5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ashton v. Ashtongreen2 sentences2014In response to this argument, Avalos contends that the evidence was improper rebuttal evidence and witness bolstering because he had not attacked the credibility of TLC's former employees prior to its admission. %24 Even if we assume that the trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the evidence of TLC's closure, Avalos has the burden to show that the error was "substantial and prejudicial in that [he] was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 1999See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). ¶ 9 Whether an exhibit should have been excluded on the basis that it lacked adequate foundation is primarily within the sound discretion of the trial court, which ruling we will not overturn absent an abuse of discretion. | 2 | 2 |
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2014In response to this argument, Avalos contends that the evidence was improper rebuttal evidence and witness bolstering because he had not attacked the credibility of TLC's former employees prior to its admission. %24 Even if we assume that the trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the evidence of TLC's closure, Avalos has the burden to show that the error was "substantial and prejudicial in that [he] was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2014In response to this argument, Avalos contends that the evidence was improper rebuttal evidence and witness bolstering because he had not attacked the credibility of TLC's former employees prior to its admission. %24 Even if we assume that the trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the evidence of TLC's closure, Avalos has the burden to show that the error was "substantial and prejudicial in that [he] was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987); see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lindgrengreen2 sentences2006In other words, Klawe has not shown that "absent the error there [wals a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable." Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1271 (quotations and citation omitted). 134 We note that "[the determination of whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome is based upon a review of the record." Id. at 1274 . 2006Again, assuming, without deciding, that the admission of Marchant's testimony was improper, Klawe has failed to demonstrate that the admission of the evidence was "harmful." State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah Ct.App.1996); see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, ¶8 , 977 P.2d 508 ("[The person asserting error has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial and prejudicial."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Covey v. Covey
green
2 sentences2014Indeed, "reversal is not warranted where the trial court's error is harmless." Hull v. Wilcock (In re Estate of Wilcock), 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 43 , 285 P.3d 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." " Id. € 44 (omission in original) (quoting Covey v. Covey, 2008 UT App 380 , ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553 . "[In other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high a 2014Indeed, "reversal is not warranted where the trial court's error is harmless." Hull v. Wilcock (In re Estate of Wilcock), 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 43 , 285 P.3d 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." " Id. € 44 (omission in original) (quoting Covey v. Covey, 2008 UT App 380 , ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553 . "[In other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high a | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph R. Wilcock (Wilcock v. Wilcock)
green
2 sentences2014Indeed, "reversal is not warranted where the trial court's error is harmless." Hull v. Wilcock (In re Estate of Wilcock), 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 43 , 285 P.3d 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." " Id. € 44 (omission in original) (quoting Covey v. Covey, 2008 UT App 380 , ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553 . "[In other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high a 2014Indeed, "reversal is not warranted where the trial court's error is harmless." Hull v. Wilcock (In re Estate of Wilcock), 2012 UT App 223, ¶ 43 , 285 P.3d 815 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." " Id. € 44 (omission in original) (quoting Covey v. Covey, 2008 UT App 380 , ¶ 21, 80 P.3d 553 . "[In other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high a | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Utah Department of Transportation v. 6200 South Associates
green
1 sentence2002"Moreover, the person asserting error has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial and prejudicial." Id. 113 Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to make findings on several material issues and the findings that the trial court did make were so ambiguous and vague that it is impossible to conduct a review of the trial court's ruling. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Wright v. Clissold
green
2 sentences1984We explained in our opinion in Wright v. Clissold, supra, that once the four elements of boundary by acquiescence (named above) are established, the Court is required to presume the existence of a binding agreement unless the party who assails it proves by competent evidence that there was actually no agreement between the adjoining land owners or there could not have been a proper agreement. 1984We explained in our opinion in Wright v. Clissold, supra, that once the four elements of boundary by acquiescence (named above) are established, the Court is required to presume the existence of a binding agreement unless the party who assails it proves by competent evidence that there was actually no agreement between the adjoining land owners or there could not have been a proper agreement. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. Kingsbury
green
2 sentences1984Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, and Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35 , 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly held that like other defenses the burden of proof is upon the person asserting the defense. 1984Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, and Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35 , 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly held that like other defenses the burden of proof is upon the person asserting the defense. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.