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13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cruz v. Stategreen2 sentences2019The Court of Appeals addressed potentially prejudicial supplemental instructions in Cruz v. State, 407 Md. at 202 (which held a supplemental jury instruction on attempted battery impermissible when the State had previously stated it would not pursue that theory and the defendant had no opportunity to defend against it) and in State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458 (2016) (which held that prejudice created by a supplemental transferred intent instruction was cured when the court gave the defendant an opportunity to supplement his closing argument in response). 2019The Court of Appeals addressed potentially prejudicial supplemental instructions in Cruz v. State , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 (which held a supplemental jury instruction on attempted battery impermissible when the State had previously *178 stated it would not pursue that theory and the defendant had no opportunity to defend against it) and in State v. Bircher , 446 Md. 458 , 132 A.3d 292 (2016) (which held that prejudice created by a supplemental transferred intent instruction was cured when the court gave the defendant an opportunity to supplement his closing argument in response). | 4 | 5 |
In the Matter of Reinstatement of Reinhardtgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 204 , 963 A.2d 1184, 1186 (2009) (“The [trial] court’s supplemental instruction, though generated by the evidence, was not appropriate . . . because defense counsel’s reliance on the [trial] court’s pre-closing argument instructions resulted in prejudice to” the defendant.). 2019The Court of Appeals addressed potentially prejudicial supplemental instructions in Cruz v. State , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 (which held a supplemental jury instruction on attempted battery impermissible when the State had previously *178 stated it would not pursue that theory and the defendant had no opportunity to defend against it) and in State v. Bircher , 446 Md. 458 , 132 A.3d 292 (2016) (which held that prejudice created by a supplemental transferred intent instruction was cured when the court gave the defendant an opportunity to supplement his closing argument in response). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Birchergreen2 sentences2021For example, in Bircher, 446 Md. at 461, 482 , 132 A.3d at 294, 306 , this Court concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked a question during deliberations about the term “intent” “because the evidence generated the instruction and the instruction did not prejudice” the defendant. 2021For example, in Bircher, 446 Md. at 461, 482 , 132 A.3d at 294, 306 , this Court concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked a question during deliberations about the term “intent” “because the evidence generated the instruction and the instruction did not prejudice” the defendant. | 1 | 3 |
Butler v. Stategreen2 sentences2021In Butler v. State, 392 Md. 169, 171-72 , 896 A.2d 359, 361 (2006), this Court held that a trial court improperly addressed the jury in response to a jury note “in such a way that the defendants may have been denied their right to a fair trial[.]” One of the defendants was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and related charges. 2021In Butler v. State, 392 Md. 169, 171-72 , 896 A.2d 359, 361 (2006), this Court held that a trial court improperly addressed the jury in response to a jury note “in such a way that the defendants may have been denied their right to a fair trial[.]” One of the defendants was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and related charges. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Perezgreen2 sentences2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh 2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh 2013Rather, the determination of whether there is manifest necessity for a mistrial — or, a “high degree” of necessity, Washington, 434 U.S. at 506-07 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 — is a fact-specific inquiry not reducible to “a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Id. at 505-06, 509-10 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-32 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (noting that deference to a trial judge’s discretion guards against the possibility of trial judges otherwise “employ[ing] coercive means to break the apparent deadlock,” which migh | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Arnettgreen2 sentences2001Cf. Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 68-69 , 650 A.2d 954, 956 (1994) (finding, inter alia, objection to jury instruction on imperfect self-defense waived by failure to offer specific additional instructions at the time of the objection). 2001Cf. Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 68-69 , 650 A.2d 954, 956 (1994) (finding, inter alia, objection to jury instruction on imperfect self-defense waived by failure to offer specific additional instructions at the time of the objection). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Wilson v. State, 44 Md.App. 318 , 408 A.2d 1058 (1979). 2001See Wilson v. State, 44 Md.App. 318 , 408 A.2d 1058 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Willie Horton
green
2 sentences2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that “a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense 12 to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments.” Bircher, 446 Md. at 472 (citing Cruz, 407 Md. at 202 ) (cleaned up)). “[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court’s instructions in order to be assured a fair trial.” Cruz, 407 Md. at 214 (quoting Horton, 921 F.2d at 541 2019Although the Court reached different conclusions based on the facts of each case, both opinions stand for the principle that "a supplemental instruction should not be given if the accused was unfairly prevented from arguing his or her defense to the jury or was substantially misled in formulating and presenting arguments." Bircher , 446 Md. at 472 , 132 A.3d 292 ( citing Cruz , 407 Md. at 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 ) (cleaned up)). "[A] defendant must have an adequate opportunity to argue his innocence under the [trial] court's instructions in order to be assured a fair trial." Cruz , 407 Md. at 214 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Baby
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 222-23 , 946 A.2d 463 . 2011Id. at 222-23 , 946 A.2d 463 . | 2 | 2009–2011 |
Heckstall v. State
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 628 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Renico v. Lett
green
2 sentences2013As the Supreme Court stated recently in Renico v. Lett, it has “never required a trial judge, before declaring a mistrial on jury deadlock, to force the jury to deliberate for a minimum period of time, to question the jurors individually, to consult with (or obtain the consent of) either the prosecutor or defense counsel, to issue a supplemental jury instruction, or to consider any other means of breaking the impasse.” 559 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 1864 , 176 L.Ed.2d at 688 . 2013As the Supreme Court stated recently in Renico v. Lett, it has “never required a trial judge, before declaring a mistrial on jury deadlock, to force the jury to deliberate for a minimum period of time, to question the jurors individually, to consult with (or obtain the consent of) either the prosecutor or defense counsel, to issue a supplemental jury instruction, or to consider any other means of breaking the impasse.” 559 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 1864 , 176 L.Ed.2d at 688 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lovell v. State
green
2 sentences2009The question here involves the propriety of the court’s response to the jury’s question. *665 The Court of Appeals has made clear that, when a jury asks a question that reflects confusion on an issue, the trial judge “must respond” to the question “in a way that clarifies the confusion” if “the question involves an issue central to the case.” State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 263 , 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 658-59 , 702 A.2d 261 (1997)). 2009The question here involves the propriety of the court’s response to the jury’s question. *665 The Court of Appeals has made clear that, when a jury asks a question that reflects confusion on an issue, the trial judge “must respond” to the question “in a way that clarifies the confusion” if “the question involves an issue central to the case.” State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 263 , 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (citing Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 658-59 , 702 A.2d 261 (1997)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Young v. State
green
2 sentences2006More specifically, Maxwell asserts: Relying on Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 307 , 493 A.2d 352 (1985), defense counsel asked that the jury be instructed “that if the Defendant’s conduct has not progressed beyond mere preparation, in other words, he has not performed the requisite overt act, then you must find the Defendant not guilty of attempted second degree rape.” ... 2006More specifically, Maxwell asserts: Relying on Young v. State, 303 Md. 298, 307 , 493 A.2d 352 (1985), defense counsel asked that the jury be instructed “that if the Defendant’s conduct has not progressed beyond mere preparation, in other words, he has not performed the requisite overt act, then you must find the Defendant not guilty of attempted second degree rape.” ... | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bowman v. State
green
2 sentences2001Cf. Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 68-69 , 650 A.2d 954, 956 (1994) (finding, inter alia, objection to jury instruction on imperfect self-defense waived by failure to offer specific additional instructions at the time of the objection). 2001Cf. Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 68-69 , 650 A.2d 954, 956 (1994) (finding, inter alia, objection to jury instruction on imperfect self-defense waived by failure to offer specific additional instructions at the time of the objection). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Duffy v. State
green
2 sentences1982The defendant was not present when a supplemental jury instruction was given, and the State argued that the "violation of [the right to be present] would not be reversible error unless injury were shown." 151 Md. at 473 . 1982The defendant was not present when a supplemental jury instruction was given, and the State argued that the "violation of [the right to be present] would not be reversible error unless injury were shown.” 151 Md. at 473 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
La Guardia v. State
green
2 sentences1982The next pertinent opinion is La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A.2d 913 (1948), which, like Duffy , involved a supplemental jury instruction when the defendants were not present. 1982The next pertinent opinion is La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A.2d 913 (1948), which, like Duffy , involved a supplemental jury instruction when the defendants were not present. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.