report violation in Texas

2018A report of a violation of law under the TWA must be in “good faith.” City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).

2014A report of a violation of law under the Whistleblower Act must be in “good faith.” City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex.2010).

2007The court specifically noted that "[t]he statute contains no exception to the report requirement or discovery stay for inadequate or incomplete medical records." Id. at 409 (referencing In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. conditionally granted])).

2007The court specifically noted that “[t]he statute contains no exception to the report requirement or discovery stay for inadequate or incomplete medical records.” Id. at 409 (referencing In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. conditionally granted])).

2025“An employee’s actions taken pursuant to his duties and authorized by state law are considered actions taken by the State,” and courts have held that for whistleblower purposes, the acts of an appointed officer that fall within the authority of his office, even if he misuses that authority, “should be construed as acts of the employing governmental entity.” Housing Auth. of City of El 23 of 159 App. 000024 Copy from re:SearchTX Paso v. Rangel, 131 S.W.3d 542, 547-48 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. granted by agr., judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 403 (5th Cir. 1

2016Further, although the evidence presented by Bastrop County indicates that Montie had a disagreement with Mollaghan that was separate from any alleged violation of the Penal Code or the Order, “[t]he fact that an employee harbors malice toward an individual should not negate the Whistleblower Act’s protection if the employee’s report of a violation of law was honestly believed and objectively reasonable given the employee’s training and experience.” Wichita Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. 1996).

2024Yoder, however, contends that the report fails to meet the “objective, good faith effort” standard, and “if a report does not meet the standard set in Scoresby [v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 557 (Tex. 2011)] it is not an expert report under the [Medical Liability Act],” and thus allowing an amended report was an error.

2017Id. § 74.351(l); see Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 502 ("The purpose of the TMLA’s expert report requirement is not to have claims dismissed regardless of their merits, but rather it is to identify and deter frivolous claims while not unduly restricting a claimant’s rights.” (citing Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. 2011))); Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. 2013) ("[O]ne purpose of the report requirement is ‘to expeditiously weed out claims that have no merit.’ ” (quoting Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 263 (Tex. 2012))); id. (“[T]he purpose of evaluating expert

2022See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. 2002) (“[W]hen feasible, we should consistently interpret terms used throughout a statute.”). 15 App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (emphasis added), superseded by statute on other grounds, TEX.

2014Without applying the good faith test as it applied to the report of a violation of law, the court concluded the same test applies “to determine if a public employee in good faith believed the governmental entity to which he reported a violation of law was an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Id. at 320- 21.

2018In 31 accordance with this goal, we have opined that one purpose of the report requirement is "to expeditiously weed out claims that have -- no merit." Loaisiga, v. Cerda 379 S.W.3d 248, 263 .

2017Id. § 74.351(l); see Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 502 ("The purpose of the TMLA’s expert report requirement is not to have claims dismissed regardless of their merits, but rather it is to identify and deter frivolous claims while not unduly restricting a claimant’s rights.” (citing Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. 2011))); Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. 2013) ("[O]ne purpose of the report requirement is ‘to expeditiously weed out claims that have no merit.’ ” (quoting Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 263 (Tex. 2012))); id. (“[T]he purpose of evaluating expert

2017Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879 )); Smith v. Wall, No. 03-13-00482-CV, 2014 WL 2918007 at *2, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 6533 at *6 (Tex. App.-Austin June 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 538 -40 & n.9; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878-79 ). .

2017Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 539 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879 )); Smith v. Wall, No. 03-13-00482-CV, 2014 WL 2918007 at *2, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 6533 at *6 (Tex. App.-Austin June 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 538 -40 & n.9; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878-79 ). .

2017Id. § 74.351(l); see Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 502 ("The purpose of the TMLA’s expert report requirement is not to have claims dismissed regardless of their merits, but rather it is to identify and deter frivolous claims while not unduly restricting a claimant’s rights.” (citing Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Tex. 2011))); Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. 2013) ("[O]ne purpose of the report requirement is ‘to expeditiously weed out claims that have no merit.’ ” (quoting Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 263 (Tex. 2012))); id. (“[T]he purpose of evaluating expert

2013In Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2013), the Texas Supreme Court stated that it has “opined that one purpose of the report requirement is to expeditiously weed out claims that have no merit” and “that the purpose of evaluating expert reports is to deter frivolous claims, not to dispose of claims regardless of their merits.” Thus, “[i]f a health care liability claim contains at least one viable liability theory, as evidenced by an expert report meeting the statutory requirements, the claim cannot be frivolous.” Id.

2023A report “express[ing] disagreement with remedial measures taken” or “internal policy recommendation[s] . . . is not a report of a violation of law that the Whistleblower Act was designed to protect.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885 . 5 Nor does the Act protect a “prediction of possible regulatory noncompliance,” id., or a complaint that internal administrative policies were not followed, see Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 854 ; Harris Cnty.

2023Thus “the elements of [a claim under the Act] can be considered as jurisdictional facts, when it is necessary to resolve whether a plaintiff has alleged a violation under the Act.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881 . “[T]o properly ‘report’ under the Act, a public employee must convey information that exposes or corroborates a violation of law or otherwise provide relevant, additional information that will help identify or investigate illegal conduct”; “[c]ommunicating unsupported opinions or legal conclusions is insufficient.” Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 184. “[T]he ‘good faith’ limitation modifies all the

2023A report “express[ing] disagreement with remedial measures taken” or “internal policy recommendation[s] . . . is not a report of a violation of law that the Whistleblower Act was designed to protect.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 885 . 5 Nor does the Act protect a “prediction of possible regulatory noncompliance,” id., or a complaint that internal administrative policies were not followed, see Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 854 ; Harris Cnty.

2016See Farran, 409 S.W.3d at 656 ; see also Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 857 (concluding that a Whistleblower report to the university police was not a report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority when the employee did not make the report of the violation of the law until after the alleged retaliatory acts occurred); Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs. v. Loya, 491 S.W.3d 920, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss retaliation claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act when employee’s protected activity could not have caused

2015Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hinds, Concurrently, in compliance with the TEA report and 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.1995).

2004Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.1995).

2011Law Prohibiting Complained-of Conduct Although there is no requirement that an employee identify a specific law when making a report and no requirement that the employee establish an actual violation of the law, Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642 , there must be some law prohibiting the *908 complained-of-conduct to give rise to a whistleblower claim.

2011Law Prohibiting Complained-of Conduct Although there is no requirement that an employee identify a specific law when making a report and no requirement that the employee establish an actual violation of the law, Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642 , there must be some law prohibiting the 7 complained-of-conduct to give rise to a whistleblower claim.

2007The court specifically noted that "[t]he statute contains no exception to the report requirement or discovery stay for inadequate or incomplete medical records." Id. at 409 (referencing In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. conditionally granted])).

2007The court specifically noted that “[t]he statute contains no exception to the report requirement or discovery stay for inadequate or incomplete medical records.” Id. at 409 (referencing In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. conditionally granted])).

2004See id.

2004See id.

2012As one court explained, “[t]he fact that an employee makes a report of a violation of law to his employer or superi- or regarding the work being performed by the governmental entity that employs him does not automatically render the Whistle-blower Act inapplicable.” Okoli, 317 S.W.3d at 810-11 .

2012As one court explained, “[t]he fact that an employee makes a report of a violation of law to his employer or superior regarding the work being performed by the governmental entity that employs him does not automatically render the Whistleblower Act inapplicable.” Okoli, 317 S.W.3d at 810–11.

2026Ctr. v. Weems, 575 S.W.3d 357, 363 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that the Texas Medical Liability Act imposes a “threshold requirement that suits asserting health care liability claims must be supported by an expert report before litigation gets underway.”) (emphasis added); Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc. v. McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2010) (“The Legislature created the threshold report requirement as a substantive hurdle for frivolous medical liability suits before litigation gets underway.”).

2012The Legislature created the threshold report requirement as a substantive hurdle for frivolous medical liability suits before litigation gets underway.” Id. (citing TEX.

2025“An employee’s actions taken pursuant to his duties and authorized by state law are considered actions taken by the State,” and courts have held that for whistleblower purposes, the acts of an appointed officer that fall within the authority of his office, even if he misuses that authority, “should be construed as acts of the employing governmental entity.” Housing Auth. of City of El 23 of 159 App. 000024 Copy from re:SearchTX Paso v. Rangel, 131 S.W.3d 542, 547-48 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. granted by agr., judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 403 (5th Cir. 1

2022Based on the record before us, we conclude, as a matter of law, Grim and Maynard made a report of a violation of law by the “employing governmental entity.” Briggs’s actions related to the public interest and her role as a council member, were not purely personal, and should be construed as acts of the City, at least for the purpose of determining coverage under the Act.22 See Office of Att’y Gen. of Tex. v. Brickman, 636 S.W.3d 659 , 672–74, 672 n.13, 673 n.15 (Tex. App.— Austin 2021, pet. pending) (rejecting arguments similar to those made by the City here—that the legislature intended to in

2025“An employee’s actions taken pursuant to his duties and authorized by state law are considered actions taken by the State,” and courts have held that for whistleblower purposes, the acts of an appointed officer that fall within the authority of his office, even if he misuses that authority, “should be construed as acts of the employing governmental entity.” Housing Auth. of City of El 23 of 159 App. 000024 Copy from re:SearchTX Paso v. Rangel, 131 S.W.3d 542, 547-48 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. granted by agr., judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 403 (5th Cir. 1

1996A report of a violation of law may be in good faith even though it is incorrect, as long as the belief is not unreasonable.” See 892 S.W.2d at 921 n. 11.

2020GOV’T CODE § 554.002. 2 City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. 2000).

2016Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69 ; Levingston, 221 S.W.3d at 226 .

2001Because we do not believe the Whistleblower Act precludes a complaint to an employer from constituting a report of a violation of law, because the Whistleblower Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed, Stinnett v. Williamson County Sheriffs Dep’t, 858 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ), and because the record contains sufficient evidence for us to so conclude, we hold that Needham’s actions constituted a “report” for purposes of the Whistleblower Act.

1995The City cites Stinnett v. Williamson County Sheriffs Department, 858 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, writ den’d), and argues that retaliation for a report of a violation of Section 2.18, “harassment made unlawful by Title VII and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act,” cannot be remedied by the Whistleblower Act.

2026Ctr. v. Weems, 575 S.W.3d 357, 363 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that the Texas Medical Liability Act imposes a “threshold requirement that suits asserting health care liability claims must be supported by an expert report before litigation gets underway.”) (emphasis added); Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc. v. McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2010) (“The Legislature created the threshold report requirement as a substantive hurdle for frivolous medical liability suits before litigation gets underway.”).

2025“An employee’s actions taken pursuant to his duties and authorized by state law are considered actions taken by the State,” and courts have held that for whistleblower purposes, the acts of an appointed officer that fall within the authority of his office, even if he misuses that authority, “should be construed as acts of the employing governmental entity.” Housing Auth. of City of El 23 of 159 App. 000024 Copy from re:SearchTX Paso v. Rangel, 131 S.W.3d 542, 547-48 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. granted by agr., judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 403 (5th Cir. 1

2025See County of Cameron v. he was employed by the State and his Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002). employment was adversely affected because he Pleadings relevant to a review of a plea to the made a report of a violation of law, in good faith, jurisdiction include amended petitions and to an appropriate law enforcement authority.