search and seizure clause in Illinois

2019Our supreme court has interpreted the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in the same manner as the fourth amendment, while allowing for consideration of "state tradition and values." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 50 (acknowledging the adoption of the "limited lockstep" approach to interpreting our state constitution's search and seizure clause, which allows for the consideration *444 *977 of state tradition and values, so that "there may be instances where the meaning of our state search and seizure clause differs from that of the federal constitution"); People

2019Our supreme court has interpreted the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in the same manner as the fourth amendment, while allowing for consideration of "state tradition and values." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 50 (acknowledging the adoption of the "limited lockstep" approach to interpreting our state constitution's search and seizure clause, which allows for the consideration *444 *977 of state tradition and values, so that "there may be instances where the meaning of our state search and seizure clause differs from that of the federal constitution"); People

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2024In order to depart from lockstep, “ ‘We must find in the language of our constitution, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitutional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are patterned.’ ” People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 310 (2006) (quoting People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984)).

2021The search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution, which is to be interpreted in lockstep with the fourth amendment (see People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984)) also provides, “ *** no warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” (Emphasis added.) Ill.

2006In Mitchell, 165 Ill.2d at 216 , 209 Ill.Dec. 41 , 650 N.E.2d 1014 , this court applied the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 , 113 S.Ct. 2130 , 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (holding that the "plain feel" doctrine does not offend the fourth amendment), to conclude that the "plain touch" doctrine comports with the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the state constitution.

2006After examining the history of the privacy clause, we concluded that “the drafters intended no change in the categorization of conduct traditionally covered by the search and seizure clause.” Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 221 .

2010The court cited People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 179-80 (2001), in which it had refused to “ ‘construe Krueger as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment.

2010The court cited People v. Bolden, 197 Ill.2d 166, 179-80 , 258 Ill.Dec. 538 , 756 N.E.2d 812 (2001), in which it had refused to "`construe Krueger as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution must be interpreted more expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment.

2019People v. Burns , 2016 IL 118973 , ¶ 19, 401 Ill.Dec. 468 , 50 N.E.3d 610 ; People v. Fitzpatrick , 2013 IL 113449 , ¶ 15, 369 Ill.Dec. 527 , 986 N.E.2d 1163 ; People v. Caballes , 221 Ill. 2d 282 , 316, 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006) ; People v. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d 231 , 240-41, 278 Ill.Dec. 244 , 798 N.E.2d 91 (2003) ; see Ill.

2019People v. Burns , 2016 IL 118973 , ¶ 19, 401 Ill.Dec. 468 , 50 N.E.3d 610 ; People v. Fitzpatrick , 2013 IL 113449 , ¶ 15, 369 Ill.Dec. 527 , 986 N.E.2d 1163 ; People v. Caballes , 221 Ill. 2d 282 , 316, 303 Ill.Dec. 128 , 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006) ; People v. Lampitok , 207 Ill. 2d 231 , 240-41, 278 Ill.Dec. 244 , 798 N.E.2d 91 (2003) ; see Ill.

2018See People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 28 . ¶ 22 For the reasons that we explain below, strict application of the void ab initio doctrine in the present context, to the extent posited by defendant, would conflict (1) with precedent from the United States Supreme Court and (2) with two recent decisions from this court. ¶ 23 Limited Lockstep Doctrine ¶ 24 Under our limited lockstep doctrine, we construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment unless any of the narrow exceptions to lo

2017See People v. Fitzpatrick , 2013 IL 113449 , ¶ 28, 369 Ill.Dec. 527 , 986 N.E.2d 1163 . ¶ 22 For the reasons that we explain below, strict application of the void ab initio doctrine in the present context, to the extent posited by defendant, would conflict (1) with precedent from the United States Supreme Court and (2) with two recent decisions from this court. ¶ 23 Limited Lockstep Doctrine ¶ 24 Under our limited lockstep doctrine, we construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment unl

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2019I, § 6 ) contains a search-and-seizure clause similar to the fourth amendment's, which is interpreted "in 'limited lockstep' with its federal counterpart." LeFlore , 2015 IL 116799 , ¶ 16, 392 Ill.Dec. 467 , 32 N.E.3d 1043 .

2016See People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335-36 , 851 N.E.2d 26, 57 (2006). ¶ 25 “When a police officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation.” People v. Ramsey, 362 Ill.

2016See People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335-36 , 851 N.E.2d 26, 57 (2006). ¶ 25 “When a police officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to investigate the violation.” People v. Ramsey, 362 Ill.

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2005See Smith, 214 Ill. 2d at 349 , 827 N,E.2d at 451; People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 , 813 N.E.2d 93, 101 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003); People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 176 , 784 N.E.2d 799, 806 (2003); People v. Bolden, 197 Ill. 2d 166, 178-79 , 756 N.E.2d 812, 820 (2001); People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 196 , 705 N.E.2d 824, 833 (1998); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302, 314 , 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (1996); People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 219 , 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1995); People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 146 , 506 N.E.2d 1269, 1274

2025But relying on the vacated portions of People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part & vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , defendant initially argued that a warrantless arrest—with or, here, without a pending investigative alert— violates the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2023Instead, the defendant contests only the merits of the circuit court’s order as it relates to the claim that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional. ¶ 12 Relying on the reasoning of the majority in People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and the reasoning of the majority in Bass’ progeny, People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , the defendant argues that his warrantless arrest based on an investigative alert violated the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2021City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2017 IL 120350, ¶ 60 (citing Caballes in support of its holding that the unique language contained in article I, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 did not weigh against interpreting the right to assemble in lockstep with federal precedent interpreting a corresponding clause in the first amendment of the federal constitution). ¶ 47 In this case, defendant has provided no reason to depart from interpreting the search and seizure clause contained in article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 in lockstep with the fourth amendment of the f

2020City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2017 IL 120350, ¶ 60 (citing Caballes in support of its holding that the unique language contained in article I, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 did not weigh against interpreting the right to assemble in lockstep with federal precedent interpreting a corresponding clause in the first amendment of the federal constitution). ¶ 47 In this case, defendant has provided no reason to depart from interpreting the search and seizure clause contained in article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 in lockstep with the fourth amendment of the f

2025But relying on the vacated portions of People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part & vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , defendant initially argued that a warrantless arrest—with or, here, without a pending investigative alert— violates the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2023Instead, the defendant contests only the merits of the circuit court’s order as it relates to the claim that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional. ¶ 12 Relying on the reasoning of the majority in People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and the reasoning of the majority in Bass’ progeny, People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , the defendant argues that his warrantless arrest based on an investigative alert violated the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2025But relying on the vacated portions of People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part & vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , defendant initially argued that a warrantless arrest—with or, here, without a pending investigative alert— violates the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2023Instead, the defendant contests only the merits of the circuit court’s order as it relates to the claim that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional. ¶ 12 Relying on the reasoning of the majority in People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640 , aff’d in part, vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434 , and the reasoning of the majority in Bass’ progeny, People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 190691 , the defendant argues that his warrantless arrest based on an investigative alert violated the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2026The search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “is to be interpreted in lockstep with the -7- fourth amendment.” People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 28 . ¶ 19 In order to be valid, “ ‘a search warrant must state with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ ” People v. Boose, 2018 IL App (2d) 170016, ¶ 8 (quoting People v. Garcia, 2017 IL App (1st) 133398, ¶ 41 ).

2023No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’ ” Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 27 (quoting Ill.

2023In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976), the Supreme Court held that, in determining whether an arrest passes scrutiny under the fourth amendment, the necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether there was probable cause to make the arrest. ¶ 35 We construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment on the issues of warrantless arrests.

2023Watson, 423 U.S. at 417 . ¶ 25 In the absence of any exception to the lockstep doctrine, we construe the search and seizure clause of our state constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment on the issues of warrantless arrests.

2025See People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22 (“When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of proof at a hearing on that motion. *** Where the basis for the motion is an allegedly illegal search, the defendant must establish both that there was a search and that it was illegal.”) Here, defendant has offered the holdings and reasoning of Kyllo and Caballes to support his argument that an unlawful search occurred.

2025See People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413 , ¶ 22 (“When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of proof at a hearing on that motion. *** Where the basis for the motion is an allegedly illegal search, the defendant must establish both that there was a search and that it was illegal.”).

2024People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 . ¶ 48 The guarantees of the fourth amendment and the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “offer protection to people, not places (People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 244 (1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)), but the extent to which they protect people depends upon where the people are (Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289 , ¶ 16.

2024I, § 6; Lozano, 2023 IL 128609, ¶ 30 ; see also People v. Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289, ¶ 15 (“This court has long held that the search and seizure clause of our state constitution stands in ‘limited lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.”) The amendment protects people, not places, and the extent of that protection depends on where the people are.

2023The Wimberly court concluded: “the perceived ‘critical difference’ between the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution that underlies the Bass 19 No. 1-22-0640 court’s holding that arrests based solely on investigative alerts, even those supported by probable cause, are unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution is nonexistent and cannot form the basis of an exception to the general rule that the search and seizure clause of our state constitution is construed in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpreta

2023As we concluded in Wimberly, 2023 IL App (1st) 220809, ¶ 23 , “the perceived ‘critical difference’ between the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution which underlies the Bass court’s holding that arrests based solely on investigative alerts, even those supported by probable cause, are unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution is nonexistent and cannot form the basis of an exception to the general rule that the search and seizure clause of our state constitution is construed in accordance with the United States Supreme Co

2024The appellate court cited Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 112 (1898), for the proposition that the requirement of an “affidavit” shows that the search and seizure clause of the state constitution goes 4 Under this approach, we construe provisions of our state constitution in lockstep with their federal counterparts unless certain criteria are met.

2022Lippman, 175 Ill. at 112 . ¶ 94 Although no supreme court case has squarely addressed investigative alerts, the arrest in this case resembles the arrest based on a “standing order” that was found unlawful in McGurn.

2023Id.

2023If a defendant is unable to set forth a colorable claim that so infected his trial such that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process, he is unable to satisfy the prejudice prong of the test necessary to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 19 Relying on the portion of the decision in People v. Braswell, 2019 IL App (1st) 172810 , declining to follow the holding in Bass relating to the constitutionality of warrantless arrests made pursuant to an investigative alert, the State argues that the defendant cannot make a prima facie showing of prejudice neces

2022At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).

2016“This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in ‘limited lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314 (2006)). ¶ 20 The parties disagree whether the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___ , 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) controls.