third element test in North Carolina

2004The third element of the test is satisfied if the employment "significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease's development." Rutledge , 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369 -70 .

2004The third element of the test is satisfied if the employment "significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease's development." Rutledge , 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369 -70 .

2004For the employment to constitute a "significant contributing factor." The plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that absent the employment the occupational disease "would not have developed to such an extent that it caused the physical disability which resulted in claimant's incapacity for work." Baker v. City of Sanford , 120 N.C.

2003For the employment to constitute a "significant contributing factor," plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that absent the employment the occupational disease "would not have developed to such an extent that it caused the physical disability which resulted in claimant's incapacity for work." Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C.

2019“The benefit sought by the defendant must be more than a continued relationship with the plaintiff.” Sterner v. Penn, 159 N.C.

2018Judge DAVIS concurs. 5 The dissent contends that “[w]hether the two weeks, which may have passed between the breaking and entering and larceny and the discovery of the property being stolen, and Defendant’s admitted possession, is too remote to apply the doctrine of recent possession was a proper question for the jury[.]” We note that whether a defendant’s possession of stolen property was sufficiently “recent” after the larceny is the third element of the doctrine of recent possession, and our holding in this case “turns upon the second element [of the doctrine]: whether the stolen goods were

2018Judge DAVIS concurs. 5 The dissent contends that “[w]hether the two weeks, which may have passed between the breaking and entering and larceny and the discovery of the property being stolen, and Defendant’s admitted possession, is too remote to apply the doctrine of recent possession was a proper question for the jury[.]” We note that whether a defendant’s possession of stolen property was sufficiently “recent” after the larceny is the third element of the doctrine of recent possession, and our holding in this case “turns upon the second element [of the doctrine]: whether the stolen goods were

2010State v. Osborne, 149 N.C.

2003App. 351, 354 , 524 S.E.2d 368, 371 (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369-70 ), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 473 , 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000).

2003App. 351, 354 , 524 S.E.2d 368, 371 (quoting Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101 , 301 S.E.2d at 369-70 ), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 473 , 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000).

2001In order to satisfy the third element of the doctrine, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “ ‘had the time and means to avoid the *67 injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care after [she] discovered or should have discovered plaintiffs perilous condition.’ ” Id. at 507 , 534 S.E.2d at 245 (quoting Watson, 309 N.C. at 505-06 , 308 S.E.2d at 273 ).

2001In holding that the third element of the doctrine had been satisfied, the Nealy court found significant that the defendant, in attempting to avoid the plaintiff, had “pulled into the left lane only slightly notwithstanding that such lane was free of oncoming traffic and defendant could safely have proceeded farther.” Id. at 508 , 534 S.E.2d at 245 ; see also, Knote v. Nifong, 97 N.C.

2001App. 105, 108 , 387 S.E.2d 185, 187 , disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 597 , 393 S.E.2d 879 (1990) (third element established by testimony that, if defendant had moved vehicle further across highway, plaintiff’s motorcycle would have been able to get by defendant’s vehicle, thereby avoiding collision).

2001App. 105, 108 , 387 S.E.2d 185, 187 , disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 597 , 393 S.E.2d 879 (1990) (third element established by testimony that, if defendant had moved vehicle further across highway, plaintiff’s motorcycle would have been able to get by defendant’s vehicle, thereby avoiding collision).

2001“The reasonableness of a defendant’s opportunity to avoid doing injury must be determined on the particular facts of each case.” Vancamp, 328 N.C. at 499 , 402 S.E.2d at 377 .

2001In holding that the third element of the doctrine had been satisfied, the Nealy court found significant that the defendant, in attempting to avoid the plaintiff, had “pulled into the left lane only slightly notwithstanding that such lane was free of oncoming traffic and defendant could safely have proceeded farther.” Id. at 508 , 534 S.E.2d at 245 ; see also, Knote v. Nifong, 97 N.C.

2001In order to satisfy the third element of the doctrine, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “ ‘had the time and means to avoid the *67 injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care after [she] discovered or should have discovered plaintiffs perilous condition.’ ” Id. at 507 , 534 S.E.2d at 245 (quoting Watson, 309 N.C. at 505-06 , 308 S.E.2d at 273 ).

2001In order to satisfy the third element of the doctrine, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “ ‘had the time and means to avoid the *67 injury to the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable care after [she] discovered or should have discovered plaintiffs perilous condition.’ ” Id. at 507 , 534 S.E.2d at 245 (quoting Watson, 309 N.C. at 505-06 , 308 S.E.2d at 273 ).

1990Leaving aside the evidence that indicates that she sometimes doubted that defendant was keeping his promise to protect her, since for the purposes of the appeal contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded, Murray v. Murray, 296 N.C. 405 , 250 S.E.2d 276 (1979), this element is supported by evidence that though Braswell had threatened to kill her she did not leave the county or go into hiding; did not have or seek to obtain a traveling companion; did not carry a weapon or quit going to her job; did not file an action under Chapter 50B of t

1990Leaving aside the evidence that indicates that she sometimes doubted that defendant was keeping his promise to protect her, since for the purposes of the appeal contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded, Murray v. Murray, 296 N.C. 405 , 250 S.E.2d 276 (1979), this element is supported by evidence that though Braswell had threatened to kill her she did not leave the county or go into hiding; did not have or seek to obtain a traveling companion; did not carry a weapon or quit going to her job; did not file an action under Chapter 50B of t