2015 IL 116799

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 116799) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. KEITH LeFLORE, Appellee. Opinion filed May 21, 2015. JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Garman and Justices Kilbride and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Burke dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Freeman and Theis. OPINION ¶1 Defendant, Keith LeFlore, was charged with aggravated robbery, robbery and burglary in connection with an April 24, 2009, robbery of a gas station in Aurora, Illinois. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that police improperly used a Global Positioning System (GPS) device without a warrant to track the movements of a vehicle he used. The trial court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all charges, and sentenced to 20 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge. The appellate court reversed and remanded. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). ¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 In April 2009, Aurora police received a tip from the Crime Stoppers hotline that defendant was committing burglaries on the west side of Aurora and bringing “various items” into his apartment complex. The police located defendant’s address at the apartment complex after a data search. Police also discovered that defendant was on mandatory supervised release from prison. They also knew that in a recent police encounter defendant had been arrested for fleeing in a red Kia Spectra with license plate X743***. The Kia was registered to Stephanie Powell, who lived at the same address as defendant. ¶4 On April 23, 2009, Aurora police detective Jeremy Shufelt placed a GPS device under the rear bumper of the Kia while it was parked at the apartment complex where defendant resided. Detective Shufelt did not obtain a warrant to place the GPS device on the car’s exterior. Early the next morning, a local gas station located a few minutes from defendant’s residence was held up. Tracking from the GPS device showed that the Kia was parked near the gas station at the time it was robbed around 4:40 a.m. ¶5 A surveillance camera captured the robbery on video. It showed that the robber used what looked like a shotgun. He took the cash drawer and a carton of Newport cigarettes from the cashier and fled. The video also showed that the robber was wearing a pair of Steve Madden athletic shoes, which have a distinctive striping pattern on them. ¶6 On the evening of the same day as the robbery, police conducted a parole search of defendant’s residence. Defendant arrived at the apartment complex driving the Kia at the same time the police were conducting their search of his residence. Defendant was taken into custody for driving with a revoked license. He was wearing Steve Madden athletic shoes. During the search, the police recovered a hollow metal cane that had the rubber tip removed from the end. ¶7 When defendant was interviewed, the police told him that he had been under surveillance, but they did not tell him about the use of the GPS device. The police also told him that the apartment complex’s video camera showed him leaving early in the morning. After the police placed the metal cane in the interview room, defendant confessed, explaining that he made the cane look like a gun by removing the rubber stopper at the end and placing a black grocery-type bag around the center. The cashier from the store later picked defendant out of a photo lineup.

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¶8 Defendant was eventually charged with aggravated robbery, robbery and burglary in the circuit court of Kane County. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that it was solely through information received through the GPS tracking device that defendant became a suspect in the robbery and therefore all the evidence against him should be suppressed. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the use and “the existence” of the GPS device, which did not interfere with defendant’s possessory interest in the vehicle, did not constitute a search under either the federal or state constitutions. Relying upon United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), and United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), as controlling authority, the court concluded that the fourth amendment was not violated because “the information secured by the police was equal to what personal surveillance would have revealed and [was] available from the observations that could have been made on or about the public way or the publicly accessible locations.”

¶9 Defendant represented himself at his trial and the jury found him guilty of all charges. The trial court entered judgment on the aggravated battery charge and sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, and that the court erroneously allowed him to waive counsel without properly admonishing him under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).

¶ 10 While this case was pending on appeal in the appellate court, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-49 (2012), which held that the attachment of a GPS tracking device and the subsequent use of the device to monitor a vehicle’s movements on public streets was a search under the fourth amendment because the placement of the device constituted an unlawful trespass. Also while this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). In Davis, the Court applied the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to an automobile search conducted by a state police officer “in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.

¶ 11 Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court in the present case, the State submitted Jones as additional authority. 2013 IL App (2d) 100659, ¶ 83 (Birkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The parties were then directed to address Davis and whether the good-faith exception applied. Id. At oral

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argument, the State argued that Knotts and Karo were “binding precedent” at the time the search was conducted, and defendant argued that those two cases were distinguishable because they involved “beeper” tracking devices and not the more advanced GPS technology used here. Id. ¶ 108.

¶ 12 A divided appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction based on Jones and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendant borrowed the vehicle with Powell’s consent so as to establish standing under Jones. Id. ¶ 29 (majority opinion). The appellate court majority accepted defendant’s argument that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was not applicable due to the more advanced nature of GPS tracking. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. However, Justice Birkett in his partial dissent determined, among other things, that the good-faith exception applied and that the evidence that resulted from the GPS tracking should not be excluded. He concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that Knotts and Karo were “binding precedent” that controlled the outcome at the time the search was conducted in April 2009. Id. ¶ 115 (Birkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, the appellate court was in unanimous agreement that the defendant’s convictions must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial based on the trial court’s failure to properly admonish defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). 2013 IL App (2d) 100659, ¶ 60.

¶ 13 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). Before this court, the State concedes that the appellate court correctly determined that defendant must be retried based on the lack of proper admonishments under Supreme Court Rule 401(a). The State contends, however, that upon remand for a new trial, there is no need for the trial court to hold a new suppression hearing. In that regard, three issues are raised before this court: (1) whether the fourth amendment permitted police to place a GPS device on a car associated with defendant, where defendant was on mandatory supervised release from prison at the time and thus had a diminished expectation of privacy from that of an ordinary citizen; (2) whether defendant is entitled to a remand to present new evidence to establish his interest in the Kia so that he can avail himself of the holding in Jones; and (3) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable under the circumstances of this case so that the evidence compiled against defendant as a result of the installation and use of the GPS device should not be excluded. For the reasons that follow, we find that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable and that a new suppression hearing is therefore

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not warranted. Because this issue is dispositive, we find it unnecessary to address the two other issues raised by the parties.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS ¶ 15 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. ¶ 16 In a similar fashion, the Illinois Constitution provides that: “[t]he people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in “limited lockstep” with its federal counterpart. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314 (2006). ¶ 17 Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment subject only to a few exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule as a general deterrent to future fourth amendment violations. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. ^[1], 10 (1995). Despite the exclusionary rule’s relationship to the fourth amendment, however, there is no constitutional right to have the fruits of an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial. United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting that the fourth amendment “ ‘says nothing about suppressing evidence in violation of [its] command’ ” (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2426)). The judicially created doctrine of exclusion at times suppresses the evidence and makes it unavailable for trial. However, even when a fourth amendment violation has occurred, the evidence that resulted will not be

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¶ 18 In the present case, we need not determine whether Aurora police conducted an unreasonable search in violation of Jones. Nor do we need to remand for further proceedings to determine whether defendant had a sufficient possessory interest in the Kia to avail himself of the holding in Jones. This is because even assuming that the search violated the fourth amendment, the good-faith exception is applicable and suppression is not warranted.

¶ 19 Defendant seeks to avoid that result by arguing that Aurora police do not fall under the good-faith exception as explained in Davis because Knotts and Karo are distinguishable cases that the officers could not have reasonably relied upon. Defendant argues that both cases are distinguishable because they involved beeper tracking and not GPS technology and did not involve a trespass of the device unto the vehicle’s exterior without the consent of the owner. Defendant also argues that police could not have reasonably relied upon Garcia, a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case directly on point, because that case “is not binding precedent on Illinois courts.” In defendant’s view, binding precedent only exists if it is from the same jurisdiction in which the case is prosecuted, is followed by police to the “letter,” and is on all fours with the case to be decided.

¶ 20 As we will explain more fully below, defendant’s reading of Davis is incorrect and too narrow. Acceptance of the narrow interpretation of Davis proposed by defendant would mean neglecting or ignoring the important principles that have been set forth by the Supreme Court to help determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply in any given case. We also note at the outset that all of the federal circuits that have considered post-Jones whether the good-faith exception applies in cases of warrantless GPS searches conducted pre-Jones have rejected a narrow reading of Davis and have instead concluded that the good-faith exception applies under circumstances identical to the present case. E.g., United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (although the facts of Knotts and Karo differ from Jones, it is the rationale that underpins those decisions that is considered binding appellate precedent and that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to rely upon the precedent under Davis); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 338 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[w]ithout the benefit of hindsight *** and with no contrary guidance from the Supreme Court or this Court, *** a reasonably well-trained officer in this Circuit could have relied on Knotts as

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permitting the type of warrantless GPS usage in this case”); United States v. Brown, 744 F.3d 474, 478 (7th Cir. 2014) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied) (observing that “all of the extant appellate precedent is on the side of applying Davis” and its good-faith exception to “all pre-Jones GPS tracking,” even when installation was nonconsensual and without a warrant (emphasis in original)); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (found that at the time police placed the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car in 2009, law enforcement could reasonably rely upon the binding appellate precedent of Knotts and Karo); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that even though the circuit had not addressed warrantless GPS tracking prior to Jones, the Supreme Court’s decision in Knotts was “sufficiently clear and apposite” to trigger Davis’s good-faith exception); see also Kelly v. State, 82 A.2d 205, 214 (Md. 2013) (the state’s highest court determined that Knotts was sufficient binding appellate precedent in Maryland to authorize GPS tracking at the time officers installed the device to the defendant’s vehicle pre-Jones).

¶ 21 I. Exclusionary Rule and the Good-Faith Exception ¶ 22 We turn now to the guiding principles that should govern any analysis as to the applicability of the exclusionary rule or its good-faith exception. There is no constitutional right to have the evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure suppressed at trial. Katzin, 769 F.3d at 170 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2426). The mere fact of a fourth amendment violation does not mean that exclusion necessarily follows. Id. Instead, application of the exclusionary rule has been restricted to those “unusual cases” where it can achieve its sole objective: to deter future fourth amendment violations. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the notion that “exclusion ‘has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.’ ” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009). ¶ 23 In order for exclusion of the evidence to apply, the deterrent benefit of suppression must outweigh the “substantial social costs.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. “ ‘Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large,’ because it ‘almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence,’ and ‘its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without

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punishment.’ ” Stephens, 764 F.3d at 335 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2427). “As this result conflicts with the ‘truth-finding functions of judge and jury,’ United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 *** (1980), exclusion is a ‘bitter pill,’ Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, swallowed only as a ‘last resort,’ Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591, 126 S. Ct. 2159.” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171. In order for the exclusionary rule to be appropriate then, the deterrent benefits must outweigh its heavy costs. Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.

¶ 24 Where the particular circumstances of a case show that police acted with an “ ‘objectively “reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct [was] lawful,’ ” or when their conduct involved only simple, isolated negligence, there is no illicit conduct to deter. Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171 (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909). In such a case, “ ‘the deterrence rationale loses much of its force and exclusion cannot pay its way.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6, 919). Thus, exclusion is invoked only where police conduct is both “sufficiently deliberate” that deterrence is effective and “sufficiently culpable” that deterrence outweighs the cost of suppression. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171.

¶ 25 The “pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herring, 555 U.S. at 145. Thus, in determining whether the good-faith exception applies, a court must ask “the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).

¶ 26 II. Davis’s Application to the Specific Circumstances Before It ¶ 27 In Davis, the Supreme Court applied the good-faith exception in one specific instance: to an automobile search following an arrest conducted by a local Greenville, Alabama, city police officer investigating a state DUI offense. The question for the Court was whether the officer could have reasonably relied upon an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedent as authority for his conduct in deciding to search the vehicle. In that case, police found in the course of their search a handgun in defendant’s jacket left inside the vehicle, and defendant was

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subsequently prosecuted for a firearm charge in federal court. Davis held that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. The Court explained that “[a]n officer who conducts a search in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act under the circumstances. [Citation.] The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the officer from do[ing] his duty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2429. Of paramount importance to the Court’s holding was the lack of police culpability:

“Under our exclusionary-rule precedents, [the] acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim. Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield ‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth the price paid by the justice system.’ [Citation.] The conduct of the officers here was neither of these things. The officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis’s *** rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. [Citation.] Nor does this case involve any ‘recurring or systemic negligence’ on the part of law enforcement. [Citation.] The police acted in strict compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regimen, it can have no application in this case.

¶ 28 Indeed, in 27 years of practice under Leon’s good-faith exception, we have ‘never applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable, innocent police conduct.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.

¶ 29 Thus, if it can be said in the present case that “binding appellate precedent” existed on April 23, 2009, allowing for warrantless GPS use when Detective Shufelt installed the device, then Davis controls without a doubt and the exclusionary rule does not apply. However, even if it could be concluded that “binding appellate precedent” did not exist in this case, it would not end the inquiry. It would still be necessary to conduct the “good-faith inquiry” and consider “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light of all of the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herring, 555 U.S. at 145. Clearly, application of the good-faith inquiry is not limited to the specific circumstances addressed by the Supreme Court in Davis or any other Supreme Court case. Stephens, 764 F.3d at 336. The Supreme Court has

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found the exclusionary rule to be inapplicable in a variety of settings after undertaking the good-faith analysis, and the fact that a court might apply the good-faith exception in a new context not yet addressed by the Supreme Court does not mean that it is creating a “new, freestanding exception” to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 336 n.10; see also Davis, 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (noting that “[t]he Court has over time applied this ‘good-faith’ exception across a range of cases”).

¶ 30 III. Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply for Three Reasons ¶ 31 We find that application of the exclusionary rule to this case is not appropriate for three reasons. First, the exclusionary rule does not apply because at the time of Detective Shufelt’s conduct in April 2009, the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo were “binding appellate precedent” that he could have reasonably relied upon. Second, we find in the alternative that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s general good-faith analysis, the police conduct in relying on the legal landscape that existed at the time was objectively reasonable and a reasonable officer had no reason to suspect that his conduct was wrongful under the circumstances. And third, this case fits squarely within the specific holding of Davis, because United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007), was binding precedent as far as the Aurora police detective was concerned and he stood in exactly the same shoes as the Alabama police officer in Davis that relied upon binding Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedent when he conducted a search in the course of investigating a state law traffic offense. Accordingly, suppression of the evidence is not warranted for each of these reasons. ¶ 32 IV. Knotts and Karo Were Binding Appellate Precedent ¶ 33 There is no question that decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting fourth amendment law are binding precedent for Illinois police officers and Illinois courts. We conclude that the Supreme Court cases of Knotts and Karo clearly authorized the police conduct in this case. Even though the underlying facts of those cases differ from the facts of the present case, it is the rationale that underlies those cases that is relevant to our discussion. See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 173-74; Stephens, 764 F.3d at 337-38. - 10 - ¶ 34 In Knotts, the police were investigating suspects relative to a conspiracy to manufacture illegal drugs. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. The police arranged for one of the suspects to voluntarily take into his vehicle a container of chloroform that, unbeknownst to the suspect, contained a beeper. By tracking the signals emitted from the beeper, police were able to locate it at defendant’s secluded manufacturing site. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of the warrantless monitoring of the beeper. The Supreme Court held that the use of the beeper to track a vehicle was not a search under the fourth amendment. Id. at 285. The Court explained that “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” and the beeper simply revealed what could have been seen by the public through visual surveillance and it made no difference that the officers “sensory faculties” were augmented by its use. Id. at 281, 282. ¶ 35 In Karo, the defendant ordered 50 gallons of ether (for use in cocaine smuggling) from an informant. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. After obtaining the informant’s consent, federal agents substituted one of the informant’s cans of ether with its own can, which contained a beeper. Defendant bought the can and took it into his car. For the next several months, the agents monitored the beeper to determine the location of the ether. One of the questions presented before the Supreme Court was whether the warrantless installation of the beeper was legal. Id. at 711. ¶ 36 The Court in Karo concluded that the warrantless installation of the beeper did not violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 713. The Court found that the transfer of the can with the beeper did not convey any information, and although there was a potential that the defendant’s privacy could be invaded, the transfer itself infringed no privacy interest. Id. at 712. Moreover, the Court found that the transfer was not a seizure despite the “technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper,” which the Court referred to as “unknown and unwanted foreign object.” Id. The Court then proceeded to “broadly discredit[ ] the relevance of trespass in the context of electronic surveillance of vehicles: ‘[A] physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, ... for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 175 (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712-13); see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (also noting that Karo discounted the importance of trespass in placing a tracking device). - 11 - ¶ 37 As the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, explained in Aguiar: “Karo’s de minimis treatment of the trespass issue gave no indication that the issue of trespass would become the touchstone for the analysis in Jones. Moreover, Karo’s brushing off of the potential trespass fits logically with earlier Supreme Court decisions concluding that ‘the physical characteristics of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation of privacy therein.’ ” Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (quoting New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986) (to examine the exterior of an automobile does not constitute a search)); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (plurality opinion) (warrantless taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of a vehicle does not constitute an unlawful search). 1 ¶ 38 We conclude that it was objectively reasonable for the police to rely upon Knotts and Karo for the conclusion that warrantless installation and monitoring of the GPS device was legal. We acknowledge that the facts are different here, but again it was reasonable for Detective Shufelt to rely upon the legal principles set forth by the Supreme Court. Here, police monitored the movement of the Kia by GPS not by a beeper signal. But there is no legally significant difference between the two technologies, and in both cases the devices were “unknown and unwanted objects.” Moreover, the police surreptitiously affixed a GPS device to the underside of the Kia’s bumper rather than surreptitiously “tricking him into unwittingly taking the GPS device into his vehicle,” but otherwise the conduct of law enforcement here “echoed that in Knotts and Karo.” Katzin, 769 F.3d at 176. Just like in Karo, the attachment of the GPS device did not itself convey any information or infringe any privacy interest apart from its use. ¶ 39 We fully agree with the conclusion reached by the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in its en banc decision in Katzin in considering the same issue under the identical facts presented here: “It would have been objectively reasonable for a law enforcement officer to conclude that Karo’s sweeping rejection of the trespass theory applied not only to the [federal] agents’ elaborate ruse therein, but also to the unremarkable strategy of magnetically attaching a battery-operated GPS unit onto the exterior of a vehicle. In sum *** the Supreme