accrual claim in New York

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147 [2008]), is whether the public corporation acquired actual [knowledge] of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter” (Matter of Jackson v Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist., 85 AD3d 1031, 1031 [2011]).

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147 [2008]), is whether the public corporation acquired actual [knowledge] of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter” (Matter of Jackson v Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist., 85 AD3d 1031, 1031 [2011]).

2005Section 1744 (2) of Public Authorities Law provides, in part: "No action or proceeding for any cause whatever, other than the one for personal injury, death, property damage or tort . . . relating to the design, construction, reconstruction, improvement, rehabilitation, repair, furnishing or equipping of educational facilities, shall be prosecuted or maintained against [SCA] . . . unless (i) it shall appear by and as an allegation in the complaint or moving papers, that a detailed, written, verified notice of each claim upon which any part of such action or proceeding is founded was presented

2005Section 1744 (2) of Public Authorities Law provides, in part: “No action or proceeding for any cause whatever, other than the one for personal injury, death, property damage or tort . . . relating to the design, construction, reconstruction, improvement, rehabilitation, repair, furnishing or equipping of educational facilities, shall be prosecuted or maintained against [SCA] . . . unless (i) it shall appear by and as an allegation in the complaint or moving papers, that a detailed, written, verified notice of each claim upon which any part of such action or proceeding is founded was presented

2020"The most important factor based on its placement in the statute and its relation to other relevant factors is whether the [municipal] corporation acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 [*2]days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter" ( Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 880 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776, 777 ).

2019In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider, in particular, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter ( see Matter of Naar v City of New York , 161 AD3d 1081 , 1082; Matter of Maldonado v City of New York , 152 AD3d 522 ; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776 ).

2015Although late service of a notice of claim by leave of court is permitted under certain circumstances, the petitioner was required to petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim within one year and 90 days of the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; McShane v Town of Hempstead, 66 AD3d 652 , 653 [2009]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760, 761 [2007]; Alston v Aversano, 24 AD3d 399, 400 [2005]).

2013The plaintiff was required to petition or move for leave within one year and 90 days after the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; Shahid v City of New York, 50 AD3d 770 [2008]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760 [2007]; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d 414, 415 [2006]).

2013The plaintiff was required to petition or move for leave within one year and 90 days after the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; Shahid v City of New York, 50 AD3d 770 [2008]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760 [2007]; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d 414, 415 [2006]).

2013The plaintiff was required to petition or move for leave within one year and 90 days after the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; Shahid v City of New York, 50 AD3d 770 [2008]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760 [2007]; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d 414, 415 [2006]).

2019Court of Claims Act § 10(4) provides that "[a] claim for breach of contract, express or implied, . . . over which jurisdiction has been conferred upon the court of claims, shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within six months after the accrual of such claim." A breach of contract claim accrues under Court of Claims Act § 10(4) when it matures and damages are reasonably ascertainable ( see Ro Jo Lo Partners v State of New York , 226 AD2d 896, 896 ; Flushing Natl.

2000It is axiomatic that the failure to file a notice of claim with the State within 90 days of the accrual of the claim is a fatal jurisdictional defect (see, Court of Claims Act § 10 [3]; Selkirk v State of New York, 249 AD2d 818, 819 ; Ro Jo Lo Partners v State of New York, 226 AD2d 896 ).

2021Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (3), "[a] claim to recover damages for . . . personal injuries caused by the negligence or unintentional tort of an officer or employee of the state while acting as such officer or employee, shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within ninety days after the accrual of such claim, unless the claimant shall within such time serve upon the attorney general a written notice of intention to file a claim therefor, in which event the claim shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within two years after the accrual of such claim." It is wel

2013It is well settled that “ ‘[flailure to comply with either the filing or service provisions of the Court of Claims Act results in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction requiring dismissal of the claim’ ” (Hatzfeld v State of New York, 104 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2013]).

2021Pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (3), "[a] claim to recover damages for . . . personal injuries caused by the negligence or unintentional tort of an officer or employee of the state while acting as such officer or employee, shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within ninety days after the accrual of such claim, unless the claimant shall within such time serve upon the attorney general a written notice of intention to file a claim therefor, in which event the claim shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within two years after the accrual of such claim." It is wel

2013We conclude that the Court of Claims properly granted the cross motion inasmuch as the claim was not filed and served nor was a notice of intention to file a claim served upon the Attorney General within 90 days after the accrual of the claim (see § 10 [3]; Ivy v State of New York, 27 AD3d 1190, 1191 [2006]).

2016Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) provides, inter alia, that a claim to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a state employee must be filed within 90 days after the accrual of such claim, unless the claimant within such time serves a written notice of intention to file a claim, in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the accrual of the claim (see Bennett v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1040, 1040 [2013]; Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 497 [2001]).

2013Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) provides, inter alia, that a claim to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of a state employee must be filed within 90 days after the accrual of such claim, unless the claimant within such time serves a written notice of intention to file a claim, in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the accrual of the claim (see Welch v State of New York, 286 AD2d 496, 497 [2001]).

2015In determining whether to extend the time to serve a notice of claim, the court must consider “ ‘whether the public corpora *533 tion acquired actual [knowledge] of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter,’ ” as well as whether the claimant has a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits (Matter of Katsiouras v City of New York, 106 AD3d 916 , 917 [2013], quoting Matter of Jackson

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147 [2008]), is whether the public corporation acquired actual [knowledge] of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter” (Matter of Jackson v Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist., 85 AD3d 1031, 1031 [2011]).

2013Here, plaintiff was unable to assert a cause of action for fraudulent inducement until she sustained damages resulting from the fraud, i.e., when she was terminated from her new position during its probationary period (see Vilsack, 96 AD3d at 828 ; see generally Kronos, 81 NY2d at 94 ).

2013Here, plaintiff was unable to assert a cause of action for fraudulent inducement until she sustained damages resulting from the fraud, i.e., when she was terminated from her new position during its probationary period (see Vilsack, 96 AD3d at 828 ; see generally Kronos, 81 NY2d at 94 ).

2015The most important factor, based on its placement in the statute and its relation to other relevant factors, is whether the public corporation acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991, 991-992 [2009]; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147 [2008]; see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776, 778 [2010]; Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991 [2009]), is whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

1996Auth., 184 AD2d 760 ) was tolled between the accrual of the claim and the discovery of the malpractice in 1990, since the defendant continuously represented the plaintiffs during that period by performing legal services related to the matter out of which the malpractice claim arose (see, Weiss v Manfredi, 83 NY2d 974 ; Glamm v Allen, supra; Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86 ; Burrowes v Caruso, Spillane, Contrastano & Ulaner, 203 AD2d 228 ; Bass & Ullman v Chanes, 185 AD2d 750 ; Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 ).

1994This accrual rule, when applied in conjunction with the "continuous representation” doctrine, leads us to conclude that the running of the statutory period was tolled only until March 22, 1976 (see, Glamm v Allen, supra, at 93-94; Pittelli v Schulman, supra, at 601; see also, Winkler v Messinger, Alperin & Hufjay, 147 AD2d 693 ) and therefore, that the action was properly dismissed as time-barred.

2025With regard to whether a Notice of Intention to File a Claim is sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), the Second Department recently held in Johnson (231 AD3d at 794 [citations omitted]), that a Notice of Intention to File a Claim " 'should provide an indication of the manner in which the claimants were injured and how the State was negligent, or enough information so that how the State was negligent can be reasonably inferred' " ( see also Martinez v State of New York, 215 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2023]; Rodriguez v State of New York, 8 AD3d 647, 647 [2

2025With regard to whether a Notice of Intention to File a Claim is sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b), the Second Department recently held in Johnson (231 AD3d at 794 [citations omitted]), that a Notice of Intention to File a Claim " 'should provide an indication of the manner in which the claimants were injured and how the State was negligent, or enough information so that how the State was negligent can be reasonably inferred' " ( see also Martinez v State of New York, 215 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2023]; Rodriguez v State of New York, 8 AD3d 647, 647 [2

2022"Accrual is measured from the commission of the alleged malpractice, when all facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and the aggrieved party can obtain relief in court, regardless of when the operative facts are discovered by the plaintiff" ( Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d at 164 [citations omitted]; see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 166 ).

2014Accrual is measured from the commission of the alleged malpractice, when all facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and the aggrieved party can obtain relief in court (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d at 301 ; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, PC., 111 AD3d 795 [2013]; 730 J & J, LLC v Polizzotto & Polizzotto, Esqs., 69 AD3d 704, 705 [2010]; Hasty Hills Stables, Inc. v Dorfman, Lynch, Knoebel & Conway, LLP, 52 AD3d at 567 ; Town of Wallkill v Rosenstein, 40 AD3d 972, 973 [2007]; Iser v Kerrigan, 37 AD3d 662, 663 [2007]), regardless of when the operative facts are discovered by the plainti

2020The Court of Claims Act requires a claim to specify, among other things, "the time when and place where" the claim arose (Court of Claims Act § 11[b]; see Lepkowski v State of New York , 1 NY3d 201, 207 ; Hargrove v State of New York , 138 AD3d 777, 777 ).

2016The Court of Claims Act requires a claim to specify, among other things, “the time when” the claim arose and the “place where” it arose (Court of Claims Act § 11 [b]; see Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]).

2015Although late service of a notice of claim by leave of court is permitted under certain circumstances, the petitioner was required to petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim within one year and 90 days of the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; McShane v Town of Hempstead, 66 AD3d 652 , 653 [2009]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760, 761 [2007]; Alston v Aversano, 24 AD3d 399, 400 [2005]).

2013The plaintiff was required to petition or move for leave within one year and 90 days after the accrual of the claim (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950, 954 [1982]; Shahid v City of New York, 50 AD3d 770 [2008]; Laroc v City of New York, 46 AD3d 760 [2007]; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d 414, 415 [2006]).

2013The plaintiffs cross motion to deem the late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc was made after the one-year- and-90-day statute of limitations had expired and, thus, the Supreme Court was without authority to grant such relief (see Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d at 954 ; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d at 415 ; Friedman v City of New York, 19 AD3d 542 [2005]; Johnson v Town of Hempstead, 18 AD3d 712 [2005]).

2013The plaintiffs cross motion to deem the late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc was made after the one-year- and-90-day statute of limitations had expired and, thus, the Supreme Court was without authority to grant such relief (see Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d at 954 ; Ellman v Village of Rhinebeck, 27 AD3d at 415 ; Friedman v City of New York, 19 AD3d 542 [2005]; Johnson v Town of Hempstead, 18 AD3d 712 [2005]).

2013Here, plaintiff was unable to assert a cause of action for fraudulent inducement until she sustained damages resulting from the fraud, i.e., when she was terminated from her new position during its probationary period (see Vilsack, 96 AD3d at 828 ; see generally Kronos, 81 NY2d at 94 ).

2013Here, plaintiff was unable to assert a cause of action for fraudulent inducement until she sustained damages resulting from the fraud, i.e., when she was terminated from her new position during its probationary period (see Vilsack, 96 AD3d at 828 ; see generally Kronos, 81 NY2d at 94 ).

2025Therefore, the claimant's claim, which was filed approximately 20 months after the accrual of the claim, was untimely ( see Sacher v State of New York , 211 AD3d at 876 ; Criscuola v State of New York , 188 AD3d at 646 ).

2022However, if the claimant serves "a written notice of intention to file a claim" within 90 days after the accrual of the claim, "the claim shall be filed and served upon the attorney general within two years after the accrual of such claim" ( id. ; see Criscuola v State of New York , 188 AD3d at 645 ; Kiesow v State of New York , 161 AD3d 1060 , 1061; Hargrove v State of New York , 138 AD3d at 777 ).