accrual claim in Texas

2025A. Prejudgment Interest Prejudgment interest is compensation that the law allows as “additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998)).

2025Equitable Prejudgment Interest Prejudgment interest is “compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 528 .

2022“Prejudgment interest is ‘compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.’” See id. at 528 (quoting Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 1985), abrogated by id. at 507)).

2021Prejudgment interest is “compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Cavnar v. Quality-Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. 1985) (citing McCormick, Damages § 50 (1935)). 4.

2025A. Prejudgment Interest Prejudgment interest is compensation that the law allows as “additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998)).

2025A. Applicable Law “Prejudgment interest is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 22 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).

2015Prejudgment interest is “compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Battaglia, 177 S.W.3d at 907 .

2015Prejudgment interest is “‘“compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.”’” Battaglia, 177 S.W.3d at 907 (quoting Columbia Hosp.

2014We recognize that the Texas Supreme Court has stated that the deferring of the accrual of a claim based on fraudulent concealment is a distinct concept from deferred accrual based on the discovery rule. 95 Thus, the discovery rule is 94 Kerlin v. Sauceda, 263 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. 2008). 95 See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Tex. 2001).

2009Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex. 2001).

2022“It is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for the lost use of money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Id.

2022“It is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for the lost use of money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Id.

2008Prejudgment interest is “compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc . v. Kenneco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998); Pringle v. Moon , 158 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2008Prejudgment interest is “compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex.1998); Pringle v. Moon, 158 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2006Co., 986 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999) (quoting LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228, 237 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied)), aff'd, 22 S.W.3d 414 (Tex.2000); accord Chilton Ins.

1999Another court has stated that “[pjrejudgment interest is additional damages for the loss of use of money due as damages during the period between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228, 237 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied).

2019Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996), delays the accrual of a claim until the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and resulting injury, Schlumberger Tech.

2015Compare S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.1996), and Computer Assoc. v. Altai, 918 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by plaintiff), with Velsicol Chem.

2009While one spouse’s fraud on the community estate could justify an unequal division of the estate, “there is no independent tort cause of action for wrongful disposition by a spouse of community assets.” Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998).

2009While one spouse's fraud on the community estate could justify an unequal division of the estate, "there is no independent tort cause of action for wrongful disposition by a spouse of community assets." Schlueter v. Schlueter , 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998).

2003Johnson & Higgins v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998); Taylor Foundry Co. v. Wichita Falls Grain Co., 51 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

2003Johnson & Higgins v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998); Taylor Foundry Co. v. Wichita Falls Grain Co., 51 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

2013See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Tex.2002) (“[L]ike pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial.”); Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex.1998) (“Prejudgment interest is ‘compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of the judgment.’”) (citation omitted).

2013See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Tex. 2002) (“[L]ike pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest is simply compensation for a judgment creditor’s lost opportunity to invest the money awarded as damages at trial.”); Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998) (“Prejudgment interest is ‘compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of the judgment.”) (citation omitted).

2013In Rivera , we explained that “[t]he general rule governing the accrual of a claim for purposes of limitations is ‘the legal injury rule,’ which states that a claim accrues ‘when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.’ ” Rivera, 262 S.W.3d at 840 (quoting Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex.1997)).

2008The general rule governing the accrual of a claim for purposes of limitations is the “legal injury rule,” which states that a claim accrues “when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tex.1997).

2024“Prejudgment interest is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 1 Appellant makes no claim, nor did he plead an affirmative defense, of usury or that the contractual interest of eighteen percent as found by the trial court was usurious. 8 507, 528 (Tex. 1998)); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 522 S.W.3d

2018Prejudgment Interest “Prejudgment interest is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528 (Tex. 1998)); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 522 S.W.3d 471, 482 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see Brainard v. Trinity Universal Ins.

2019See Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646 .

2012Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex.1988).

2005See Id. at 528 ; Miga v. Jensen , 25 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2002).

2005See Id. at 528 ; Miga v. Jensen, 25 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, rev’d on other grounds, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex.2002)).

2005It reasoned that (1) prejudgment interest in condemnation cases is based upon the constitutional requirement of adequate compensation, not the common law; and (2) consistent with this, the traditional accrual rule in condemnation cases is triggered by a constitutionally cognizable *908 taking. 138 S.W.3d at 388-89 .

2005Also, observing that Johnson & Higgins did not purport to overrule or limit the traditional accrual rule in Hale , the court concluded that “[w]ithout additional guidelines from the supreme court, we follow Hale and its progeny.” Id. at 389 n. 5.

2022In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tex. 1978), the supreme court recognized two separate bases for the award of prejudgment interest: (1) an enabling statute; and (2) general principles of equity.

2010Co., 569 S.W.2d at 485 .

2020See id. at 168 . 65 Because National had obtained summary judgment on the alternative ground of limitations, the supreme court conducted an accrual analysis to determine whether Arnold’s newly recognized cause of action was nevertheless barred by statute: The court of appeals held that all of Arnold’s causes of action including his good faith and fair dealing claim were barred by both the two-year (tort) and four-year (contract) statutes of limitations.

2020Arnold adopted the accrual analysis for a Stowers claim In Arnold, the supreme court recognized that an insurer owed its insured a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing when handling and adjusting a claim under its UM coverage. 725 S.W.2d at 167 .

2019Instead, to conform with principles of equity, interest must begin “accruing on a monthly basis for each post- suit breach.” See Garden Ridge, L.P., 504 S.W.3d at 45311 ; Roberson, 761 S.W.2d at 54 ; see also Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 528 (noting that prejudgment interest, by definition, accrues only “during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the 11 PILOT notes correctly that the Garden Ridge court ordered “interest accruing on a monthly basis for each post-suit breach” only because that is what the plaintiff requested at oral argument.

2019Instead, to conform with principles of equity, interest must begin “accruing on a monthly basis for each post- suit breach.” See Garden Ridge, L.P., 504 S.W.3d at 45311 ; Roberson, 761 S.W.2d at 54 ; see also Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 528 (noting that prejudgment interest, by definition, accrues only “during the lapse of time between the accrual of the claim and the date of judgment”).

2015Compare S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.1996), and Computer Assoc. v. Altai, 918 S.W.2d 453, 455-56 (cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by plaintiff), with Velsicol Chem.

2012The cause of action is deferred in those cases (and thus limitations does not begin to run at the time of the legal injury) “because a person cannot be permitted to avoid liability for his actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until limitations has run.”20 But “[f]raudulent concealment will not . . . bar limitations when the plaintiff discovers the wrong or could have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”21 To the extent that David’s argument is that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because he raised a fact issue on this affirmative defense,22 Da

2025See id.