13 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stites v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Stites v. State, 829 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind. 2005) (holding that ineffective assistance claim was “merely a subset of Stites’[s] claim that her plea agreement was void because it called for consecutive sentences”). 2013See Stites v. State, 829 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind. 2005) (holding that ineffective assistance claim was “merely a subset of Stites’[s] claim that her plea agreement was void because it called for consecutive sentences”). | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002) (“We do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.”). | 1 | 1 |
Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc.green2 sentences2015“To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages.” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind.2010). - A statement is defamatory if it tends “to harm a person’s reputation by lowering the person in the community’s estimation or deterring third persons from dealing or associating with the person.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind.2007) (citation omitted). “... ■ [Defamation per se, arises when the language of a statement, without reference to extrinsic evidence, const 2015“To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages.” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind.2010). - A statement is defamatory if it tends “to harm a person’s reputation by lowering the person in the community’s estimation or deterring third persons from dealing or associating with the person.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind.2007) (citation omitted). “... ■ [Defamation per se, arises when the language of a statement, without reference to extrinsic evidence, const | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Tanoosgreen1 sentence2015“To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages.” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind.2010). - A statement is defamatory if it tends “to harm a person’s reputation by lowering the person in the community’s estimation or deterring third persons from dealing or associating with the person.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind.2007) (citation omitted). “... ■ [Defamation per se, arises when the language of a statement, without reference to extrinsic evidence, const | 1 | 1 |
Cruz v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2012The Cruz and Lee analyses, however, only apply to a “nontestifying 5 codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant.” Cruz 481 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added). 2012The Cruz and Lee analyses, however, only apply to a “nontestifying 5 codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant.” Cruz 481 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Sinn v. Stategreen1 sentence2003In Sinn v. State, 609 N.E.2d 434, 435 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), Sinn was convicted of robbery pursuant to a plea agreement, which called for the sentence in the robbery case to be served consecutively to a sentence previously imposed by another court. | 1 | 1 |
May v. Blinzingergreen1 sentence1987The injunction prohibited Lee from “engaging in or practicing medicine or osteopathic medicine, directly or indirectly, in the State of Indiana until such time that she may qualify for, and be issued a license under the laws of the State of Indiana.” On May 31, 1985 , the trial court, pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B), granted Lee’s motion for relief from judgment and vacated the order because of Senate Enrolled Act 237 which amended the prior statutory exemption to include persons such as Lee who are employed and supervised by “a physician with a limited license.” 6 The | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Robbins
green
2 sentences1975Having disposed of the jurisdictional contention, we need only address Lee’s argument in his petition for rehearing that our opinion contravened the case of State v. Robbins (1943), 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691 , by not limiting our opinion to questions of law for the guidance of inferior courts. 1975Having disposed of the jurisdictional contention, we need only address Lee’s argument in his petition for rehearing that our opinion contravened the case of State v. Robbins (1943), 221 Ind. 125 , 46 N.E.2d 691 , by not limiting our opinion to questions of law for the guidance of inferior courts. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Stanley v. Walker
green
1 sentence2015That the legal issues to be determined by the Court concerning the Motion in Limine are: 1) does the Collateral Source Rule apply; and 2) if the Rule applies, is the.amount reimbursed by HIP admissible under the holding of Stanley [v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind.2009), reh’g denied ]. 5. [] established at common law, the Collateral Source Rule prohibited defendants from introducing evidence of compensation received by Plaintiffs from collateral sources. 6. [] Justice Sullivan found the common law Collateral Source Rule was abrogated by enacting the Collateral Source Statute, Ind.Code § 34-44-1 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lee v. State
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 863-64 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hatton v. State
green
1 sentence2001However, it expressly noted the availability of the Davis/Hatton procedure, suggesting that a Davis/Hatton request "may have been appropriate under circumstances like this case where the claim asserted arguably requires a certain level of fact finding[.]" Id. at 721 n. 6. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hopper v. State
green
2 sentences1976ISSUE FOUR: Lee filed a verified motion for a continuance on August 23, 1974, which motion was to the effect that certain key witnesses could not be on hand for trial on August 26, 1974, which trial date was the last of a number of resettings. *476 *475 This court held in Hopper v. State (1974), 161 Ind. App. 29 , 314 N.E.2d 98 , 103 that the granting of a continuance was *476 usually within, the sound discretion of the trial court and that denial of such a motion will not result in reversal absent a clear abuse of discretion. 1976ISSUE FOUR: Lee filed a verified motion for a continuance on August 23, 1974, which motion was to the effect that certain key witnesses could not be on hand for trial on August 26, 1974, which trial date was the last of a number of resettings. *476 *475 This court held in Hopper v. State (1974), 161 Ind. App. 29 , 314 N.E.2d 98 , 103 that the granting of a continuance was *476 usually within, the sound discretion of the trial court and that denial of such a motion will not result in reversal absent a clear abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Parker v. State
green
1 sentence1976See: Parker v. State (1949), 228 Ind. 1, 12 , 89 N.E.2d 442 .” The court correctly overruled Lee’s motion to suppress his oral statements. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.