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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turpin v. Toddgreen2 sentences2011A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance, see Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-826 ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997), and ineffective assistance is the only argument that Perkins offers to excuse the procedural default of his claim that he was incompetent at trial. 2011A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance, see Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 824-826 ( 493 SE2d 900 ) (1997), and ineffective assistance is the only argument that Perkins offers to excuse the procedural default of his claim that he was incompetent at trial. | 2 | 2 |
Turpin v. Hillgreen2 sentences2021But cf. Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (3 and 4) (holding that, where alleged intellectual disability was not determined by a jury at trial despite the statutory provision allowing for such a claim at that stage, a habeas court may consider alleged intellectual disability under the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default rule). 2021But cf. Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (3 and 4) (holding that, where alleged intellectual disability was not determined by a jury at trial despite the statutory provision allowing for such a claim at that stage, a habeas court may consider alleged intellectual disability under the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default rule). | 1 | 4 |
Perkins v. Hallgreen2 sentences2019See Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822 (III) (C) (explaining that “[a] common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance”). 2019See Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822 (III) (C). | 1 | 1 |
Valenzuela v. Newsomegreen2 sentences2011Miscarriage of Justice In addition to the cause and prejudice exception, OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) provides an exception to the procedural default rule where necessary “to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Like its non-statutory federal counterpart, our statutory miscarriage of justice exception has always been interpreted as a very narrow exception tied to evidence of actual innocence, thereby advancing the fundamental purpose of the habeas writ, “which is to free the innocent wrongfully deprived of their liberty.” Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 796 ( 325 SE2d 370 ) (1985). 2011Miscarriage of Justice In addition to the cause and prejudice exception, OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) provides an exception to the procedural default rule where necessary “to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Like its non-statutory federal counterpart, our statutory miscarriage of justice exception has always been interpreted as a very narrow exception tied to evidence of actual innocence, thereby advancing the fundamental purpose of the habeas writ, “which is to free the innocent wrongfully deprived of their liberty.” Valenzuela v. Newsome, 253 Ga. 793, 796 ( 325 SE2d 370 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
White v. Kelsogreen2 sentences2007See White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 ( 401 SE2d 733 ) (1991). 2007See White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 ( 401 SE2d 733 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turpin v. Hillgreen2 sentences2021But cf. Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (3 and 4) (holding that, where alleged intellectual disability was not determined by a jury at trial despite the statutory provision allowing for such a claim at that stage, a habeas court may consider alleged intellectual disability under the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default rule). 2021But cf. Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (3 and 4) (holding that, where alleged intellectual disability was not determined by a jury at trial despite the statutory provision allowing for such a claim at that stage, a habeas court may consider alleged intellectual disability under the miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default rule). | 3 | 4 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zant v. Akins
green
2 sentences1987E.g., Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982); Rann v. State, 183 Ga. App. 234 (3) ( 358 SE2d 644 ) (1987). 1987E.g., Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982); Rann v. State, 183 Ga. App. 234 (3) ( 358 SE2d 644 ) (1987). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Rann v. State
green
2 sentences1987E.g., Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982); Rann v. State, 183 Ga. App. 234 (3) ( 358 SE2d 644 ) (1987). 1987E.g., Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5 (2) ( 295 SE2d 313 ) (1982); Rann v. State, 183 Ga. App. 234 (3) ( 358 SE2d 644 ) (1987). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.