third element claim (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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third element claim in Ohio

14 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Johnson v. Microsoft Corp.green
ohio · 2005 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See Johnson v. Microsoft Corp. , 106 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2005-Ohio-4985 , 834 N.E.2d 791 , ¶ 20 (claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment); Hambleton v. R.G.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

CaseCitedYears
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

2022No. 01AP-683 (Feb. 5, 2002), citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). {¶ 34} The third element of a claim for hostile work environment created by racial harassment provides the harassment must be based on race.

12022–2022
Lisa Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P. Motel 6 G.P., Inc. Accor North America Corporation and Accor S.A. green
ca6 · 1998
1 sentence

2018Consequently, we need not consider the third element of the test, particularly because our finding that the APA did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of operating in Ohio "is dispositive." Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P. , 134 F.3d 1269 , 1275 (6th Cir.1998). {¶ 37} We find that the APA did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting its affairs within Ohio and that Appellants' causes of action do not arise from the APA's activities in this state.

12018–2018
Pannozzo v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield green
ohioctapp · 2003
1 sentence

2014Pannozzo v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 152 Ohio App.3d 235 , 2003-Ohio-1601 , ¶ 19 (7th Dist.); Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Grass Valley Group, Inc., 1st Dist.

12014–2014
Cohen v. Lamko, Inc. green
ohio · 1984
2 sentences

2009Given the allegations, this court’s focus is on the third element of the claim, that is, whether the representation was “made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred.” Cohen, 10 Ohio St.3d at 169 , 10 OBR 500, 462 N.E.2d 407 .

2009Given the allegations, this court’s focus is on the third element of the claim, that is, whether the representation was “made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred.” Cohen, 10 Ohio St.3d at 169 , 10 OBR 500, 462 N.E.2d 407 .

12009–2009
Strock v. Pressnell green
ohio · 1988
1 sentence

2009Id. {¶ 85} Specifically, the trial court found that the work assignments from AK Steel, which Mike and Wanda's companies (Fairbanks and HCS) lost, would have been lost to them even if Phillip's companies, Superior and JMI, had not agreed to take them.

12009–2009
City of Middletown v. McGee green
ohio · 1988
2 sentences

2008In other words, annexation petitioners, assuming a valid annexation petition exists, have no plain and adequate remedy in *Page 4 the ordinary course of the law, making an action in mandamus the appropriate means to seek a remedy. {¶ 8} Since we found that the third element of the test for a writ of mandamus has been met, we must next determine whether or not the Board has a clear legal duty to act, and whether Relators have a clear legal right. {¶ 9} "As revealed by the statutes enacted by the General Assembly that are currently in force, it is the policy of the state of Ohio to encourage ann

2008In other words, annexation petitioners, assuming a valid annexation petition exists, have no plain and adequate remedy in *Page 4 the ordinary course of the law, making an action in mandamus the appropriate means to seek a remedy. {¶ 8} Since we found that the third element of the test for a writ of mandamus has been met, we must next determine whether or not the Board has a clear legal duty to act, and whether Relators have a clear legal right. {¶ 9} "As revealed by the statutes enacted by the General Assembly that are currently in force, it is the policy of the state of Ohio to encourage ann

12008–2008
Griffith v. Linton green
ohioctapp · 1998
1 sentence

2007Griffith , supra; Med.

12007–2007
Bowins v. Euclid General Hospital Ass'n green
ohioctapp · 1984
1 sentence

2006Hosp. (1984), 20 Ohio App.3d 29 , 31 . {¶ 16} Burrows fell only after he left the heated sidewalk.

12006–2006
State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins green
ohio · 1996
1 sentence

2006Zimmerman, 75 Ohio St.3d at 449 . {¶ 16} Appellee established that appellant failed to demonstrate that he could prove the third element of his claim for retaliatory discharge.

12006–2006
Notman v. am/pm, Inc., Unpublished Decision (1-23-2004) green
ohioctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2006Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the business owner to take reasonable precautions to minimize the risk and upon invitees to take reasonable precautions to protect themselves from this risk. 1 {¶ 15} Burrows' own duty of care leads to a consideration of the third element of the claim, the proximate cause of Burrows' injury. "[E]ven when an owner or occupier is aware of an unnatural accumulation of ice and breaches its duty by failing to remove or warn, the owner or occupier will not be liable `if the owner or occupier and the invitee are equally aware of the dangerous condition and the invite

12006–2006
Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. green
ohio · 1998
1 sentence

2005Hannah v. Dayton Power Light Co. , 82 Ohio St.3d 482 , 487 , 1998-Ohio-408 . {Sentence moved from end of next paragraph.} {¶ 40} To overcome a motion for summary judgment, an employee alleging an intentional tort must set forth specific facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employer committed an intentional tort.

12005–2005
Trussell v. General Motors Corp. green
ohio · 1990
1 sentence

2005We disagree. {¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that to prove malicious criminal prosecution, a plaintiff must show the following by the preponderance of the evidence: "(1) malice in instituting or continuing the prosecution; (2) lack of probable cause; and (3) termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused." Trussell v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 142 , syllabus. {¶ 16} Appellant does not dispute that Eberhart satisfied the third element of his claim, as he admits that the Prosecutor dismissed the hunting without permission complaint.

12005–2005
Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. green
ohio · 1998
1 sentence

2005Hannah v. Dayton Power Light Co. , 82 Ohio St.3d 482 , 487 , 1998-Ohio-408 . {Sentence moved from end of next paragraph.} {¶ 40} To overcome a motion for summary judgment, an employee alleging an intentional tort must set forth specific facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employer committed an intentional tort.

12005–2005
Walworth v. Bp Oil Co. green
ohioctapp · 1996
2 sentences

1998Schrader v. Gillette, 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 549 N.E.2d 218 ; cf., Walworth v. BP Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 340 , 678 N.E.2d 959 .

1998Schrader v. Gillette, 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 549 N.E.2d 218 ; cf., Walworth v. BP Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 340 , 678 N.E.2d 959 .

11998–1998
Schrader v. Gillette green
ohioctapp · 1988
2 sentences

1998Schrader v. Gillette, 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 549 N.E.2d 218 ; cf., Walworth v. BP Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 340 , 678 N.E.2d 959 .

1998Schrader v. Gillette, 48 Ohio App.3d 181 , 549 N.E.2d 218 ; cf., Walworth v. BP Oil Co., 112 Ohio App.3d 340 , 678 N.E.2d 959 .

11998–1998
State v. Saunders green
ohioctapp · 1984
2 sentences

1997Instead, the rule contemplates a demonstration of corroborating circumstances * * * which, on balance, persuade the trial judge that the statement bears the clear indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, leaving the ultimate determination of credibility to the jury.” State v. Saunders (1984), 23 Ohio App.3d 69, 73 , 23 OBR 132, 137, 491 N.E.2d 313, 319 .

1997Instead, the rule contemplates a demonstration of corroborating circumstances * * * which, on balance, persuade the trial judge that the statement bears the clear indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, leaving the ultimate determination of credibility to the jury.” State v. Saunders (1984), 23 Ohio App.3d 69, 73 , 23 OBR 132, 137, 491 N.E.2d 313, 319 .

11997–1997
State v. Branham green
ohioctapp · 1995
2 sentences

1997In discussing the third Gilliam factor, we note the following passage from State v. Long, supra, at 7: “With regard to whether the third element of the rule was satisfied, we note ■ the following excerpt from State v. Branham (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359 , 662 N.E.2d 54 [56-57], discretionary appeal disallowed in (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 656 N.E.2d 344 : “ ‘ “[A] bare showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough.

1997In discussing the third Gilliam factor, we note the following passage from State v. Long, supra, at 7: “With regard to whether the third element of the rule was satisfied, we note ■ the following excerpt from State v. Branham (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359 , 662 N.E.2d 54 [56-57], discretionary appeal disallowed in (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 656 N.E.2d 344 : “ ‘ “[A] bare showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough.

11997–1997
State v. Jonsson green
ohio · 1995
1 sentence

1997In discussing the third Gilliam factor, we note the following passage from State v. Long, supra, at 7: “With regard to whether the third element of the rule was satisfied, we note ■ the following excerpt from State v. Branham (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359 , 662 N.E.2d 54 [56-57], discretionary appeal disallowed in (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 656 N.E.2d 344 : “ ‘ “[A] bare showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough.

11997–1997
Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Case W. Res. Univ. neutral
ohio · 1995
1 sentence

1997In discussing the third Gilliam factor, we note the following passage from State v. Long, supra, at 7: “With regard to whether the third element of the rule was satisfied, we note ■ the following excerpt from State v. Branham (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 355, 359 , 662 N.E.2d 54 [56-57], discretionary appeal disallowed in (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 656 N.E.2d 344 : “ ‘ “[A] bare showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough.

11997–1997

Where else courts name it

TX 36 (1990–2026) CA 25 (1953–2026) OH 14 (1997–2022) WI 13 (1974–2024) IL 10 (1985–2026) NC 9 (1990–2019) WA 9 (2007–2025) ME 6 (1992–2021) ID 6 (1995–2020) MI 6 (1989–2025) MN 6 (1992–2025) NY 6 (1973–2024) OR 5 (1999–2025) IA 4 (1980–2023) OK 4 (2005–2021) MD 4 (1969–2026) PA 4 (1983–2025) CT 4 (1995–2021) UT 4 (1983–2024) NJ 4 (1984–2021) GA 4 (1990–2026) NM 4 (2013–2013) CO 4 (1998–2025) FL 3 (1988–2003) KY 3 (2021–2025) SD 2 (2010–2026) WY 2 (2012–2016) HI 2 (1995–1995) MO 2 (1994–2007) AR 2 (1990–1996) NE 2 (1993–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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