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28 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1931–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Ass'n v. Dentongreen2 sentences2013See Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 760 . 2013See Denton, 897 S.W.2d at 760 . | 3 | 3 |
Olguin v. Jungmangreen2 sentences2011RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT SUE WAS UNSUITABLE A. There Was No Evidence of Conflict of Interest Joe argues that the trial court‘s finding of direct conflict should be upheld. ―[T]he suitability of an executor . . . claiming title to property owned by the testator at the time of death has been addressed by several courts of appeals,‖ which have concluded that a conflict of interest in this situation ―establish[ed] unsuitability as a matter of law.‖ Pine v. Deblieux, No. 01-10-00411-CV, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2011, no pet. h.); see Olguin v. Jungma 2011RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT SUE WAS UNSUITABLE A. There Was No Evidence of Conflict of Interest Joe argues that the trial court’s finding of direct conflict should be upheld. “[T]he suitability of an executor ... claiming title to property owned by the testator at the time of death has been addressed by several courts of appeals,” which have concluded that a conflict of interest in this situation “establish[ed] unsuitability as a matter of law.” Pine v. Deblieux, — S.W.3d—, 2011 WL 2732570 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet. h.); see Olguin v. Jungman, 931 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.A | 3 | 3 |
Bays v. Jordangreen2 sentences2011This is because ―the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.‖ Pine, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 5 App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (―Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.‖); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 3 2011This is because “the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.” Pine , — S.W.3d at—(citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (“Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.”); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (Tex. | 3 | 3 |
Ayala v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2011This is because ―the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.‖ Pine, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 5 App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (―Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.‖); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 3 2011This is because “the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.” Pine , — S.W.3d at—(citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (“Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.”); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (Tex. | 3 | 3 |
Haynes v. Clantongreen2 sentences2011This is because ―the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.‖ Pine, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 5 App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (―Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.‖); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 3 2011This is because “the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.” Pine , — S.W.3d at—(citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (“Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.”); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (Tex. | 3 | 3 |
Fisher v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Id. at 703 . “[T]he Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral [mental] compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976). 1986See Apodoca, supra, 146 S.W.2d at 382, quoting 16 Corpus Juris 566 ("Compulsion is the keynote of the prohibition [against self-incrimination]; and to render evidence inadmissible on the ground that defendant was compelled to produce it against himself, it must appear that such compulsion was used as to rob him of volition in the matter.") The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of `physical or moral [mental] compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 , 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1574 , 48 | 2 | 5 |
Jennifer Pine and Robin Pine Sims v. Catherine deBlieux, Individually and as Successor Administrator of the Estate of Robert Edward Pinegreen2 sentences2011RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT SUE WAS UNSUITABLE A. There Was No Evidence of Conflict of Interest Joe argues that the trial court‘s finding of direct conflict should be upheld. ―[T]he suitability of an executor . . . claiming title to property owned by the testator at the time of death has been addressed by several courts of appeals,‖ which have concluded that a conflict of interest in this situation ―establish[ed] unsuitability as a matter of law.‖ Pine v. Deblieux, No. 01-10-00411-CV, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 14, 2011, no pet. h.); see Olguin v. Jungma 2011RECORD DID NOT SUPPORT FINDING THAT SUE WAS UNSUITABLE A. There Was No Evidence of Conflict of Interest Joe argues that the trial court’s finding of direct conflict should be upheld. “[T]he suitability of an executor ... claiming title to property owned by the testator at the time of death has been addressed by several courts of appeals,” which have concluded that a conflict of interest in this situation “establish[ed] unsuitability as a matter of law.” Pine v. Deblieux, — S.W.3d—, 2011 WL 2732570 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet. h.); see Olguin v. Jungman, 931 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.A | 2 | 3 |
Hitt v. Dumitrovgreen2 sentences2011This is because ―the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.‖ Pine, 2011 WL 2732570, at *4 (citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 5 App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (―Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.‖); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 3 2011This is because “the interest of the estate and that administrator or executor are too adverse for that one person to advocate effectively for both sides.” Pine , — S.W.3d at—(citing Ayala v. Martinez, 883 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Bays v. Jordan, 622 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1981, no writ) (“Clearly, one whose personal interests are so adverse to those of the estate or the beneficiaries thereof that both cannot be fairly represented by the same person is not a proper person to administer the estate.”); Hitt v. Dumitrov, 598 S.W.2d 355, 355-56 (Tex. | 1 | 3 |
Tommy Henry v. Dr. Chad Kellygreen1 sentence2024Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court “has encouraged trial courts to liberally construe expert reports in favor of plaintiffs.” Henry v. Kelly, 375 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Loaisiga v. Cerdagreen1 sentence2024It is “a low threshold” a person asserting a claim “against a health care provider must cross merely to show that his claim is not frivolous.” Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 264 (Tex. 2012) (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Zaher A. El-Ali v. Stategreen1 sentence2023“A person asserting this defense bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he did not know or should not reasonably have know[n] of the [allegedly criminal] act or omission that justified the seizure.” El-Ali, 388 S.W.3d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
C.W. 100 Louis Henna, Ltd. v. El Chico Restaurants of Texas, L.P.green1 sentence2023ACI Design Build Contractors Inc. v. Loadholt, 605 S.W.3d 515 , 519 (Tex. App.— Austin 2020, pet. denied) (citing C.W. 100 Louis Henna, Ltd. v. El Chico Rests., L.P., 295 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)). | 1 | 1 |
Madison v. Gordongreen1 sentence2022“Status as a bona fide purchaser is an affirmative defense,” and the person asserting that defense must show that he acquired the subject property “in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest.” Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen1 sentence2015Also a Court applying the Hoffman test must be “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case” that the person asserting the privilege cannot possibly provide an answer that would have any remote tendency to provide a link the chain of evidence that might have a “tendency to incriminate.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 (1964), overruled in non-pertinent part by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) [concerning the test for voluntariness of a confession]. | 1 | 1 |
Malloy v. Hogangreen1 sentence2015Also a Court applying the Hoffman test must be “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case” that the person asserting the privilege cannot possibly provide an answer that would have any remote tendency to provide a link the chain of evidence that might have a “tendency to incriminate.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 (1964), overruled in non-pertinent part by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) [concerning the test for voluntariness of a confession]. | 1 | 1 |
$9,050.00 in U.S. Currency v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Id.; see also $9,050.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 874 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (noting that the claimant making the innocent owner defense has the burden to prove it). | 1 | 1 |
Giffin v. Smithgreen1 sentence2008See Giffin v. Smith , 688 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Steubner Realty 19, Ltd. v. Cravens Road 88, Ltd.green1 sentence2002See id. | 1 | 1 |
City of Ottumwa v. Nicholsongreen2 sentences1963See City of Ottumwa v. Nicholson, 161 Iowa 473 , 143 N.W. 439 , L.R.A.1916E, 983. 1963See City of Ottumwa v. Nicholson, 161 Iowa 473 , 143 N.W. 439 , L.R.A. 1916E, 983 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stanley v. Schwalby
neutral
2 sentences1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that “Before it can be said that a cause of action exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained”; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that “The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued— that is, when a suit may be maintained— and not until that time.” It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that “Limitation runs upon the right or cause of acti 1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that "Before it can be said that a cause of action *160 exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained"; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that "The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued — that is, when a suit may be maintained — and not until that time." It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that "Limitation runs upon the right or cause | 4 | 1931–1972 |
Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills
green
2 sentences1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that “Before it can be said that a cause of action exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained”; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that “The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued— that is, when a suit may be maintained— and not until that time.” It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that “Limitation runs upon the right or cause of acti 1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that "Before it can be said that a cause of action *160 exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained"; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that "The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued — that is, when a suit may be maintained — and not until that time." It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that "Limitation runs upon the right or cause | 3 | 1942–1963 |
Deaton v. Rush
green
2 sentences1980It involves both the existence of the right and facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ “In Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176 , 252 S.W. 1025 , a vendor’s cause of action for recovery of certain land, the deed to which was obtained by fraud, is said not to accrue until after the cancellation of such deed, the reason being that such action could not be maintained until the deed had been set aside. 1980It involves both the existence of the right and facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ “In Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176 , 252 S.W. 1025 , a vendor’s cause of action for recovery of certain land, the deed to which was obtained by fraud, is said not to accrue until after the cancellation of such deed, the reason being that such action could not be maintained until the deed had been set aside. | 2 | 1938–1980 |
Stanley v. Schwalby
green
2 sentences1972It involves the existence of the right to sue, as well as of facts deemed sufficient in a general sense to constitute a cause of action; and the right to sue may depend . . . upon the denial of the right to sue a state . which but for such legal denial would be subject to suit.” Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , 266 (1892), rev’d, other grounds, Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 , 13 S.Ct. 418 , 37 L.Ed. 259 (1892). 1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that "Before it can be said that a cause of action *160 exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained"; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that "The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued — that is, when a suit may be maintained — and not until that time." It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that "Limitation runs upon the right or cause | 2 | 1963–1972 |
Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills
green
2 sentences1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that “Before it can be said that a cause of action exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained”; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that “The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued— that is, when a suit may be maintained— and not until that time.” It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that “Limitation runs upon the right or cause of acti 1963It was said by this Court in Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 143 S.W. 926 , that "Before it can be said that a cause of action *160 exists in a legal sense, there must be such a mature right as may be declared upon and maintained"; the Court further quoted with approval the statement that "The statute of limitation begins to run from the time when a complete cause of action accrued — that is, when a suit may be maintained — and not until that time." It was held in Stanley v. Schwalby, 85 Tex. 348 , 19 S.W. 264 , that "Limitation runs upon the right or cause | 2 | 1942–1963 |
Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills
neutral
2 sentences1946It involves both the existence of the right and facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” See also Condor Petroleum Co. v. Greene, Tex.Civ.App. 164 S.W.2d 713 ; Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 152 S.W. 629 ; A. H. 1942Company v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 520, 143 S.W. 926, 928 , 148 S.W. 283 , 150 S.W. 884 , 152 S.W. 629 , the Supreme Court said: - “In determining- this issue, ' it is necessary to first ascertain what plaintiff’s cause of action was as sued upon, and when such cause of action accrued to it. | 2 | 1942–1946 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences2026“Physical compulsion includes such obvious force as physical torture or extended deprivation of food and water.” Thomas, 723 S.W.2d at 704 . 2026Id. at 703 . “[T]he Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral [mental] compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Berry-Helfand
green
1 sentence2025While it is true that an accrual date prescribed by statute governs over the general rule that a cause of action accrues and statutes of limitations begin to run when facts come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy, Southwestern Energy Prod., 491 S.W.3d at 721 , when construing the statutorily prescribed “termination” date consistently with the parties’ intent as expressed in the Contract and Bond, the only reasonable conclusion is that which aligns with the general common-law rule of accrual: that the parties intended the Contract to survive the Contractor’s defa | 1 | 2025–2025 |
American Exchange Nat. Bank of Dallas v. Keeley
green
1 sentence2025Thus, generally the statute of limitations “can only be put in motion . . . when the right or cause of action accrues, and not before, and this does not exist until facts have arisen which authorize a person asserting a claim to obtain relief from some court of justice against the person liable on the alleged cause of action.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Perlman v. United States
green
2 sentences1983As the United States Supreme Court has declared: “[The constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination] is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 , 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1574 , 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 , 38 S.Ct. 417, 420 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918). 1983As the United States Supreme Court has declared: “[The constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination] is limited to prohibiting the use of ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted on the person asserting the privilege.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 , 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1574 , 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 , 38 S.Ct. 417, 420 , 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Condor Petroleum Co. v. Greene
green
1 sentence1946It involves both the existence of the right and facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” See also Condor Petroleum Co. v. Greene, Tex.Civ.App. 164 S.W.2d 713 ; Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills, 105 Tex. 514 , 152 S.W. 629 ; A. H. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Belo Corp. v. Thomas Blanton green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. Beaumont Rice Mills neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| San Antonio Real Estate Building & Loan Ass'n v. Stewart green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Leach v. Wilson County neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Reese v. Cobb green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.