94 Ohio opinions name it 6 courts 1966–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kinney v. Mathiasgreen2 sentences2025It is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.’” Connin v. Bailey, 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1984), quoting Smith v. Smith, 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 (8th Dist. 1957). “‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 35-36, quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus; accord Kinney v. Mathias, 10 Ohio St.3d 72 2007The party must also show that "* * * the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim." Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus; see, also, Kinney v. Mathias (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 72 , 461 N.E.2d 901 . | 6 | 11 |
Connin v. Baileygreen2 sentences2025It is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.’” Connin v. Bailey, 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1984), quoting Smith v. Smith, 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 (8th Dist. 1957). “‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 35-36, quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus; accord Kinney v. Mathias, 10 Ohio St.3d 72 2019“Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in 7 order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.” Connin, supra. Similarly, prejudice in a laches defense is generally not inferred merely from inconvenience or the passage of time. | 4 | 34 |
Thirty-Four Corp. v. Sixty-Seven Corp.green2 sentences2021Id. “‘[I]n order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 354 , quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus. 2021Id. “‘[I]n order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 354 , quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus. | 1 | 10 |
Smith v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025It is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.’” Connin v. Bailey, 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1984), quoting Smith v. Smith, 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 (8th Dist. 1957). “‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 35-36, quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus; accord Kinney v. Mathias, 10 Ohio St.3d 72 2013In order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, "it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim." Id., citing Connin at 35-36 ; Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus. | 1 | 8 |
Fisher v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006The Fifth Amendment is limited to "prohibiting the use of `physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States (1976), 425 U.S. 391 , 397 . 1999Thus, because the letter was not written at the attorney's request for the attorney's use regarding the charges pending against the client, no discussion of the confidence portion of DR 4-101(B)(1), as discussed by the Lopez court, Id. at 1155, is necessary. 7 See, Fisher v. United States (1976), 425 U.S. 391 ; United States v. Doe (1984), 465 U.S. 605 (contents of subpoenaed documents were not privileged under the Fifth Amendment since the Fifth Amendment protects the person asserting the privilege from compelled incrimination and the documents themselves were not prepared involuntarily). 8 S | 1 | 3 |
In the Matter of Buechter, Unpublished Decision (1-26-2007)green1 sentence2025It is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence.’” Connin v. Bailey, 15 Ohio St.3d 34, 35 (1984), quoting Smith v. Smith, 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 (8th Dist. 1957). “‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’” Id. at 35-36, quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus; accord Kinney v. Mathias, 10 Ohio St.3d 72 | 1 | 1 |
Hays v. Younggreen2 sentences2024Young, 2024-Ohio-3149 , ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), quoting Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3 , 7 (1993). 2024Young, 2024-Ohio-3149, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), quoting Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Hartt v. Munobegreen2 sentences2024Young, 2024-Ohio-3149 , ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), quoting Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3 , 7 (1993). 2024Young, 2024-Ohio-3149, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.), quoting Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. City of Clevelandgreen1 sentence2022Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. City of 19 Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 83 (1988) (“Under Ohio law, a person asserting an exception is required to prove the facts warranting such an exception”). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Chryslergreen2 sentences2013Baker v. Chrysler, 179 Ohio App.3d 351 , 2008-Ohio-6032 , 901 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). 2013Baker v. Chrysler, 179 Ohio App.3d 351 , 2008-Ohio-6032 , 901 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Riley, Unpublished Decision (7-6-2006)green1 sentence2011Hayman at ¶47, citing Connin at ¶35-36 ; see, also, Smith, 168 Ohio St. at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 32} “Issues of waiver, laches, and estoppel are ‘fact-driven.’” Riley v. Riley, Knox App. No. 2005-CA-27, 2006-Ohio-3572, ¶27 , quoting Dodley v. Jackson, Franklin App. No. 05AP11, 2005-Ohio-5490 . | 1 | 1 |
Dodley v. Jackson, Unpublished Decision (10-18-2005)green1 sentence2011Hayman at ¶47, citing Connin at ¶35-36 ; see, also, Smith, 168 Ohio St. at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 32} “Issues of waiver, laches, and estoppel are ‘fact-driven.’” Riley v. Riley, Knox App. No. 2005-CA-27, 2006-Ohio-3572, ¶27 , quoting Dodley v. Jackson, Franklin App. No. 05AP11, 2005-Ohio-5490 . | 1 | 1 |
Bernhard v. Perrysburg Townshipgreen2 sentences2010See also Hayman at ¶ 47. {¶ 51} “The doctrine of laches bars a judgment if there was (1) an unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) an absence of excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Bernhard v. Perrysburg Twp., 185 Ohio App.3d 470 , 2009-Ohio-6345 , 924 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 31 , citing Mason City School Dist. v. Warren Cty. 2010See also Hayman at ¶ 47. {¶ 51} “The doctrine of laches bars a judgment if there was (1) an unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) an absence of excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Bernhard v. Perrysburg Twp., 185 Ohio App.3d 470 , 2009-Ohio-6345 , 924 N.E.2d 856, ¶ 31 , citing Mason City School Dist. v. Warren Cty. | 1 | 1 |
Korodi v. Minotgreen1 sentence2007See, also, Korodi v. Minot (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 1 , 3-4 ; Yo-Can, Inc. v. The Yogurt Exchange, Inc. , 149 Ohio App.3d 513 , 2002-Ohio-5194 , at ¶ 42 . {¶ 22} "Common law fraud must be pleaded with particularity under Civ.R. 9(B), a rule that places a higher burden than is normally required upon the person asserting such a claim to support general allegations with specific facts." Reasoner v. State Farm Mut. | 1 | 1 |
| Holmberg v. Armbrechtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harknessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alabama Electric Co-Operative, Inc. v. Partridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stevens v. National City Bank
green
2 sentences2004City Bank (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 276 , 285 , quoting Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447 , paragraph three of the syllabus. 2002City Bank (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 276, 285 , 544 N.E.2d 612 , quoting Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447 , 7 O.O.2d 276 , 156 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 44} Here, appellant claims that he was materially prejudiced because he relied on the Nova Scotia order. | 8 | 1998–2004 |
Seegert v. Zietlow
green
2 sentences2007More particularly, plaintiff claims defendant's counterclaim was barred by her failure to demand the return of her security deposit soon after she vacated the premises in September 2001 rather than waiting to assert it only as a counterclaim to plaintiff's complaint. {¶ 43} " `In order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by an unreasonable and unexplained delay of the person asserting his claim.' " Goff v. Walters (Oct. 28, 1998), Summit App. No. 18981, quoting Seege 1999In order to invoke the doctrine of laches, it must be established that the "person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by an unreasonable and unexplained delay of the person asserting his claim." Goff v. Walters (Oct. 28, 1998), Summit App. No. 18981, unreported at 5, quoting Seegert v. Zietlow (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 451 , 457 . | 7 | 1999–2007 |
Still v. Hayman, Unpublished Decision (7-30-2003)
green
2 sentences2004Rather, the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has to demonstrate that he or she has been materially prejudiced by the unreasonable and unexplained delay of the person asserting the claim.” (Citations omitted.) Still v. Hayman, 153 Ohio App.3d 487 , 2003-Ohio-4113 , 794 N.E.2d 751, at ¶ 14 . {¶ 18} First, appellant did not prove that there was an unreasonable delay on appellee’s part in asserting her claim. 2004Rather, the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has to demonstrate that he or she has been materially prejudiced by the unreasonable and unexplained delay of the person asserting the claim.” (Citations omitted.) Still v. Hayman, 153 Ohio App.3d 487 , 2003-Ohio-4113 , 794 N.E.2d 751, at ¶ 14 . {¶ 18} First, appellant did not prove that there was an unreasonable delay on appellee’s part in asserting her claim. | 3 | 2003–2008 |
State v. Robbins
green
2 sentences2006“In Ohio, to prove self-defense it must be established that the person asserting this defense had ‘ * * * a bona fide belief that he [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force.’ (Emphasis added.) ” (Bracketed material sic.) Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215 , 551 N.E.2d 970 , quoting State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74 , 12 O.O.3d 84 , 388 N.E.2d 755 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2006“In Ohio, to prove self-defense it must be established that the person asserting this defense had ‘ * * * a bona fide belief that he [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force.’ (Emphasis added.) ” (Bracketed material sic.) Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215 , 551 N.E.2d 970 , quoting State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74 , 12 O.O.3d 84 , 388 N.E.2d 755 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 3 | 1990–2006 |
State v. Koss
green
2 sentences2006“In Ohio, to prove self-defense it must be established that the person asserting this defense had ‘ * * * a bona fide belief that he [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force.’ (Emphasis added.) ” (Bracketed material sic.) Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215 , 551 N.E.2d 970 , quoting State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74 , 12 O.O.3d 84 , 388 N.E.2d 755 , paragraph two of the syllabus. 2006“In Ohio, to prove self-defense it must be established that the person asserting this defense had ‘ * * * a bona fide belief that he [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force.’ (Emphasis added.) ” (Bracketed material sic.) Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 215 , 551 N.E.2d 970 , quoting State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74 , 12 O.O.3d 84 , 388 N.E.2d 755 , paragraph two of the syllabus. | 3 | 1996–2006 |
Wright v. Oliver
green
2 sentences2005Seegert v. Zietlow (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 451 , 457 , citing Wright v. Oliver (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 10 , 517 N.E.2d 883 , syllabus; Ferree v. Sparks (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 185 , 601 N.E.2d 568 ; Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34 , 472 N.E.2d 328 ; Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 8} Parents are obligated to support their minor children, including illegitimate children. 2005Seegert v. Zietlow (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 451 , 457 , citing Wright v. Oliver (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 10 , 517 N.E.2d 883 , syllabus; Ferree v. Sparks (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 185 , 601 N.E.2d 568 ; Connin v. Bailey (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 34 , 472 N.E.2d 328 ; Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 , paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 8} Parents are obligated to support their minor children, including illegitimate children. | 3 | 1990–2005 |
State ex rel. Rife v. Franklin County Board of Elections
green
2 sentences2021Bd. of Elections, 70 Ohio St.3d 632, 635 , 640 N.E.2d 522 (1994); see also Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 455, 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959) (“in order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his rights”). {¶ 27} The sole assertion of prejudice made in this case is that petitioners’ “unreasonable delay not only caused this matter to become an expedited election 10 January Term, 2021 matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, but it also resulted in the Court having to issue a s 2021Bd. of Elections, 70 Ohio St.3d 632, 635 , 640 N.E.2d 522 (1994); see also Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 455, 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959) (“in order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his rights”). {¶ 27} The sole assertion of prejudice made in this case is that petitioners’ “unreasonable delay not only caused this matter to become an expedited election 10 January Term, 2021 matter under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, but it also resulted in the Court having to issue a s | 2 | 2018–2021 |
State ex rel. Case v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2020Comm. of Ohio, 28 Ohio St.3d 383, 385 , 504 N.E.2d 30 (1986). “[I]t must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.” Id., citing Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959), paragraph three of the 27 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS syllabus. 2020Comm. of Ohio, 28 Ohio St.3d 383, 385 , 504 N.E.2d 30 (1986). “[I]t must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.” Id., citing Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959), paragraph three of the 27 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS syllabus. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Swidler & Berlin v. United States
green
1 sentence2024However, it “presumes that the person asserting the defense engaged in actionable conduct ‘on the advice of counsel.’” Id., quoting Mancz v. McHenry, 2021- Ohio-82, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.). {¶46} As stated, Appellants served 55 new document requests despite SWN having produced nearly 1,000 pages of documents prior to the filing of the cross-motions for summary judgment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mancz v. McHenry
green
1 sentence2021Greene No. 2019-CA-74, 2021-Ohio-82, ¶ 33 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gordon v. Reid
neutral
1 sentence2014Montgomery No. 25507, 2013-Ohio-3649 at ¶ 16 . {¶ 15} “ ‘[I]n order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim.’ ” Thirty-Four Corp. at 354, quoting Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447 , 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959), paragraph three of the syllabus. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Merchants Bank Trust Co. v. Kelly, Unpublished Decision (7-26-2004)
neutral
1 sentence2013As such, we find that the doctrine of laches may be used as a defense in a taxpayer lawsuit where it is shown "that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asserting his claim." Kelly, 2004-Ohio-3913 at ¶ 20 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State ex rel. Cater v. City of North Olmsted
green
1 sentence2011Cater v. N. Olmsted, 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325 , 1994-Ohio-488 , 631 N.E.2d 1048 (“elements of a laches defense are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for such delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party”). {¶ 31} Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asser | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted
neutral
1 sentence2011Cater v. N. Olmsted, 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325 , 1994-Ohio-488 , 631 N.E.2d 1048 (“elements of a laches defense are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for such delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party”). {¶ 31} Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the person asser | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hayman v. Hayman
green
2 sentences2010THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: LACHES {¶ 50} Laches is defined as “ ‘ “an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” ’ ” Hayman v. Hayman, 184 Ohio App.3d 97 , 2009-Ohio-4855 , 919 N.E.2d 797, ¶ 47 , quoting Smith v. Smith (1957), 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 , 8 O.O.2d 424 , 146 N.E.2d 454 . “ ‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has bee 2010THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE: LACHES {¶ 50} Laches is defined as “ ‘ “an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to the adverse party.” ’ ” Hayman v. Hayman, 184 Ohio App.3d 97 , 2009-Ohio-4855 , 919 N.E.2d 797, ¶ 47 , quoting Smith v. Smith (1957), 107 Ohio App. 440, 443-444 , 8 O.O.2d 424 , 146 N.E.2d 454 . “ ‘Delay in asserting a right does not of itself constitute laches, and in order to successfully invoke the equitable doctrine of laches it must be shown that the person for whose benefit the doctrine will operate has bee | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Yo-Can, Inc. v. Yogurt Exchange, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007See, also, Korodi v. Minot (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 1 , 3-4 ; Yo-Can, Inc. v. The Yogurt Exchange, Inc. , 149 Ohio App.3d 513 , 2002-Ohio-5194 , at ¶ 42 . {¶ 22} "Common law fraud must be pleaded with particularity under Civ.R. 9(B), a rule that places a higher burden than is normally required upon the person asserting such a claim to support general allegations with specific facts." Reasoner v. State Farm Mut. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| South Dakota v. Neville green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ferree v. Sparks green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Blakemore v. Blakemore green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Denune green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hulett v. Hulett green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Witness Arnold & McDowell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| United States v. Doe green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Wise v. Wise green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Emrick v. Multicon Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State ex rel. Caspar v. City of Dayton green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State ex rel. Shady Acres Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rhodes green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Board of National Missions of Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Neeld green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.