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13 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
George v. Department of Services for Children, Youth & their Families (DSCYF/DFS)green2 sentences2017Accordingly, these claims are not subject to the procedural default rule in part because the Delaware Supreme Court will not generally hear these 3 Redden v. Slale, 150 A.3d 768, 772 (Del. 2016). 4 Super. 2017Accordingly, these claims are not subject to the procedural default rule in part because the Delaware Supreme Court will not generally hear these 3 Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768, 772 (Del. 2016). 4 Super. | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. Carriergreen2 sentences2025A. Claim I – Fraudulent Ballistics Examiner Carl Rone Rone’s transgressions first came to light in 2018 in Fowler v. State 181 while Fowler’s appeal from this Court’s denial of his postconviction relief motion was before the Delaware Supreme Court. 182 They were unknown at the time of 179 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335 , 344 (1980)). 180 Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 , at *4 (internal citations omitted). 181 194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018). 182 Id. at 17. 29 Mayfield’s trial and direct appeal. 183 Since this issue was not raised before, Mayfield must sho 2020We borrowed this proposition from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492 , a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court, in part, addressed the “cause” prong of the procedural default rule, see id. at 488-92 . | 1 | 2 |
Martinez v. Ryangreen2 sentences2021Compare Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17 (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.”). 2014Harris does not attempt to ground his argument in the text of the federal Constitution or any precedent, nor does Harris present a coherent argument about the duty of a state to provide a defendant with counsel for post-conviction proceedings when it has already 1 ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). 2 Id. at 1315-20 (holding that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assista | 1 | 2 |
Fahy v. Horngreen2 sentences2020Taylor was slightly different because it interpreted the procedural default claim as stated in Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008), a predecessor to Bronshtein that did not make clear whether the date of default was when the defendant’s deadline occurred or when the court applied the rule to the case. 2018R. 61. 6 See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 (Del. 2015) (applying amended Rule 61 to a motion filed merely six months after Rule 61 was amended). 7 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding Pennsylvania procedural rules could not bar federal review of the state court’s decision because the rules were not firmly established at the time of the prisoner’s default). 8 Id. at 187 . 6 prevent discrimination by means of inconsistently-applied procedural rules through whim or prejudice against a claimant. “[W]hether the rule was firmly established and regularly followed is determined as of the date | 1 | 2 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences2025A. Claim I – Fraudulent Ballistics Examiner Carl Rone Rone’s transgressions first came to light in 2018 in Fowler v. State 181 while Fowler’s appeal from this Court’s denial of his postconviction relief motion was before the Delaware Supreme Court. 182 They were unknown at the time of 179 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335 , 344 (1980)). 180 Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 , at *4 (internal citations omitted). 181 194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018). 182 Id. at 17. 29 Mayfield’s trial and direct appeal. 183 Since this issue was not raised before, Mayfield must sho 2025A. Claim I – Fraudulent Ballistics Examiner Carl Rone Rone’s transgressions first came to light in 2018 in Fowler v. State 181 while Fowler’s appeal from this Court’s denial of his postconviction relief motion was before the Delaware Supreme Court. 182 They were unknown at the time of 179 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335 , 344 (1980)). 180 Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 , at *4 (internal citations omitted). 181 194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018). 182 Id. at 17. 29 Mayfield’s trial and direct appeal. 183 Since this issue was not raised before, Mayfield must sho | 1 | 1 |
Ploof v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Scaggs has not attempted to establish the necessary “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation” to overcome the procedural default bar to relief. 33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 34 Were it to address the merits of the Motion, it is apparent that in order to grant Scaggs relief, he would need to persuade the Court to disregard much of what he said in his plea colloquy. 6 THERE | 1 | 1 |
Bailey v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Stevens’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not subject to the procedural default rule, 5 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). 6 Super. | 1 | 1 |
Flamer v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Ct. Nov. 24, 2014). 5 Id. (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)). 6 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 748 (Del. 1990). 2 Defendant has to show that he would not have been convicted if the claim had been raised.7 Defendant must show both cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default bar. 8 Here, Defendant did not demonstrate cause or prejudice; therefore, his assertions regarding his mental state are procedurally barred. | 1 | 1 |
Younger v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Ct. Nov. 24, 2014). 5 Id. (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)). 6 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 748 (Del. 1990). 2 Defendant has to show that he would not have been convicted if the claim had been raised.7 Defendant must show both cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default bar. 8 Here, Defendant did not demonstrate cause or prejudice; therefore, his assertions regarding his mental state are procedurally barred. | 1 | 1 |
Flamer v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Harris does not attempt to ground his argument in the text of the federal Constitution or any precedent, nor does Harris present a coherent argument about the duty of a state to provide a defendant with counsel for post-conviction proceedings when it has already 1 ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309 , 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). 2 Id. at 1315-20 (holding that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assista | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Robbins
green
2 sentences2023Sparaco’s Supplemental Brief does not address any of the bars to relief of Rule 61(i) at all.168 The State concedes that Cooper’s claims of ineffectiveness are not procedurally barred,169 but that “Cooper’s substantive claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3).”170 The bar to relief of Rule 61(i)(3) may be avoided if the movant shows: “(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) Prejudice from violation of the 165 Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285 ). 166 D.I. 120. 167 D.I. 135 at 63, 69. 168 D.I. 154. 169 State’s Resp., D.I. 160, at n. 6 and associated text. 170 Id. 2023Sparaco’s Supplemental Brief does not address any of the bars to relief of Rule 61(i) at all.168 The State concedes that Cooper’s claims of ineffectiveness are not procedurally barred,169 but that “Cooper’s substantive claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3).”170 The bar to relief of Rule 61(i)(3) may be avoided if the movant shows: “(A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) Prejudice from violation of the 165 Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285 ). 166 D.I. 120. 167 D.I. 135 at 63, 69. 168 D.I. 154. 169 State’s Resp., D.I. 160, at n. 6 and associated text. 170 Id. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2024Scaggs has not attempted to establish the necessary “cause for relief” and “prejudice from [the] violation” to overcome the procedural default bar to relief. 33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 34 Were it to address the merits of the Motion, it is apparent that in order to grant Scaggs relief, he would need to persuade the Court to disregard much of what he said in his plea colloquy. 6 THERE | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Bennett
green
1 sentence2018Therefore, Defendant cannot rely on the exceptions contained in Rule 6l(i)(3) to avoid summary dismissal of his Second PCR Motion. 15 HOlmeS v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Tabl€) (D€l. 2018); Durham v. State, 173 A.3d 1061 (Tabie) (Dei. 2017); Coles v. S¢a¢e, 169 A.3d 858 (Tabie) (D@i. 2017). 16 Super. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Durham v. State
green
1 sentence2018Therefore, Defendant cannot rely on the exceptions contained in Rule 6l(i)(3) to avoid summary dismissal of his Second PCR Motion. 15 HOlmeS v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Tabl€) (D€l. 2018); Durham v. State, 173 A.3d 1061 (Tabie) (Dei. 2017); Coles v. S¢a¢e, 169 A.3d 858 (Tabie) (D@i. 2017). 16 Super. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cannon v. State
green
1 sentence2018R. 61. 6 See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 (Del. 2015) (applying amended Rule 61 to a motion filed merely six months after Rule 61 was amended). 7 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding Pennsylvania procedural rules could not bar federal review of the state court’s decision because the rules were not firmly established at the time of the prisoner’s default). 8 Id. at 187 . 6 prevent discrimination by means of inconsistently-applied procedural rules through whim or prejudice against a claimant. “[W]hether the rule was firmly established and regularly followed is determined as of the date | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Campbell v. State
neutral
1 sentence2018Therefore, Defendant cannot rely on the exceptions contained in Rule 6l(i)(3) to avoid summary dismissal of his Second PCR Motion. 15 HOlmeS v. State, 180 A.3d 41 (Tabl€) (D€l. 2018); Durham v. State, 173 A.3d 1061 (Tabie) (Dei. 2017); Coles v. S¢a¢e, 169 A.3d 858 (Tabie) (D@i. 2017). 16 Super. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.