Lee defendant in New York

2022Lee defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324-325 ).

2008The Lee defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice causes of action insofar as asserted against them by submitting an expert’s affirmation showing that the treatment Dr. Lee rendered to Howard Glazer conformed to good and accepted medical practice (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Mustello v Berg, 44 AD3d 1018 [2007]; Behar v Coren, 21 AD3d 1045 [2005]).

2014Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting this explanation as an excusable default (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d at 630 ; Remote Meter Tech. of NY, Inc. v Aris Realty Corp., 83 AD3d 1030 [2011]; Winthrop Univ.

2014Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting this explanation as an excusable default (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d at 630 ; Remote Meter Tech. of NY, Inc. v Aris Realty Corp., 83 AD3d 1030 [2011]; Winthrop Univ.

2014In moving pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a default, the movant is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d 630 [2011]; Dimitriadis v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 84 AD3d 1150 [2011]).

2014In moving pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a default, the movant is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d 630 [2011]; Dimitriadis v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 84 AD3d 1150 [2011]).

2014In moving pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a default, the movant is required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d 630 [2011]; Dimitriadis v Visiting Nurse Serv. of N.Y., 84 AD3d 1150 [2011]).

2014Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting this explanation as an excusable default (see Kohn v Kohn, 86 AD3d at 630 ; Remote Meter Tech. of NY, Inc. v Aris Realty Corp., 83 AD3d 1030 [2011]; Winthrop Univ.

2014The Lee defendants also demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see generally Quis v Bolden, 298 AD2d 375 [2002]; see also Citibank, N.A. v Silverman, 85 AD3d 463 [2011]; Estate of Burke v Repetti & Co., 255 AD2d 483 [1998]).

2014The Lee defendants also demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see generally Quis v Bolden, 298 AD2d 375 [2002]; see also Citibank, N.A. v Silverman, 85 AD3d 463 [2011]; Estate of Burke v Repetti & Co., 255 AD2d 483 [1998]).

2014The Lee defendants also demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see generally Quis v Bolden, 298 AD2d 375 [2002]; see also Citibank, N.A. v Silverman, 85 AD3d 463 [2011]; Estate of Burke v Repetti & Co., 255 AD2d 483 [1998]).

2014The Lee defendants also demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see generally Quis v Bolden, 298 AD2d 375 [2002]; see also Citibank, N.A. v Silverman, 85 AD3d 463 [2011]; Estate of Burke v Repetti & Co., 255 AD2d 483 [1998]).

2022Lee defendants are still responsible for the costs incurred by the Bechtel defendants in defending this action to that point ( see id. ).

2022Lee defendants are still responsible for the costs incurred by the Bechtel defendants in defending this action to that point ( see id. ).

2022Lee defendants), which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them must be dismissed on the ground that Imperial is not aggrieved by those portions of the order ( see id. § 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc. , 76 AD3d 144 ).

2019The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address Lee's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; cf. Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2019The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address Lee's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; cf. Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2019The papers submitted by the defendant failed to adequately address Lee's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d 969 ; Rouach v Betts , 71 AD3d 977 ; cf. Richards v Tyson , 64 AD3d 760, 761 ).

2019Since the defendant failed to meet her prima facie burden in this regard, it is unnecessary to determine whether the submissions by Lee [*2]in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff , 90 AD3d at 969 ).

2019Here, the Lee defendants and Chowdhury established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff could not identify the cause of Colon's injuries without engaging in speculation ( see Ash v City of New York , 109 AD3d at 855-856 ).

2019Even assuming that Colon fell down the subject stairway, the evidence demonstrated that it was just as likely that some other factor, such as a misstep or a loss of balance due to his intoxication, could have caused his accident ( see id. ; cf. Tyrell v Pollak , 163 AD3d 1232 , 1234-1235).

2008Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from such order on October 28, 2008 but, on October 29, 2008, this Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, upon Lee’s motion and upon the ground that the order appealed from had not yet been entered ( 55 AD3d 1133 [2008]).

2008The Lee defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice causes of action insofar as asserted against them by submitting an expert’s affirmation showing that the treatment Dr. Lee rendered to Howard Glazer conformed to good and accepted medical practice (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Mustello v Berg, 44 AD3d 1018 [2007]; Behar v Coren, 21 AD3d 1045 [2005]).

2008Co. v Cordero, 22 AD3d 815 [2005]; Wilson v Buff a, 294 AD2d 357 [2002]; cf. Howe v Flatbush Presbyt.

2008The Lee defendants established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice causes of action insofar as asserted against them by submitting an expert’s affirmation showing that the treatment Dr. Lee rendered to Howard Glazer conformed to good and accepted medical practice (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Mustello v Berg, 44 AD3d 1018 [2007]; Behar v Coren, 21 AD3d 1045 [2005]).

2008Corp., 251 AD2d 148 [1998]).

2008Co. v Cordero, 22 AD3d 815 [2005]; Wilson v Buff a, 294 AD2d 357 [2002]; cf. Howe v Flatbush Presbyt.

2002In a recent, thoughtful, decision in Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Bronx County, the court wrote that the issue of admissibility of this kind of testimony should be determined pretrial at which time the applicant would be asked to meet five requirements: “(1) to the extent known [the applicant must] set forth the pertinent alleged facts of the identification and any corroborative evidence; (2) set forth the name and qualifications of the witness and the ‘proffered’ testimony; (3) correlate the proffered testimony with the facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert testimony;

2002In a recent, thoughtful, decision in Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Bronx County, the court wrote that the issue of admissibility of this kind of testimony should be determined pretrial at which time the applicant would be asked to meet five requirements: “(1) to the extent known [the applicant must] set forth the pertinent alleged facts of the identification and any corroborative evidence; (2) set forth the name and qualifications of the witness and the ‘proffered’ testimony; (3) correlate the proffered testimony with the facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert testimony;

2000The accuracy of an eyewitness identification is an issue particularly within the province of the jury (see, People v Mosley, 112 AD2d 812, 813-814 , affd 67 NY2d 985 ).

2000The accuracy of an eyewitness identification is an issue particularly within the province of the jury (see, People v Mosley, 112 AD2d 812, 813-814 , affd 67 NY2d 985 ).

1998Generally, where money is paid to or obtained by an attorney on behalf of a client pursuant to a judgment subsequently reversed on appeal, the attorney is liable to make restitution of that portion of the funds that represents a contingency fee retained in connection with the matter (see, CPLR 5523; Zaccour v Zaccour, 32 AD2d 745 ; Mormilo v Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 AD2d 217, 218 ), but will not be liable for amounts paid out as distributions or disbursements or amounts retained by the attorney in payment of debts owed by his or her client (see, Millfield Realty Co. v Catena, 257 NY 515, 517

1998Generally, where money is paid to or obtained by an attorney on behalf of a client pursuant to a judgment subsequently reversed on appeal, the attorney is liable to make restitution of that portion of the funds that represents a contingency fee retained in connection with the matter (see, CPLR 5523; Zaccour v Zaccour, 32 AD2d 745 ; Mormilo v Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 AD2d 217, 218 ), but will not be liable for amounts paid out as distributions or disbursements or amounts retained by the attorney in payment of debts owed by his or her client (see, Millfield Realty Co. v Catena, 257 NY 515, 517

1998Generally, where money is paid to or obtained by an attorney on behalf of a client pursuant to a judgment subsequently reversed on appeal, the attorney is liable to make restitution of that portion of the funds that represents a contingency fee retained in connection with the matter (see, CPLR 5523; Zaccour v Zaccour, 32 AD2d 745 ; Mormilo v Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 AD2d 217, 218 ), but will not be liable for amounts paid out as distributions or disbursements or amounts retained by the attorney in payment of debts owed by his or her client (see, Millfield Realty Co. v Catena, 257 NY 515, 517

1998Generally, where money is paid to or obtained by an attorney on behalf of a client pursuant to a judgment subsequently reversed on appeal, the attorney is liable to make restitution of that portion of the funds that represents a contingency fee retained in connection with the matter (see, CPLR 5523; Zaccour v Zaccour, 32 AD2d 745 ; Mormilo v Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 AD2d 217, 218 ), but will not be liable for amounts paid out as distributions or disbursements or amounts retained by the attorney in payment of debts owed by his or her client (see, Millfield Realty Co. v Catena, 257 NY 515, 517

1998Generally, where money is paid to or obtained by an attorney on behalf of a client pursuant to a judgment subsequently reversed on appeal, the attorney is liable to make restitution of that portion of the funds that represents a contingency fee retained in connection with the matter (see, CPLR 5523; Zaccour v Zaccour, 32 AD2d 745 ; Mormilo v Allied Stevedores Corp., 8 AD2d 217, 218 ), but will not be liable for amounts paid out as distributions or disbursements or amounts retained by the attorney in payment of debts owed by his or her client (see, Millfield Realty Co. v Catena, 257 NY 515, 517

1992Corp. v Kuang Hsung Chuang, 690 F Supp 192 ), since the promissory note was denominated as such in Korean, directly beneath the same written in English.

1987Furthermore, the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion when he declined to offer Lee immunity, as there was no indication that Lee’s decision to invoke her right against self-incrimination was in any way the result of intimidation on the part of the prosecutor (cf., People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747 ), and Lee was not an agent of law enforcement authorities or otherwise a part of the prosecutorial apparatus (see, People v Arroyo, 46 NY2d 928 ; People v Sapia, 41 NY2d 160 , cert denied 434 US 823 ).

1987Furthermore, the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion when he declined to offer Lee immunity, as there was no indication that Lee’s decision to invoke her right against self-incrimination was in any way the result of intimidation on the part of the prosecutor (cf., People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747 ), and Lee was not an agent of law enforcement authorities or otherwise a part of the prosecutorial apparatus (see, People v Arroyo, 46 NY2d 928 ; People v Sapia, 41 NY2d 160 , cert denied 434 US 823 ).