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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Roegreen2 sentences2018See Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 227 (1979). ¶15 The “discovery rule” delays the accrual of a claim when “[t]he injury or the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.” Doe, 191 Ariz. at 330 , ¶ 54 (quoting Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. 2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (citing Doe, 191 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 37 ). ¶16 Moreover, if a plaintiff claims the discovery rule applies to delay the accrual of a claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the discovery rule should apply. | 3 | 3 |
Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2019Co. of America, 182 Ariz. 586, 590 (1995) (applying the discovery rule to the accrual of a claim for breach of contract). 2018Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 589 (1995) (citation omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Walk v. Ringgreen2 sentences2010The relevant inquiry is when did a plaintiff‟s “„knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide[] sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.‟” Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, ¶ 23 , 44 P.3d 990, 996 (2002), quoting Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 36 , 955 P.2d 951, 962 (1998). ¶10 Here, we must determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that Johnson‟s filing the Board complaint on Little‟s behalf marked the accrual of her claim for purposes of § 12-821.01(B). 2010The relevant inquiry is when did a plaintiff‟s “„knowledge, understanding, and acceptance in the aggregate provide[] sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.‟” Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, ¶ 23 , 44 P.3d 990, 996 (2002), quoting Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, ¶ 36 , 955 P.2d 951, 962 (1998). ¶10 Here, we must determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that Johnson‟s filing the Board complaint on Little‟s behalf marked the accrual of her claim for purposes of § 12-821.01(B). | 2 | 2 |
Falcon Ex Rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa Countygreen1 sentence2024Sandoval v. Maricopa County, 213 Ariz. 525, 527, ¶ 10 (2006). ¶26 Under A.R.S. § 12-821, “[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.” “[A] cause of action accrues when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B); see also Dube v. Likins, 216 4 Rogut also suggests that the Parents’ Bill of Rights excludes the use of “any affirmative defense.” F | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Union Insurance v. Lewis & Rocagreen1 sentence2023Co. v. Lewis & Roca, 183 Ariz. 250, 252-53 (App. 1995). ¶9 “[T]he accrual of a claim for breach of a guaranty is independent of the accrual of a claim for breach of the underlying obligation.” Mill Alley Partners v. Wallace, 236 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 12 (App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 774852green1 sentence2023See Cusano, 264 F.3d at 947 . 8 DOE v. THE ROMAN CATH. | 1 | 1 |
Mill Alley Partners v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2023Co. v. Lewis & Roca, 183 Ariz. 250, 252-53 (App. 1995). ¶9 “[T]he accrual of a claim for breach of a guaranty is independent of the accrual of a claim for breach of the underlying obligation.” Mill Alley Partners v. Wallace, 236 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 12 (App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Kenyon v. Hammergreen1 sentence2022See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 , 8 (2014) (“A statute of repose . . . is measured not from the date on which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.”); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 73 (1984) (reasoning that if the statute in question were tied to the date of a negligent act it would be a statute of repose). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen1 sentence2022See id. ¶ 23; see also Merkens, 237 Ariz. 274 , ¶ 18 & n.6 (suggesting that a bad faith claim may accrue before final compensability determination and “there can be simultaneous proceedings in both the Industrial Commission and superior court”). ¶19 By contending his bad faith claim was not “ripe” until this court ruled in his favor, France appears to argue that the “final judgment accrual rule,” adopted by our supreme court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 185 Ariz. 174 (1996), should apply in the workers’ compensation context. | 1 | 1 |
Dube v. Likinsgreen1 sentence2022For instance, a cause of action accrues for claims against public entities under § 12-821 “when the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” § 12-821.01(B); see also Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406 , 421 ¶ 2 (App. 2007) (explaining that § 12.821.01(B) sets the accrual standard for claims governed by § 12-821). ¶27 It is true that tying § 35-212(E) to “the date of an illegal payment” as opposed to when an injury occurred or was discovered is character | 1 | 1 |
Merkens v. Federal Insurancegreen1 sentence2022See id. ¶ 23; see also Merkens, 237 Ariz. 274 , ¶ 18 & n.6 (suggesting that a bad faith claim may accrue before final compensability determination and “there can be simultaneous proceedings in both the Industrial Commission and superior court”). ¶19 By contending his bad faith claim was not “ripe” until this court ruled in his favor, France appears to argue that the “final judgment accrual rule,” adopted by our supreme court in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 185 Ariz. 174 (1996), should apply in the workers’ compensation context. | 1 | 1 |
Ulibarri v. Gerstenbergergreen1 sentence2018Wyckoff, 232 Ariz. at 591, ¶ 9 ; Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 155 (App. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Sato v. Van Denburghgreen1 sentence2018See Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 227 (1979). ¶15 The “discovery rule” delays the accrual of a claim when “[t]he injury or the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.” Doe, 191 Ariz. at 330 , ¶ 54 (quoting Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 1 |
ELM RETIREMENT CENTER, LP v. Callawaygreen1 sentence2018Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (citing Doe, 191 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 37 ). ¶16 Moreover, if a plaintiff claims the discovery rule applies to delay the accrual of a claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the discovery rule should apply. | 1 | 1 |
Wyckoff v. Mogollon Health Alliancegreen1 sentence2018Wyckoff, 232 Ariz. at 591, ¶ 9 ; Ulibarri v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 155 (App. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Flori Corp. v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2014Although Mill Alley is correct that a guaranty contract is independent of the underlying obligation, Flori Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 167 Ariz. 601, 602-03 , 810 P.2d 599, 600-01 (App. 1990), it does not follow that a claim for breach of a guaranty cannot accrue upon a breach of the underlying obligation. 2014Although Mill Alley is correct that a guaranty contract is independent of the underlying obligation, Flori Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 167 Ariz. 601, 602-03 , 810 P.2d 599, 600-01 (App. 1990), it does not follow that a claim for breach of a guaranty cannot accrue upon a breach of the underlying obligation. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Browngreen1 sentence2014See Provident Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Sbrocca, 180 Ariz. 464, 466 , 885 P.2d 152, 154 (App. 1994) (“The nature and extent of a guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of the contract.”); United States v. Gottlieb, 948 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1991) (when guaranty required written demand for performance, claim for breach did not accrue until after demand was made); United States v. Brown, 833 F.Supp. 625, 629 (E.D.Mich. 1993); 38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 96 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard Melvin Gottlieb Eileen N. Gottliebgreen1 sentence2014See Provident Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Sbrocca, 180 Ariz. 464, 466 , 885 P.2d 152, 154 (App. 1994) (“The nature and extent of a guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of the contract.”); United States v. Gottlieb, 948 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1991) (when guaranty required written demand for performance, claim for breach did not accrue until after demand was made); United States v. Brown, 833 F.Supp. 625, 629 (E.D.Mich. 1993); 38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 96 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Provident National Assurance Co. v. Sbroccagreen2 sentences2014See Provident Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Sbrocca, 180 Ariz. 464, 466 , 885 P.2d 152, 154 (App. 1994) (“The nature and extent of a guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of the contract.”); United States v. Gottlieb, 948 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1991) (when guaranty required written demand for performance, claim for breach did not accrue until after demand was made); United States v. Brown, 833 F.Supp. 625, 629 (E.D.Mich. 1993); 38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 96 (2014). 2014See Provident Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Sbrocca, 180 Ariz. 464, 466 , 885 P.2d 152, 154 (App. 1994) (“The nature and extent of a guarantor’s liability depends upon the terms of the contract.”); United States v. Gottlieb, 948 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir.1991) (when guaranty required written demand for performance, claim for breach did not accrue until after demand was made); United States v. Brown, 833 F.Supp. 625, 629 (E.D.Mich. 1993); 38 Am.Jur.2d Guaranty § 96 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Flood Control Dist. v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2004See Flood Control Dist., 202 Ariz. at 254, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d at 202 (holding that discovery rule applies to inverse condemnation claim under A.R.S. § 12-821). ¶ 17 Rescission and reformation are claims that seek relief based on fraud or mistake. 2004See Flood Control Dist., 202 Ariz. at 254, ¶ 17 , 43 P.3d at 202 (holding that discovery rule applies to inverse condemnation claim under A.R.S. § 12-821). ¶ 17 Rescission and reformation are claims that seek relief based on fraud or mistake. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Liuzzo v. United States
green
1 sentence1988The Barrett court pointed out that both cases present “an instance in which knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor is a critical element to the accrual of a claim.” Barrett, 689 F.2d at 330 , quoting Liuzzo, 485 F.Supp. at 1283 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
cluster 409215
green
1 sentence1988The Barrett court pointed out that both cases present “an instance in which knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor is a critical element to the accrual of a claim.” Barrett, 689 F.2d at 330 , quoting Liuzzo, 485 F.Supp. at 1283 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.