procedural default bar in Alabama

2015In Martinez , the United States Supreme Court held that “[w]here,- under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must-be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceedings, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” — U.S. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 .

2011The Court was clear to point out, however, that the procedural-default rule, and thus the exception the Court created to that rule, is “neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement,” but a federal “doctrine adhered to by courts to conserve judicial resources.” 538 U.S. at 504 .

2006In Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: “The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua sponte in a habeas case.” (Footnote omitted.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 , 126 S.Ct. 1675 , 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), held that a federal court could apply a procedural default bar sua sponte if the petitioner was given an opportunity to d

2006In Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: “The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua sponte in a habeas case.” (Footnote omitted.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 , 126 S.Ct. 1675 , 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), held that a federal court could apply a procedural default bar sua sponte if the petitioner was given an opportunity to d

2006In Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: “The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua sponte in a habeas case.” (Footnote omitted.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 , 126 S.Ct. 1675 , 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), held that a federal court could apply a procedural default bar sua sponte if the petitioner was given an opportunity to d

2006In Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir.1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua sponte in a habeas case." (Footnote omitted.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 , 126 S.Ct. 1675 , 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), *535 held that a federal court could apply a procedural default bar sua sponte if the petitioner was given an opportunity

2006However, the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), contains permissive procedural default bars— bars that may be excused if the petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice.” As this Court has stated: “Although in federal court a habeas petitioner can allege that the ineffective assistance of counsel was ‘cause and prejudice’ to excuse a procedural default, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 , 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), Alabama state courts in postconviction proceedings do not recognize the cause and prejudice exception.

2006However, the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), contains permissive procedural default bars— bars that may be excused if the petitioner establishes “cause and prejudice.” As this Court has stated: “Although in federal court a habeas petitioner can allege that the ineffective assistance of counsel was ‘cause and prejudice’ to excuse a procedural default, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 , 106 S.Ct. 2639 , 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), Alabama state courts in postconviction proceedings do not recognize the cause and prejudice exception.

1999See Zapata v. Estelle , 588 F.2d 1017 , 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); Nathaniel v. Estelle , 493 F.2d 794 , 798 (5th Cir. 1974); Bruce v. Estelle , 483 F.2d 1031 , 1037 (5th Cir. 1973).

1999See Zapata v. Estelle , 588 F.2d 1017 , 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); Nathaniel v. Estelle , 493 F.2d 794 , 798 (5th Cir. 1974); Bruce v. Estelle , 483 F.2d 1031 , 1037 (5th Cir. 1973).

1999Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Adams's petition for the writ of habeas corpus, it wrote: "Binding precedent fully supports the petitioner's contention that the procedural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), does not operate to preclude a defendant who failed to request a competency hearing at trial or pursue a claim of incompetency on direct appeal from contesting his competency to stand trial and be sentenced through post-conviction proceedings.

1999Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Adams's petition for the writ of habeas corpus, it wrote: "Binding precedent fully supports the petitioner's contention that the procedural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), does not operate to preclude a defendant who failed to request a competency hearing at trial or pursue a claim of incompetency on direct appeal from contesting his competency to stand trial and be sentenced through post-conviction proceedings.

1991Dugger v. Adams , 489 U.S. 401 , 109 S.Ct. 1211 , 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989).

1991Dugger v. Adams , 489 U.S. 401 , 109 S.Ct. 1211 , 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989).