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11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCreadie v. Arquesgreen1 sentence2025(Id. at pp. 1146, 1149-1150.) Stiles found the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the judgment “[g]iven that the [defendant] satisfied only one of the three criteria necessary for setting aside a default.” (Id. at p. 1150.) In McCreadie v. Arques (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 39, 48 (McCreadie), the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Rendagreen1 sentence2022(Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Renda (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 14, 19-22 (Airlines Reporting Corp).) 7 they are neither listed in the statute, nor catalogued in the Law Review Commission’s comment. | 1 | 1 |
Bruton v. Tearlegreen2 sentences1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” 1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” | 1 | 1 |
Ogle v. Heimgreen1 sentence1981Klein, P. J., and Cobey, J., concurred. 1 Code of Civil Procedure section 690.50 provides the procedure by which a judgment debtor may claim, as exempt, property which has been levied upon under writ of execution. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 690.18, subdivision (a), provides: “Except with regard to court-ordered child or spousal support payments, all money received by any person, a resident of the state, as a pension, or as an annuity or retirement or disability or death or other benefit, or as a return of contributions and interest thereon, from the United States government, or from the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spencer v. Lowery
green
2 sentences1998In so ruling, the trial court relied on the decision in Spencer v. Lowery (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1636 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 795 ], which held that a judgment debtor may not claim a homestead exemption on the proceeds of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 1998In so ruling, the trial court relied on the decision in Spencer v. Lowery (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1636 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 795 ], which held that a judgment debtor may not claim a homestead exemption on the proceeds of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
WV 23 Jumpstart, LLC v. Mynarcik
green
2 sentences2024The authority he cited for this proposition, WV 23 Jumpstart, LLC v. Mynarcik (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 596 , in the context of a similar provision in the Sister State Money Judgments Act (§ 1710.10 et seq.; see § 1710.40, subd. (a)), explains briefly that “a judgment debtor may challenge a judgment based on a lack of ‘fundamental jurisdiction’ at any time, regardless of the 30-day rule set forth in the Act.” (Mynarcik, at p. 606, fn. 3.) The question in Mynarcik was whether the California court had personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, a matter that clearly implicates the court’s fundam 2024The authority he cited for this proposition, WV 23 Jumpstart, LLC v. Mynarcik (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 596 , in the context of a similar provision in the Sister State Money Judgments Act (§ 1710.10 et seq.; see § 1710.40, subd. (a)), explains briefly that “a judgment debtor may challenge a judgment based on a lack of ‘fundamental jurisdiction’ at any time, regardless of the 30-day rule set forth in the Act.” (Mynarcik, at p. 606, fn. 3.) The question in Mynarcik was whether the California court had personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, a matter that clearly implicates the court’s fundam | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Taylor v. Madigan
green
1 sentence2023(Id. at pp. 350-351, 354.) The court in Taylor v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 943 , similarly concluded that after a judgment is rendered, constitutional due process does not require that the judgment debtor receive a second notice of the existence of the homestead exemption prior to levy by the judgment creditor. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ilshin Investment Co. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014(See Ilshin Investment Co., Ltd. v. 20 Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 612, 627 .) The legislative history cited by Vartelas does not support a contrary interpretation. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Phillips v. Bartolomie
green
2 sentences1995(Cf. Phillips v. Bartolomie (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 346 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 56 ], rejecting the contention that levy on exempt property without a prior judicial hearing is a denial of due process.) There is no arbitrary deprivation of property in the requirement that a judgment debtor claim and prove his or her exemption. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Enforcement of Judgment § 165, p. 156.) VI. 1995(Cf. Phillips v. Bartolomie (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 346 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 56 ], rejecting the contention that levy on exempt property without a prior judicial hearing is a denial of due process.) There is no arbitrary deprivation of property in the requirement that a judgment debtor claim and prove his or her exemption. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Enforcement of Judgment § 165, p. 156.) VI. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Slaughter v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1981The commissioner may defend any such action on behalf of the fund and shall have recourse to all appropriate means of defense and review including examinations of witnesses." Section 10473.1, as added in 1969, differed from its present version by (1) omitting the sentence giving the judgment debtor defense rights, and (2) stating that the judgment, instead of creating a rebuttable presumption, was "prima facie evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of the fraud...." Slaughter v. Edwards (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 285 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 144 ] held that, because the broker was not party to a proceeding 1981The commissioner may defend any such action on behalf of the fund and shall have recourse to all appropriate means of defense and review including examinations of witnesses." Section 10473.1, as added in 1969, differed from its present version by (1) omitting the sentence giving the judgment debtor defense rights, and (2) stating that the judgment, instead of creating a rebuttable presumption, was "prima facie evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of the fraud...." Slaughter v. Edwards (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 285 [ 90 Cal. Rptr. 144 ] held that, because the broker was not party to a proceeding | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McIntosh v. McIntosh
green
2 sentences1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” 1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Rankins v. Rankins
green
2 sentences1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” 1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Henry v. Henry
green
2 sentences1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” 1981(Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.2d 48, 53 [ 59 P.2d 953 , 106 A.L.R. 580 ]; McIntosh v. McIntosh, 209 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 28 ]; Henry v. Henry, 182 Cal.App.2d 707 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 418 ]; Rankins v. Rankins, 52 Cal.App.2d 231 [ 126 P.2d 125 ].) [Fn. omitted.]” | 1 | 1981–1981 |
German National Bank v. First National Bank
neutral
2 sentences1921Bank, 55 Neb. 86 , [ 75 N. W. 531 ], where it was held that the fact that the defendant had applied the proceeds of the converted property to a debt owed by the judgment debtor was no defense to a creditor’s suit for the conversion. [4] Res adjudicata is another defense advanced by defendant ■ which cannot be sustained. 1921Bank, 55 Neb. 86 , [ 75 N. W. 531 ], where it was held that the fact that the defendant had applied the proceeds of the converted property to a debt owed by the judgment debtor was no defense to a creditor’s suit for the conversion. [4] Res adjudicata is another defense advanced by defendant ■ which cannot be sustained. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.