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14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist.green2 sentences2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain 2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain | 2 | 4 |
American Friends Service Committee v. Procunierred2 sentences1977Government Code section 11440 refers to the declaration relief provision of the Code of Civil Procedure as does Unemployment Insurance Code section 409.2. (2) We acknowledge the fundamental principle that when a regulation (the precedent benefit decision) is challenged, the person asserting the challenge must be a person or organization who is subject to the regulation or affected by it. ( American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 252, 255 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 ].) (1b) By its complaint, plaintiff alleges that it employs 32 persons. 1977Government Code section 11440 refers to the declaration relief provision of the Code of Civil Procedure as does Unemployment Insurance Code section 409.2. (2) We acknowledge the fundamental principle that when a regulation (the precedent benefit decision) is challenged, the person asserting the challenge must be a person or organization who is subject to the regulation or affected by it. ( American Friends Service Committee v. Procunier (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 252, 255 [ 109 Cal. Rptr. 22 ].) (1b) By its complaint, plaintiff alleges that it employs 32 persons. | 2 | 2 |
California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain 2018Dist. (2013) 570 U.S. 595 , 622, 133 S.Ct. 2586 , 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (dis. opn. of Kagan, J.).) " '[A] predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.' [Citation.] Or, in other words, the condition is one that would have constituted a taking of property without just compensation if it were imposed by the government on a property owner outside of the permit process." ( California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 | 1 | 3 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2015In a related context, the United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553 [ 74 L.Ed.2d 748 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ] (Neville) held that use of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as evidence in a DUI trial does not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. “ ‘[T]he Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of “physical or moral compulsion” exerted on the person asserting the privilege.’ ” ( 459 U.S. at p. 562 .) “Here, the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of sub 2015In a related context, the United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553 [ 74 L.Ed.2d 748 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ] (Neville) held that use of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test as evidence in a DUI trial does not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. “ ‘[T]he Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of “physical or moral compulsion” exerted on the person asserting the privilege.’ ” ( 459 U.S. at p. 562 .) “Here, the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of sub | 1 | 2 |
Nollan v. California Coastal Commissiongreen1 sentence2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. City of Tigardgreen2 sentences2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain 2025(See Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at pp. 280- 281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.), citing Koontz, supra, 570 U.S. at p. 612 ; see also California Building, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 459-460.) As recognized by the Supreme Court in Koontz: “A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.” (Koontz, at p. 612 [“[W]e began our analysis in both Nollan and Dolan by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain | 1 | 1 |
City and County of San Francisco v. Stanleygreen1 sentence2022(In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1150, 1160 (Sachs).) Whether the privilege actually applies turns on whether husband, as the person asserting the privilege, is able to County of San Francisco v. Stanley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1727 [postjudgment order modifying child support directly appealable].) 6 show that “‘responsive answer[s] to the question[s posed] or an explanation of why [a question] cannot be answered might be dangerous because”’ they ““‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness for a criminal offense.’” (Id. at pp. 1150- | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Sachsgreen1 sentence2022(In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1150, 1160 (Sachs).) Whether the privilege actually applies turns on whether husband, as the person asserting the privilege, is able to County of San Francisco v. Stanley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1727 [postjudgment order modifying child support directly appealable].) 6 show that “‘responsive answer[s] to the question[s posed] or an explanation of why [a question] cannot be answered might be dangerous because”’ they ““‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness for a criminal offense.’” (Id. at pp. 1150- | 1 | 1 |
People v. McAuliffegreen2 sentences2014A “[h]omicide is also justifiable” when it is committed in the lawful defense of a person against one who “manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony,” or when there is reasonable ground to fear great bodily injury “and imminent danger of such design being accomplished”; but when the person asserting the defense “was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat,” he or she must first actually and in good faith “have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide [or in this case, the attempted homicide] was committed.” (§ 197; People v. McAuliffe 2014A “[h]omicide is also justifiable” when it is committed in the lawful defense of a person against one who “manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony,” or when there is reasonable ground to fear great bodily injury “and imminent danger of such design being accomplished”; but when the person asserting the defense “was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat,” he or she must first actually and in good faith “have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide [or in this case, the attempted homicide] was committed.” (§ 197; People v. McAuliffe | 1 | 1 |
Kately v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a 1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a | 1 | 1 |
Lokey v. Pine Mountain Lumber Co.green2 sentences1963Co., 205 Cal.App.2d 522, 531 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 293 ]; Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal.App. 2d 575 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]). 1963Co., 205 Cal.App.2d 522, 531 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 293 ]; Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal.App. 2d 575 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Ryan v. Weltegreen2 sentences1951(Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897, 900 [ 198 P.2d 357 ]; Estate of Cropper, 83 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 187 P.2d 780 ].) The heirs, devisees and legatees, not the executor or administrator, are necessary parties to such an action. 1951(Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897, 900 [ 198 P.2d 357 ]; Estate of Cropper, 83 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 187 P.2d 780 ].) The heirs, devisees and legatees, not the executor or administrator, are necessary parties to such an action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
red
2 sentences1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a 1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a | 2 | 1983–1990 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a 1983(See Shepard v. Superior Court, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at pp. 20-21.) In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the Supreme Court also distinguished between bystander injuries, governed by *587 Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , and direct injuries, i.e., those in which the defendant’s negligence is foreseeably directed toward the person asserting a claim for emotional distress. | 2 | 1983–1990 |
Sheetz v. El Dorado County
green
1 sentence2025(Sheetz, supra, 601 U.S. at p. 280 .) In doing so, the high court did not resolve the “important threshold question to any application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny: whether the permit condition would be a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting context.” (Id. at pp. 280-281 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) As explained by Justice Sotomayor: “ ‘A predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.’ [Citation.] In the takings context, N | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hoffman v. United States
green
1 sentence2022(In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1150, 1160 (Sachs).) Whether the privilege actually applies turns on whether husband, as the person asserting the privilege, is able to County of San Francisco v. Stanley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1727 [postjudgment order modifying child support directly appealable].) 6 show that “‘responsive answer[s] to the question[s posed] or an explanation of why [a question] cannot be answered might be dangerous because”’ they ““‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness for a criminal offense.’” (Id. at pp. 1150- | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cudjo
green
1 sentence2022(In re Marriage of Sachs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1150, 1160 (Sachs).) Whether the privilege actually applies turns on whether husband, as the person asserting the privilege, is able to County of San Francisco v. Stanley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1727 [postjudgment order modifying child support directly appealable].) 6 show that “‘responsive answer[s] to the question[s posed] or an explanation of why [a question] cannot be answered might be dangerous because”’ they ““‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the witness for a criminal offense.’” (Id. at pp. 1150- | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Action Apartment Assn. v. City of Santa Monica
green
2 sentences2018However, another limitation on the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to takings claims is that the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan / Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges. ( Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456 , 470, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ( Action Apartment ) [" Nollan / Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable legislative general zoning decisions."].) The Action Apartment court affi 2018However, another limitation on the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to takings claims is that the doctrine, with its attendant Nollan / Dolan test, generally is not applied to facial challenges. ( Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 456 , 470, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 722 ( Action Apartment ) [" Nollan / Dolan test developed for use in land exaction takings litigation applies only in the case of individual adjudicative permit approval decisions; not to generally applicable legislative general zoning decisions."].) The Action Apartment court affi | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Holt
green
2 sentences2014“There is certainly no law to justify the proposition that a man may be the assailant and bring on an attack, and then claim exemption from the consequence of killing his adversary on the ground of self defense.”’” (People v. Holt, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 66 ; People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1102 .) In this case the threat to Sanchez was not imminent or even likely, by any account, until after he had followed Cortez in order to fight, until after he had continued to approach Cortez with gun drawn after Cortez had stopped and turned, and until after he had already shot twice at Corte 2014A “[h]omicide is also justifiable” when it is committed in the lawful defense of a person against one who “manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony,” or when there is reasonable ground to fear great bodily injury “and imminent danger of such design being accomplished”; but when the person asserting the defense “was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat,” he or she must first actually and in good faith “have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide [or in this case, the attempted homicide] was committed.” (§ 197; People v. McAuliffe | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Hill
red
1 sentence2014“There is certainly no law to justify the proposition that a man may be the assailant and bring on an attack, and then claim exemption from the consequence of killing his adversary on the ground of self defense.”’” (People v. Holt, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 66 ; People v. Hill (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1102 .) In this case the threat to Sanchez was not imminent or even likely, by any account, until after he had followed Cortez in order to fight, until after he had continued to approach Cortez with gun drawn after Cortez had stopped and turned, and until after he had already shot twice at Corte | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ochoa v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hedlund v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a 1990(Id. at p. 923.) The court drew an express distinction between the status of the plaintiff in Dillon v. Legg, supra, 68 Cal.2d 728 , who suffered injury solely from witnessing the infliction of injury on her child and thus was a “bystander,” and the status of the husband as a “direct victim.” (Molien, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 923 .) After the decision in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d 916 , the imposition of a duty of care under the theory developed in that case was defined as arising when “the defendant’s negligence is foresee-ably directed toward the person asserting a | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc.
green
2 sentences1963Co., 205 Cal.App.2d 522, 531 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 293 ]; Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal.App. 2d 575 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]). 1963Co., 205 Cal.App.2d 522, 531 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 293 ]; Atherley v. MacDonald, Young & Nelson, Inc., 142 Cal.App. 2d 575 [ 298 P.2d 700 ]). | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Malcolm v. Stevens
green
2 sentences1951(Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897, 900 [ 198 P.2d 357 ]; Estate of Cropper, 83 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 187 P.2d 780 ].) The heirs, devisees and legatees, not the executor or administrator, are necessary parties to such an action. 1951(Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal.App.2d 897, 900 [ 198 P.2d 357 ]; Estate of Cropper, 83 Cal.App.2d 105 [ 187 P.2d 780 ].) The heirs, devisees and legatees, not the executor or administrator, are necessary parties to such an action. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.