gross disproportionality principle in California

2024Federal Constitution “The Eighth Amendment [forbidding ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.)] prohibits ‘a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.’ (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 271 .) But ‘[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.’ (Id. at p. 272.) ‘The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case.’ (Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77 .) And while the ‘precise contours’

2024Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” (Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1001 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Consequently, “[s]uccessful challenges based on proportionality are extremely rare.” (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73 [noting “the precise contours” of the gross disproportionality principle in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case”]; Ewing, at p. 21.) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution “

2024(See Rummel v. Estelle, at p. 274 [life sentence for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80, forging a check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses]; Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 18 [25 years to life for stealing golf clubs]; Lockyer v. Andrade, at p. 77 [50 years to life for stealing video tapes].)” (People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160 , 1172 (Bernal).) Given the United States Supreme Court precedent described in Bernal, supra, we cannot say Clotfelter’s sentence—which the trial court imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law—violates the federal consti

2020I, § 17.) Similarly, under the federal Constitution, a punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” if it is “ ‘ “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” ’ ” (Meneses, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 ; see U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2001) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569 (Sullivan).) “The gross disproportionality principle reserv

2024Two justices were of the view that in cases not involving the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment provides for no judicial review whether the length of a legislatively mandated sentence is excessively disproportionate to the crime ([ Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S.] at pp. 962-994); the three concurring justices agreed that the length of a legislatively mandated sentence could be held unconstitutional, but only in cases of ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).) 55 disproportionate to the defendant’s “per

2020I, § 17.) Similarly, under the federal Constitution, a punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” if it is “ ‘ “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” ’ ” (Meneses, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 ; see U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2001) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569 (Sullivan).) “The gross disproportionality principle reserv

2024Two justices were of the view that in cases not involving the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment provides for no judicial review whether the length of a legislatively mandated sentence is excessively disproportionate to the crime ([ Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S.] at pp. 962-994); the three concurring justices agreed that the length of a legislatively mandated sentence could be held unconstitutional, but only in cases of ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).) 55 disproportionate to the defendant’s “per

2014A prison sentence violates article I, section 17, if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], fn. omitted.) “Lynch suggests three areas of focus: (1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with the punishment imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. [Citation.] Disproportionality

2022(Id. at p.__ [ 139 S.Ct. at p. 691 ].) A fine is excessive under the Eighth Amendment “if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (United States v. Bajakajian 34 (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334 .) In a gross disproportionality analysis, a court considers four factors: “(1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.” (People ex rel.

2000“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must *1322 bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. [Citations.] . . . [A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” (Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at p. 334 [ 118 S.Ct. at p. 2036 ].) Bajakajian adopted a gross disproportionality standard articulated in cruel and unusual punishments clause precedent to hold that a reviewin

2024Two justices were of the view that in cases not involving the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment provides for no judicial review whether the length of a legislatively mandated sentence is excessively disproportionate to the crime ([ Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S.] at pp. 962-994); the three concurring justices agreed that the length of a legislatively mandated sentence could be held unconstitutional, but only in cases of ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).) 55 disproportionate to the defendant’s “per

2024Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” (Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1001 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Consequently, “[s]uccessful challenges based on proportionality are extremely rare.” (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; see Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73 [noting “the precise contours” of the gross disproportionality principle in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case”]; Ewing, at p. 21.) Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution “

2024Two justices were of the view that in cases not involving the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment provides for no judicial review whether the length of a legislatively mandated sentence is excessively disproportionate to the crime ([ Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S.] at pp. 962-994); the three concurring justices agreed that the length of a legislatively mandated sentence could be held unconstitutional, but only in cases of ‘extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).) 55 disproportionate to the defendant’s “per

2020I, § 17.) Similarly, under the federal Constitution, a punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” if it is “ ‘ “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” ’ ” (Meneses, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 ; see U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2001) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569 (Sullivan).) “The gross disproportionality principle reserv

2020I, § 17.) Similarly, under the federal Constitution, a punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” if it is “ ‘ “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” ’ ” (Meneses, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 ; see U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2001) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569 (Sullivan).) “The gross disproportionality principle reserv

2020I, § 17.) Similarly, under the federal Constitution, a punishment may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” if it is “ ‘ “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” ’ ” (Meneses, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 ; see U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) “ ‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ ” (People v. Sullivan (2001) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 569 (Sullivan).) “The gross disproportionality principle reserv

2014Nor does the sentence in these circumstances “ ‘shock[] the conscience’ and offend[] fundamental notions of human dignity, considering the offender’s history and the seriousness of his offenses.” (People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092 [applying state constitutional standard].) We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant’s contention that because his sentence exceeds his remaining life expectancy, the sentence is de facto one of life without parole (LWOP) and therefore unconstitutional.

2014A prison sentence violates article I, section 17, if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], fn. omitted.) “Lynch suggests three areas of focus: (1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with the punishment imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. [Citation.] Disproportionality

2014A prison sentence violates article I, section 17, if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ], fn. omitted.) “Lynch suggests three areas of focus: (1) the nature of the offense and the offender; (2) a comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with the punishment imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. [Citation.] Disproportionality