supplemental jury instruction in Tennessee

2019You should not single out one or more of them to the exclusion of others but should consider each one in light of and in harmony with the others.” See Forbes, 918 S.W.2d at 452 (holding that the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction was not reversible error even though the trial court did not admonish the jury to place no undue emphasis upon the supplemental instruction because the primary charge “included an instruction not to single out one instruction over any other”).

2015State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 451 (Tenn. Crim.

2024Criminal responsibility “is an alternative theory under which the State may establish guilt based upon the conduct of another.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386 (citing State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)).

2017See State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011) (holding that the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury includes the “right to a complete and correct charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions”).

2019In examining whether evidence is sufficient, this court must only determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 .

2015A. Sufficiency of the Evidence The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the State‟s evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R.

2024See, e.g., Fontenot, 14 F.3d at 1368 (providing that “if a supplemental jury instruction given in response to a jury’s question introduces a new theory to the case, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the new theory” to prevent unfair prejudice); United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that although the better course would have been for the trial court to have allowed the parties to give additional argument following the issuance of a supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting, no prejudice resulted); United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 4

2024See, e.g., United States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (providing that “reargument was not required” where the trial court’s instruction in response to a jury question during deliberations “neither amended nor added a new element to the indictment’s charge”); United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th 5 This provision is currently set forth in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.1(d).

2024See, e.g., Fontenot, 14 F.3d at 1368 (providing that “if a supplemental jury instruction given in response to a jury’s question introduces a new theory to the case, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the new theory” to prevent unfair prejudice); United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that although the better course would have been for the trial court to have allowed the parties to give additional argument following the issuance of a supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting, no prejudice resulted); United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 4

2024See, e.g., Fontenot, 14 F.3d at 1368 (providing that “if a supplemental jury instruction given in response to a jury’s question introduces a new theory to the case, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the new theory” to prevent unfair prejudice); United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that although the better course would have been for the trial court to have allowed the parties to give additional argument following the issuance of a supplemental instruction on aiding and abetting, no prejudice resulted); United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 4

2024See, e.g., United States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (providing that “reargument was not required” where the trial court’s instruction in response to a jury question during deliberations “neither amended nor added a new element to the indictment’s charge”); United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th 5 This provision is currently set forth in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.1(d).

2024Criminal responsibility “is an alternative theory under which the State may establish guilt based upon the conduct of another.” Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386 (citing State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999)).

2019See Brooks, 277 S.W.3d at 412 .

2017The “dynamite charge” is a supplemental jury instruction that gained national prominence following the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-502 (1896), which upheld, in a criminal case, a jury instruction encouraging dissenting jurors to consider whether their doubt was reasonable when the majority of jurors were for conviction.

2017See id.

2015A. Sufficiency of the Evidence The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the State‟s evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R.

2014Additionally, although the Supreme Court has determined that the giving of a supplemental jury instruction is a critical stage of criminal proceedings, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114,119, n. 4 (1983), and the Sixth Circuit has concluded that re-instructing a jury is a critical stage of the proceedings for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.2003), it is clear from the record in this case that trial counsel was present when the jury submitted a question to the court and agreed with the court on its proposed response to the jury. -7- d

2014Additionally, although the Supreme Court has determined that the giving of a supplemental jury instruction is a critical stage of criminal proceedings, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114,119, n. 4 (1983), and the Sixth Circuit has concluded that re-instructing a jury is a critical stage of the proceedings for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.2003), it is clear from the record in this case that trial counsel was present when the jury submitted a question to the court and agreed with the court on its proposed response to the jury. -7- d