13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Levine v. Dade County School Bd.green2 sentences2011In Levine v. Dade County School Board, 442 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.1983), we observed that “[sjection 768.28(6) clearly requires written notice to the department within three years of the accrual of the claim before suit may be filed against any state agency or subdivision except a municipality.” 2 Given the express requirement of notice in subsection (6), and the express statement that notice and denial of the claim are conditions precedent to maintaining a negligence cause of action, we find it instructive that subsection (7) does not further require service of process on DFS as a condition prec 1992In Levine v. Dade County School Board, 442 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.1983), the court pointed out that the language in the statutory notice provision is very clear and must be strictly construed: Section 768.28(6) clearly requires written notice to the department within three years of the accrual of the claim before suit may be filed against any state agency or subdivision except a municipality. | 4 | 5 |
Iselin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024Put differently, given the comprehensive statutory framework governing accrual, “[t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 , 46 S.Ct. 248 , 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926); see also S. Ct. Adept, 271 So. 3d at 886 (Canady, J., dissenting) (“The accrual doctrine should not be manipulated when the Legislature has clearly pronounced what the exceptions are and are not.”). 2024Put differently, given the comprehensive statutory framework governing accrual, “[t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 , 46 S.Ct. 248 , 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926); see also S. Ct. Adept, 271 So. 3d at 886 (Canady, J., dissenting) (“The accrual doctrine should not be manipulated when the Legislature has clearly pronounced what the exceptions are and are not.”). | 1 | 3 |
Simon Dockswell v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc., etc.green1 sentence2023However, Dr. Neall did not make that argument at the hearing, and it was not the basis of the trial court’s dismissal of the action against him. 9 Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2017); Pierrot v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc., 106 So. 3d 491, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
Pierrot v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc.green1 sentence2023However, Dr. Neall did not make that argument at the hearing, and it was not the basis of the trial court’s dismissal of the action against him. 9 Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2017); Pierrot v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc., 106 So. 3d 491, 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). | 1 | 1 |
D.H. v. Adept Community Services, Inc.green1 sentence2020Put differently, given the comprehensive statutory framework governing accrual, “[t]o supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926); see also S. Ct. Adept, 271 So. 3d at 886 (Canady, J., - 14 - dissenting) (“The accrual doctrine should not be manipulated when the Legislature has clearly pronounced what the exceptions are and are not.”). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Gallaghergreen1 sentence2011See Turner v. Gallagher, 640 So.2d 120, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“[Although section 768.28(6) imposes a deadline for the giving of notice, section 768.28(7) does not, on its own, establish any time limits for serving the Department of [Financial Services].”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sap v. State, Dhrs
green
2 sentences2017Expressing the accrual rule applicable to the claims of a minor, the First District stated that "the statute could not begin to run against [a] minor child until a parent, guardian, or next friend knew or reasonably should have known of facts which supported the child's cause of action." Id. (emphasis added). 2017Expressing the accrual rule applicable to the claims of a minor, the First District stated that “the statute could not begin to run against [a] minor child until a parent, guardian, or next Mend knew or reasonably should have known of facts which supported the child’s cause of action.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Dade County v. Ferro
green
1 sentence1992The holding in Johnson was explained in Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 1980), which distinguished the accrual of a claim under the particular limitations provision involved in Johnson from the occurrence of a claim under other limitations provisions. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Abston v. Bryan
green
1 sentence1990Although not expressly addressing the issue as framed in this case, the same result was obtained in Abston v. Bryan, 519 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), in which the fifth district concluded the complaint alleging medical malpractice was filed timely within two years and ninety days of the accrual of the claim. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Perez v. Department of Transp.
green
1 sentence1985Perez v. Department of Transportation, 435 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1983), should also be considered, wherein the supreme court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in order to state a cause of action consistent with the rule announced by it in City of St. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.