59 California opinions name it 3 courts 1962–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.green2 sentences2025As a rule, “[a] plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a cause of action accrues at the moment when the party alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action thereon.’ ” ’ ” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918 , 930–931 (Pollock).) However, certain equitable exceptions “may 2025Proc., § 339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” ( Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions exist “[t]o align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.” (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ noti | 5 | 13 |
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.green2 sentences2025As a rule, “[a] plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a cause of action accrues at the moment when the party alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action thereon.’ ” ’ ” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918 , 930–931 (Pollock).) However, certain equitable exceptions “may 2022Application of the Tolling Doctrine to a Noncompulsory Cross- Complaint As a rule, “[a] plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.) However, certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 C | 3 | 4 |
Norgart v. Upjohn Co.green2 sentences2026(Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (Norgart).) The most important exception to the accrual rule is the discovery rule, which postpones accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. 2026(Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (Norgart).) The most important exception to the accrual rule is the discovery rule, which postpones accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. | 2 | 6 |
Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences2025As a rule, “[a] plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a cause of action accrues at the moment when the party alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action thereon.’ ” ’ ” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918 , 930–931 (Pollock).) However, certain equitable exceptions “may 2025Proc., § 339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” ( Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions exist “[t]o align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.” (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ noti | 2 | 4 |
Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.green2 sentences2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( 2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( | 2 | 3 |
Artal v. Allengreen2 sentences2026(Ibid.) The discovery rule “may be expressed by the Legislature or implied by the courts.” (Ibid.) The statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions is found in section 340.5, which provides: “In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” The general rule applies to the t 2026(Ibid.) The discovery rule “may be expressed by the Legislature or implied by the courts.” (Ibid.) The statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions is found in section 340.5, which provides: “In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” The general rule applies to the t | 2 | 2 |
Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc.green2 sentences2025The cited authority is a California case explaining “that a defendant may be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations when, as a result of intentional concealment, the plaintiff is unable to discover the defendant’s actual identity.” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 936 (Bernson).) This flavor of equitable tolling, which is predicated on a specific type of fraudulent concealment, tolls the statute “until such time as the plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the defendant’s identity.” (Ibid.) It 2016(Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 24, 33 .) Also applicable to contract-based claims is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which is “[a] close cousin of the discovery rule” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931 (Bernson)) that is “available ‘in all cases’” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 533 , quoting Kane v. Cook (1857) 8 Cal. 449, 458 ). “‘It has long been established that the defendant’s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations | 2 | 2 |
Hanh Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp.green2 sentences2022(Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1551 (Nguyen); Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807 4 The elements of intentional misrepresentation are (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity (or “scienter”), (3) intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. 2016(Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1551 (Nguyen).) “‘Wrong’ is not used in a technical sense, but in a lay one.” (Creekridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc. v. C. | 2 | 2 |
Seelenfreund v. Terminix of Northern California, Inc.green2 sentences2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( 2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( | 2 | 2 |
Collins v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( 2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( | 2 | 2 |
Munoz v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2015(Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435, fn. 8 ; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1772, fn. 1 .) Frank Z. raises several issues on appeal: (1) the accrual of his claim against LAUSD; (2) the delayed discovery rule; and (3) his mistake and excusable neglect. 1. 2006California Tort Claims Act and Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Under the Tort Claims Act, a person may not sue a public entity for personal injury or wrongful death unless he or she first presented a written claim to the public entity within six months following the accrual of the claim and the public entity rejected the claim. (§§ 911.2, 945.4; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ] (Munoz).) If a claim is presented late, the public entity, within a prescribed time, may send the claimant written notice that the claim is being returned without actio | 2 | 2 |
Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp.green2 sentences1998Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 381 P.2d 645 ; cf. 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, supra, Damages, § 19.10, at pp. 610-612 [attorney fees as mitigation expenses recoverable in malpractice action].) [7] *758 The "actual injury" provision in section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1), effectively continues the accrual rule Budd established. 1998Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 , 30 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 381 P.2d 645 ; cf. 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, supra, Damages, § 19.10, at pp. 610-612 [attorney fees as mitigation expenses recoverable in malpractice action].) [7] *758 The "actual injury" provision in section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1), effectively continues the accrual rule Budd established. | 2 | 2 |
Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurancegreen2 sentences2025Proc., § 339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” ( Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions exist “[t]o align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.” (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ noti 2025Proc., § 339, subd. (1).) Certain equitable exceptions “may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” ( Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) These exceptions exist “[t]o align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it.” (Ibid.) Equitable tolling, applied by the trial court here, “may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ noti | 1 | 3 |
April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTVgreen2 sentences2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1318 6 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notice of circ 2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notic | 1 | 3 |
County of San Diego v. Myersgreen2 sentences2017In Carrick , the plaintiff, a fire department employee who, upon retirement, began receiving a pension, brought suit 12 years later, contending that he had been misclassified and his pension benefits had thereby been understated. ( Id. at p. 404, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338. ( Carrick , at p. 410, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The court distinguished Dryden on the basis that it involved the accrual of a claim for periodic pension benefits t 2017In Carrick , the plaintiff, a fire department employee who, upon retirement, began receiving a pension, brought suit 12 years later, contending that he had been misclassified and his pension benefits had thereby been understated. ( Id. at p. 404, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338. ( Carrick , at p. 410, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The court distinguished Dryden on the basis that it involved the accrual of a claim for periodic pension benefits t | 1 | 2 |
E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servicesgreen2 sentences2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1318 6 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notice of circ 2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notic | 1 | 2 |
Cox v. McLaughlingreen2 sentences2015First, “interest traditionally has been denied on unliquidated claims because of the general equitable principle that a person who does not know what sum is owed cannot be in default for failure to pay.” (Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 901, 906 [citing Cox v. McLaughlin (1888) 76 Cal. 60, 67 ] (Chesapeake).) “Thus, no prejudgment penalty is assessed against a litigant for failing to pay a sum which is unascertainable prior to judgment. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) On the other hand, the countervailing policy instructs that parties should be compensated fo 1983(See Cox v. McLaughlin, supra, 76 Cal. 60, 68-69 [tracing modification of early rule from ascertainment of sum due from face of contract to reference to standards providing debtor with “proximate knowledge” of amount due]; see also 14 Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 77.) The injured party’s right to prejudgment interest is further protected by the rule that the legal interest allowable under section 3287 cannot be defeated by setting up an unliquidated counterclaim as an offset. | 1 | 2 |
Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.green1 sentence2025As a rule, “[a] plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (Fox).) A cause of action typically “accrues at ‘the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.’ ” (Ibid.) Put differently, “a cause of action accrues at the moment when the party alleging injury is entitled to ‘ “ ‘begin and prosecute an action thereon.’ ” ’ ” (Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918 , 930–931 (Pollock).) However, certain equitable exceptions “may | 1 | 1 |
| Helen T. Steel (Muff) v. United States of America and Dean E. Steelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boaz v. Boyle & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mai Chi Nguyen v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Aultgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph F. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shively v. Bozanichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roger Cleveland Golf Co. v. Krane & Smith, APCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carrick v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leaf v. City of San Mateogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Home Loan Funding, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thomson v. Canyongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keru Investments, Inc. v. Cube Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jefferson v. County of Kerngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Entreprises, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Children's Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ebersol v. Cowangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jefferson v. J. E. French Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| John R. v. Oakland Unified School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vaughn v. Dame Construction Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rose v. Fifegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shonda Ambers-Phillips and Richard Phillips II v. SSM DePaul Health Centergreen1 sentence2025These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192 (Aryeh); but see Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Center (Mo. 2015) 459 S.W.3d 901, 907 [while Missouri Supreme Court has “recognized the fairness of adopting a discovery rule and of equitable tolling in regard to the statute of limitations, . . . these cases have emphasized that it is up to the legislature to determine whether to adopt a discovery rule or equitable tolling in a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp.
green
2 sentences2022(Norgart, at p. 397.) The delayed discovery rule postpones the accrual of a claim (and hence the running of the applicable limitations period) until the earlier of when the “‘“plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its . . . cause or (2) could have discovered [the] injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . .” [Citation.]’” (CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1536 , italics omitted.) Under the latter prong, the limitations period will begin to run once the facts available to the plaintiff would cause a reasonable person to 2016Because a rule pegged solely to the fact of injury can be “harsh” and “manifestly unjust” (Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 398, 406-407 (Leaf)), courts sometimes employ a “discovery rule” that postpones the accrual of the claim (and hence the running of the three-year limitations period) until the earlier of when the “‘“plaintiff either (1) actually discovered his injury and its negligent cause or (2) could have discovered [the] injury and cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” [Citation.]’” (CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1536 .) | 2 | 2016–2022 |
Laird v. Blacker
green
2 sentences2019The statute of limitations is tolled and recommences to run when the appellate process has been exhausted." ( Id. at p. 674, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Roger Cleveland noted that the Supreme Court, construing section 340.6(a) in a malpractice case, had "rejected the contention that 'accrual should be tolled' until resolution of the appeal ...." ( Roger Cleveland, at p. 675, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 [discussing Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2d 691 ].) Roger Cleveland reasoned that, in malicious prosecution cases, "[a]pplying section 340.6, subdivision (a) to attorneys 2019The statute of limitations is tolled and recommences to run when the appellate process has been exhausted." ( Id. at p. 674, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 .) Roger Cleveland noted that the Supreme Court, construing section 340.6(a) in a malpractice case, had "rejected the contention that 'accrual should be tolled' until resolution of the appeal ...." ( Roger Cleveland, at p. 675, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 [discussing Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Cal.4th 606 , 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 , 828 P.2d 691 ].) Roger Cleveland reasoned that, in malicious prosecution cases, "[a]pplying section 340.6, subdivision (a) to attorneys | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Baxter v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys.
green
2 sentences2019(Id. at p. 366.) Holding that CalSTRS was thus chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the Fellows memorandum (id. at p. 367), we concluded that “CalSTRS was placed on inquiry notice as of [August 18, 2005,] through the Fellows memorandum, thus triggering the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008(c).” (Id. at p. 368, original italics, fn. omitted.) Third, this court in Baxter addressed section 22008, subdivision (a) (§ 22008(a)), which requires that the “action . . . be commenced” within three years of the accrual of the claim.9 This court concluded in Baxter that CalSTRS 2019(Id. at p. 366.) Holding that CalSTRS was thus chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the Fellows memorandum (id. at p. 367), we concluded that “CalSTRS was placed on inquiry notice as of [August 18, 2005,] through the Fellows memorandum, thus triggering the three-year statute of limitations under section 22008(c).” (Id. at p. 368, original italics, fn. omitted.) Third, this court in Baxter addressed section 22008, subdivision (a) (§ 22008(a)), which requires that the “action . . . be commenced” within three years of the accrual of the claim.9 This court concluded in Baxter that CalSTRS | 2 | 2019–2019 |
United States Liability Insurance v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( 2017Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc . (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586 , 596, 83 Cal.Rptr. 418 , 463 P.2d 770 ; see also Collins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 451 , 454, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586 ( Collins ) ["A cause of action accrues at the moment the party who owns it is entitled to bring and prosecute an action thereon."].) "Generally, the right to bring and prosecute an action arises immediately upon the commission of the wrong claimed...." ( Ibid . ) Stated differently, a "cause of action accrues 'when [it] is complete with all of its elements'-those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation." ( | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners
green
2 sentences2017In Carrick , the plaintiff, a fire department employee who, upon retirement, began receiving a pension, brought suit 12 years later, contending that he had been misclassified and his pension benefits had thereby been understated. ( Id. at p. 404, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338. ( Carrick , at p. 410, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The court distinguished Dryden on the basis that it involved the accrual of a claim for periodic pension benefits t 2017In Carrick , the plaintiff, a fire department employee who, upon retirement, began receiving a pension, brought suit 12 years later, contending that he had been misclassified and his pension benefits had thereby been understated. ( Id. at p. 404, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338. ( Carrick , at p. 410, 20 Cal.Rptr. 878 .) The court distinguished Dryden on the basis that it involved the accrual of a claim for periodic pension benefits t | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.
green
2 sentences2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1318 6 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notice of circ 2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notic | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Tarke v. Bingham
green
2 sentences2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308 , 1318 6 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notice of circ 2016It permits delayed accrual until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the wrongful conduct at issue.” (April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 832 .) The rule thus tolls the accrual of a claim “until the aggrieved party has notice of the facts constituting the injury.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 (E-Fab).) In this context, “[n]otice may be actual or constructive. [Citation.] Actual notice is ‘express information of a fact,’ while constructive notice is that ‘which is imputed by law.’ [Citation.] A person with ‘actual notic | 2 | 2016–2016 |
American Surety Company of New York v. Price B. Williford and Duren N. Sleyster, D/B/A Quick-Way Construction Company and Quick-Way Excavating Company
green
2 sentences1969As the court said in American Surety Co. of New York v. Williford, 243 F.2d 494 , 498 : “Appellant can not, by the mere act of issuing a policy subsequent to the accrual of a claim under a preexisting oral contract and dating its coverage to a period subsequent to the time of the accrual of the claim, escape liability upon such claim if a valid oral contract of insurance protecting against such claim has been established. ’ ’ *76 It has long been recognized that practicality dictates that a temporary insurance binder issued upon an application for insurance cannot contain all of the details an 1962In American Surety Co. of New York v. Williford, 243 F.2d 494 , the court stated (p. 498) : “Appellant can not, by the mere act of issuing a-policy subsequent to the accrual of a claim under a pre-existing oral contract and dating its coverage to a period subsequent to the time of the accrual of the claim, escape liability upon such claim if a valid oral contract of insurance protecting against such claim has been established.” The retroactive effect given the United policy by the trial court could be defensible only if the new policy were in the nature of a reformation rather than a rescissio | 2 | 1962–1969 |
In Re Marriage of Lehman
green
1 sentence2025Annette’s counsel reiterated at oral argument that examining the nature of the benefit is entirely irrelevant and encapsulates the approach in In re Gram (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 859 (Gram) that was disapproved in Lehman. ( Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 181, 187–188.) Annette maintains that after Lehman is applied and it is determined the community owns an interest in the asset because a right to it was acquired during marriage, the issue of whether it is a mixed-character asset (i.e., the community interest is something less than 100 percent) depends on whether a separate property interest ex | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Marriage of Gram
green
1 sentence2025Annette’s counsel reiterated at oral argument that examining the nature of the benefit is entirely irrelevant and encapsulates the approach in In re Gram (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 859 (Gram) that was disapproved in Lehman. ( Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 181, 187–188.) Annette maintains that after Lehman is applied and it is determined the community owns an interest in the asset because a right to it was acquired during marriage, the issue of whether it is a mixed-character asset (i.e., the community interest is something less than 100 percent) depends on whether a separate property interest ex | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) One such exception is the continuing violation doctrine. “ ‘The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.’ ” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104 , 1124, quoting Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) “Consequent | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| cluster 712147 green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Williams v. City of Belvedere green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| White v. Cridlebaugh green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Regents of University of California v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kane v. Cook green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Estate of Baldwin green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Shirk v. Vista Unified School District red | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| J.J. v. County of San Diego green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Vafi v. McCloskey green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Cheong Yu Yee v. Don Cheung green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Stutz Motor Car of America, Inc. v. Reebok International, Ltd. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Algernon L. Butler, Jr., Trustee in Bankruptcy for Cheryl Lynn Harper v. Nationsbank, N.A. (Formerly Ncnb National Bank of North Carolina) green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College District green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| In Re: Cool Fuel,incorporated,debtor. Cool Fuel, Incorporated, a California Corporation v. Board of Equalization of the State of California,appellee green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| San Francisco Unified School District v. W.R. Grace & Company-Connecticut green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| McBrearty v. City of Brawley green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.