procedural default doctrine in Connecticut

2025Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘although federal postconvic- tion jurisprudence does not bind us, this court has adopted the procedural default standard articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 , 97 S. Ct. 2497 , 53 L.

2025Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘although federal postconvic- tion jurisprudence does not bind us, this court has adopted the procedural default standard articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 , 97 S. Ct. 2497 , 53 L.

2025The procedural default doctrine is a Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Brown v. Commissioner of Correction prudential limitation on the right to raise constitutional claims in collateral proceedings that vindicates the interests of finality of judgments and uniformity.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saun- ders v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 9 . ‘‘Although ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is the most commonly asserted basis for cause to excuse procedural default . . . it is not the exclusive basis. . . . [T]he cause req

2025The procedural default doctrine is a Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 18 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Brown v. Commissioner of Correction prudential limitation on the right to raise constitutional claims in collateral proceedings that vindicates the interests of finality of judgments and uniformity.’’ (Cita- tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saun- ders v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 9 . ‘‘Although ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is the most commonly asserted basis for cause to excuse procedural default . . . it is not the exclusive basis. . . . [T]he cause req

2016In fact, the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, citing Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 409 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991) (adopting cause and prejudice as ‘‘the appropriate standard for reviewability in a habeas cor- pus proceeding of constitutional claims not adequately preserved at trial because of procedural default’’), spe- cifically emphasizes in his brief that he is not challeng- ing the Appellate Court’s consideration of the procedural default rule in its review of the petitioner’s claim, but only the manner in which the court applied the rule.

2016In fact, the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, citing Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 218 Conn. 403, 409 , 589 A.2d 1214 (1991) (adopting cause and prejudice as ‘‘the appropriate standard for reviewability in a habeas cor- pus proceeding of constitutional claims not adequately preserved at trial because of procedural default’’), spe- cifically emphasizes in his brief that he is not challeng- ing the Appellate Court’s consideration of the procedural default rule in its review of the petitioner’s claim, but only the manner in which the court applied the rule.

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2021We begin with a review of the procedural default rule. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a [peti- tioner] may not raise, in a collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018).

2016Accordingly, the majority cannot view Justice Katz’ concurring opinion, together with the opinion of the plurality, as supporting the conclusion that the procedural default rule does not apply to Salamon claims because Justice Katz had the broadest view of retroactiv- ity, not the narrowest, which means that the plurality opinion in Luurtsema has no legal effect, contrary to what the majority would like to believe. 4 In Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453 , 820 A.2d 1009 (2003), this court also recognized the United States Supreme Court’s holding in the context of procedural default that, ‘‘wher

2016Accordingly, the majority cannot view Justice Katz’ concurring opinion, together with the opinion of the plurality, as supporting the conclusion that the procedural default rule does not apply to Salamon claims because Justice Katz had the broadest view of retroactiv- ity, not the narrowest, which means that the plurality opinion in Luurtsema has no legal effect, contrary to what the majority would like to believe. 4 In Correia v. Rowland, 263 Conn. 453 , 820 A.2d 1009 (2003), this court also recognized the United States Supreme Court’s holding in the context of procedural default that, ‘‘wher

2019Therefore, attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not adequately excuse compliance with our rules of [trial and] appellate procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bru- netti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012).

2019Therefore, attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not adequately excuse compliance with our rules of [trial and] appellate procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bru- netti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012).

2019Therefore, attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not adequately excuse compliance with our rules of [trial and] appellate procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bru- netti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012).

2019Therefore, attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not adequately excuse compliance with our rules of [trial and] appellate procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bru- netti v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 160, 168 , 37 A.3d 811 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 903 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012).

2016The procedural default rule provides that the peti- tioner in a habeas proceeding ‘‘must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropri- ety claimed in the habeas petition.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 567 , 941 A.2d 248 (2008).

2016The procedural default rule provides that the peti- tioner in a habeas proceeding ‘‘must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropri- ety claimed in the habeas petition.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 567 , 941 A.2d 248 (2008).

2003Specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas court violated his federal and state due process rights by permitting the respondent to amend his return, in accordance with the Appellate Court’s decision in Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734 , 779 A.2d 156 (2001), to clarify the procedural default defense, while simultaneously concluding that the petitioner did not have cause for failing to raise his state constitutional claim at trial or on direct appeal.

2003Specifically, the petitioner contends that the habeas court violated his federal and state due process rights by permitting the respondent to amend his return, in accordance with the Appellate Court’s decision in Milner v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 726, 734 , 779 A.2d 156 (2001), to clarify the procedural default defense, while simultaneously concluding that the petitioner did not have cause for failing to raise his state constitutional claim at trial or on direct appeal.

2005The petitioner acknowledges that the issues raised in the amended petition *839 were not decided on the initial direct appeal because they resulted from the decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Carpenter, [supra, 214 Conn. 77 ].

2002The petitioner acknowledges that the "issues raised in the Amended Petition were not decided on the initial direct appeal because they resulted from the decision of the Supreme Court in State v. Carpenter , 214 Conn. 77 (1990)." Pet'r Reply to Return, at 1.

2025Because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the habeas court’s resolution of his claim on procedural default grounds is debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the claim raises a question that deserves encouragement to proceed further, we do not address this aspect of the petitioner’s claim. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 27 Canady v. Commissioner of Correction Conn. App. 837, 852, 97 A.3d 986 (2014), aff’d, 321 Conn. 56 , 136 A.3d 596 (2016). ‘‘The cause and prejudice standard [of reviewability] i

2024In the context of termination cases, extended litiga- tion imposes that burden on the most vulnerable people whom the system and such cases seek to protect: the children.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548 , 569 n.18, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017). 18 Pursuant to the procedural default doctrine, ‘‘a petitioner is barred from raising a claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding unless there is cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default . . . .’’ Rose v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333 , 347 n.8, 304 A.3d

2024In the context of termination cases, extended litiga- tion imposes that burden on the most vulnerable people whom the system and such cases seek to protect: the children.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548 , 569 n.18, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017). 18 Pursuant to the procedural default doctrine, ‘‘a petitioner is barred from raising a claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding unless there is cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default . . . .’’ Rose v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333 , 347 n.8, 304 A.3d

2024In the context of termination cases, extended litiga- tion imposes that burden on the most vulnerable people whom the system and such cases seek to protect: the children.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548 , 569 n.18, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017). 18 Pursuant to the procedural default doctrine, ‘‘a petitioner is barred from raising a claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding unless there is cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default . . . .’’ Rose v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 333 , 347 n.8, 304 A.3d

2023Objective factors external to the defense include, but are not limited to, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, outside interfer- ence by officials that made compliance impracticable, and ineffective assistance of counsel that violates the sixth amendment.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saunders v. Commiss- ioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 1, 20 , 272 A.3d 169 (2022).

2019For example, in Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 886 , 119 S. Ct. 199 , 142 L.

2019For example, in Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 818 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 886 , 119 S. Ct. 199 , 142 L.

2019But see Hinds v. Com- missioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 56 , 61, 136 A.3d 596 (2016) (concluding that ‘‘challenges to kidnapping instructions in criminal proceedings rendered final before [State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008)] are not subject to the procedural default rule’’); Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 422 , 641 A.2d 1356 (1994) (holding that substantial claim of actual innocence is not subject to procedural default rule).

2019But see Hinds v. Com- missioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 56 , 61, 136 A.3d 596 (2016) (concluding that ‘‘challenges to kidnapping instructions in criminal proceedings rendered final before [State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 , 949 A.2d 1092 (2008)] are not subject to the procedural default rule’’); Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 422 , 641 A.2d 1356 (1994) (holding that substantial claim of actual innocence is not subject to procedural default rule).

2019In order to resolve the petitioner’s claim on appeal, we begin with a review of the procedural default rule and its development. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a claimant may not raise, in a collateral pro- ceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018). ‘‘Prior to 1991, [our Supreme Court] emplo

2019In order to resolve the petitioner’s claim on appeal, we begin with a review of the procedural default rule and its development. ‘‘Under the procedural default doctrine, a claimant may not raise, in a collateral pro- ceeding, claims that he could have made at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding, unless he can prove that his default by failure to do so should be excused.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cator v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App. 167, 199 , 185 A.3d 601 , cert. denied, 329 Conn. 902 , 184 A.3d 1214 (2018). ‘‘Prior to 1991, [our Supreme Court] emplo

2019Specifically, the respondent cites to Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S. 107 , 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), for its conclusion that "any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before **558 obtaining relief." In explaining the rationale for requiring petitioners to establish both cause and prejudice, the United States Supreme Court explained that "writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.

2019Specifically, the respondent cites to Engle v. Isaac , 456 U.S. 107 , 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558 , 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), for its conclusion that "any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before **558 obtaining relief." In explaining the rationale for requiring petitioners to establish both cause and prejudice, the United States Supreme Court explained that "writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.