentence2022Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by the finder’s exception to the real estate licensing laws.” (Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 8 .) “The line between brokers and finders is based on whether the person in question has engaged in any negotiating to consummate the transaction. . . . ‘If the broker takes any part in the negotiations, no matter how slight, he is not a middleman but a broker.’” (Preach, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1452 .) GLG does not argue for application of the finder’s exception on appeal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Holt
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703 ; Strickland, at p. 687.) Here, defendant’s trial counsel may have determined that a section 7053 instruction was not warranted by the evidence presented, and defendant cannot establish prejudice, i.e., that had his trial counsel requested a section 7053 instruction, the jury would have found that he was an employee and, thus, not subject to the licensing requirement. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
WSS Industrial Construction, Inc. v. Great West Contractors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned. 2017(See WSS, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 595 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 8 .) In Citizens State Bank v. Gentry (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 415 , 67 P.2d 364 , the plaintiff contractor was licensed at the time of the contract but renewed the license while work was still ongoing in the name of a corporation that he owned. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Estate of Baldwin
green
2 sentences2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati 2015(See 2 Miller & Starr, supra, Cal. Real Estate, § 5:1, p. 5-9.) " 'The purpose of the licensing requirement is to protect the public from the perils incident to dealing with incompetent or untrustworthy real estate practitioners.' " (GreenLake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Investments, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 731, 736 .) " '[W]hen the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the consummati | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013“A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies its burden of showing a claim lacks merit if the defendant can show one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established because the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence necessary to establish the claim, or a complete defense to that cause of action exists. [Citations.] If this burden of production is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable material issue of fact.” (Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. (2 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Capitelli v. Sawamura
green
1 sentence2011Capitelli v. Sawamura, supra, 123 Cal.App.2d 169 does not stand for the proposition that a joint venturer selling its own produce pursuant to a valid joint venture agreement is required to obtain a license as a produce dealer. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Los Carneros Community Associates v. Penfield & Smith Engineers Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Nationwide Investment Corp. v. California Funeral Service, Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ferdig v. State Personnel Board green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Asdourian v. Araj green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Gaines v. Eastern Pacific green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Nelson v. Marshall green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| B. C. Cotton, Inc. v. Voss green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Raden v. Laurie green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Buchwald v. Superior Court of S.F. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Trewin v. State of California green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| In Re Williamson green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Fall River Joint Unified School District v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Nelson v. State of California green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Herzberg's, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Marshall v. Von Zumwalt green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Barrett v. United States Customs Service & the Department of Treasury neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Marschner v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ETC. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Eddie David Cox v. United States Department of Justice green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Weeks v. Merritt Building & Construction Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Katrinak green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.