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16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TGS-NOPEC GEOPHYSICAL CO. v. Combsgreen2 sentences2012See id. §§ 1101.606, .607, .609, .610, .611; see also TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex. 2011) (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction and indeed of language itself that words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which they are used.”). 2012See id. §§ 1101.606, .607, .609, .610, .611; see also TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tex.2011) (“It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction and indeed of language itself that words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which they are used.”). | 3 | 3 |
Schwartz v. F.M.I. Properties Corp.green2 sentences2008Corp., this court similarly recognized the federal constitutional requirement of providing a means for a judgment debtor to challenge the judgment and observed the UEFJA could not be read as a pure registration statute. 714 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). [6] For example, if the judgment debtor was the plaintiff in the original action but lost a counterclaim, the reasoning in Moncrief would dictate the conclusion that, having chosen the original forum, the debtor would be unable to preserve a challenge to any Texas venue. [7] Fair Labor Standards Act of 2008Corp., this court similarly recognized the federal constitutional requirement of providing a means for a judgment debtor to challenge the judgment and observed the UEFJA could not be read as a pure registration statute. 714 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex.App .-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). . | 2 | 2 |
Walnut Equipment Leasing Co. v. Wen Lung Wugreen2 sentences2008See Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso, 98 S.W.3d at 279; Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 714-15 ; Bahr, 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone, 858 S.W.2d at 548. 2008See Wu , 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso , 93 S.W.3d at 279 ; Reading & Bates , 976 S.W.2d at 714 B 15; Bahr , 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone , 858 S.W.2d at 548 . | 2 | 2 |
Markham v. Diversified Land & Exploration Co.green2 sentences2002Markham v. Diversified Land & Exploration Co. , 973 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. denied). 2001Markham, 973 S.W.2d at 439 . | 1 | 3 |
Malone v. Emmert Industrial Corp.green2 sentences2008See Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso, 98 S.W.3d at 279; Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 714-15 ; Bahr, 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone, 858 S.W.2d at 548. 2008See Wu , 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso , 93 S.W.3d at 279 ; Reading & Bates , 976 S.W.2d at 714 B 15; Bahr , 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone , 858 S.W.2d at 548 . | 1 | 2 |
Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp.green2 sentences2008See Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso, 98 S.W.3d at 279; Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 714-15 ; Bahr, 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone, 858 S.W.2d at 548. 2008See Wu , 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso , 93 S.W.3d at 279 ; Reading & Bates , 976 S.W.2d at 714 B 15; Bahr , 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone , 858 S.W.2d at 548 . | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. Westgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Davis v. West, 317 S.W.3d 301 , 308-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding that a judgment debtor’s claim in a Brazoria County suit that a receiver’s “powers exceed[ed] that allowed by the statute” constituted an impermissible “collateral attack on the turnover order” that appointed the receiver in a prior Harris County suit); Sun Tec Computer, Inc. v. Recovar Group, LLC, No. 05-14-00257- 23 CV, 2015 WL 5099191 , at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a judgment debtor could not attack “actions taken by the receiver” pursuant to | 1 | 1 |
Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A.green1 sentence2023See Cantu v. Howard S. Grossman, P.A., 251 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (Frost, J., dissenting) (concluding that a UEFJA proceeding is not a “lawsuit” subject to Texas’ venue statute); Moncrief v. Harvey, No. 05-90-01116-CV, 1991 WL 258684 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 26, 1991, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (concluding that the judgment debtor could not challenge a UEFJA filing for improper venue because the UEFJA gave the judgment debtor “all those defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying a judgment that they can bring pos | 1 | 1 |
Urso v. Lyon Financial Services, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Wu , 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso , 93 S.W.3d at 279 ; Reading & Bates , 976 S.W.2d at 714 B 15; Bahr , 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone , 858 S.W.2d at 548 . | 1 | 1 |
Don Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd.green1 sentence2008No. 93-259, sec. 6 (d)(1), 88 Stat. 55 (which substituted "maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction" for "maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . . "). [8] Our dissenting colleague complains that this court "should not adopt a statutory interpretation of the general venue statute that frustrates both the legislature's desire for uniformity among states and the dominant purpose of the Uniform Act." On the contrary, our disposition is consistent with every State that has ruled on this very question. [9] The | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bahr v. Kohr
green
2 sentences2008See Wu, 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso, 98 S.W.3d at 279; Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 714-15 ; Bahr, 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone, 858 S.W.2d at 548. 2008See Wu , 920 S.W.2d at 286 ; Urso , 93 S.W.3d at 279 ; Reading & Bates , 976 S.W.2d at 714 B 15; Bahr , 928 S.W.2d at 100 ; Malone , 858 S.W.2d at 548 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
International Armament Corp., Firearms International Inc. and Alan Aronstein v. Stocker & Lancaster LLP
green
1 sentence2026Int’l Armament Corp., 565 S.W.3d at 826 ; TEX. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Karstetter v. Voss
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 401-02 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Minuteman Press International, Inc. v. Sparks
green
2 sentences2001Minuteman, 782 S.W.2d at 340 ; Hill Country Spring Water, 773 S.W.2d at 639 . 2001Minuteman, 782 S.W.2d at 340 ; Hill Country Spring Water, 773 S.W.2d at 639 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hill Country Spring Water of Texas, Inc. v. Krug
green
2 sentences2001Minuteman, 782 S.W.2d at 340 ; Hill Country Spring Water, 773 S.W.2d at 639 . 2001Minuteman, 782 S.W.2d at 340 ; Hill Country Spring Water, 773 S.W.2d at 639 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield
green
2 sentences1983That precise issue was addressed by the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals in Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964, writ ref'd). 1983That precise issue was addressed by the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals in Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Duffield, 385 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964, writ ref’d). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.