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93 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2025 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daniell v. Stategreen2 sentences2025After receiving this instruction, the jury reached its verdict and sentenced Guillory to twenty-five years on each conviction. 12 “When the trial judge responds substantively to a jury question during deliberations, that communication essentially amounts to an additional or supplemental jury instruction.” Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Crim. 2024“When the trial judge responds substantively to a jury question during deliberations, that communication essentially amounts to an additional or supplemental jury instruction.” Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Crim. | 59 | 63 |
Lucio, Pedro Ariel Zarategreen2 sentences2025A trial court’s substantive response to a jury question “essentially amounts to a supplemental jury instruction” and is therefore governed by the “same rules” that “generally govern jury instructions.” Lucio, 353 S.W.3d at 875 . 17 “Because a trial court’s answer to a jury’s question must comply with the same rules that govern charges, the trial court, as a general rule, must limit its answer to setting forth the law applicable to the case; it must not express any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, sum up the testimony, discuss the facts, or use any response calculated to arouse the sym 2025“When the trial court responds substantively to a question the jury asks during deliberations, that communication essentially amounts to a supplemental jury instruction, and the trial court must follow the same rules for impartiality and neutrality that generally govern jury instructions.” Id. | 11 | 17 |
Earnhart v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (concluding that “referral to the original charge is not considered an additional instruction”). 2012See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (concluding that "referral to the original charge is not considered an additional instruction"). | 3 | 4 |
Barrera v. Stategreen2 sentences2012When the trial court submits a substantive response to a jury question during deliberations, such communication is viewed as an additional or supplemental jury instruction. 15 Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Barrera v. State, 10 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). 2012Barrera v. State, 10 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see TEX. | 3 | 3 |
Barnett v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Rather, it is a supplemental jury instruction that “reminds the jury that if it is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial will result, the case will still be pending, and there is no guarantee that a second jury would find the issue any easier to resolve.” Barnett v. State, 189 S.W.3d 272 , 277 n.13 (Tex. Crim. 2023An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction that “reminds the jury that if it is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial will result, the case will still be pending, and there is no guarantee that a second jury would find the issue any easier to resolve.” Barnett v. State, 189 S.W.3d 272 , 277 n.13 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 6 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Brooks v. State , 967 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). 2001Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145 , 147 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Brooks v. State, 967 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Read v. Scott Fetzer Co.green2 sentences2003See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read , 945 S.W.2d 854, 871 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997), aff’d , 990 S.W.2d 732 ( Tex. 1999). 2003See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read, 945 S.W.2d 854, 871 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997), aff’d, 990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.1999). | 2 | 2 |
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Readgreen2 sentences2003See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read , 945 S.W.2d 854, 871 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997), aff’d , 990 S.W.2d 732 ( Tex. 1999). 2003See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read, 945 S.W.2d 854, 871 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997), aff’d, 990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.1999). | 2 | 2 |
Haliburton v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (citing Haliburton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Crim.App.1979)). 1993See Haliburton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (written communications between judge and jury during deliberations addressed as supplemental instruction); see also Article 36.16 V.A.C.C.P. (additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); but see Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (communication from the court that merely refers the jury to the original charge is not an “additional instruction”); Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) (communication from the court informing the jury that the court is unable to re | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022App. 2016) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) as “permitting a supplemental jury instruction that reminds the jury that if it is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial will result, the case will still be pending, and there is no guarantee that a second jury would find the issue any easier to resolve”). 2019While she was on the ground, one passenger, later identified as Kenneth Martin, kicked Cardona- Melendez’s knee, took her cell phone from her hand, and took her purse, which 1 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (providing for a supplemental jury instruction to encourage dialogue between an otherwise deadlocked jury). 2 contained another cell phone, $160 in cash, and other personal items. | 1 | 5 |
Keene Corp. v. Gardnergreen2 sentences2003Keene Corp. v. Gardner , 837 S.W.2d 224 , 228–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied). 2003Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 228-29 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). | 1 | 2 |
Lockard v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Merryman, 391 S.W.3d at 274 ; cf. Lockard v. State, 364 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (explaining trial court properly denied appellant’s proposed answer to jury question because it was effectively a supplemental jury instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Bruce Randol Merryman v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See Merryman, 391 S.W.3d at 274 ; cf. Lockard v. State, 364 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (explaining trial court properly denied appellant’s proposed answer to jury question because it was effectively a supplemental jury instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Martinez v. State , 131 S.W.3d 22 , 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) ; see also Baptiste v. State , Nos. 01-01-00488-CR, 01-01-00489-CR, 2002 WL 827188 , at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2002, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). | 1 | 1 |
Renico v. Lettgreen2 sentences2017As such, before declaring a mistrial .based on jury deadlock, a trial judge is not required to “force the jury to deliberate for a minimum period of time, to question the jurors individually, to consult with (or obtain the consent of) either the prosecutor or defense counsel, to issue a supplemental jury instruction, or to consider any other means of breaking the impasse.” Id. 2017See Renico, 559 U.S. at 775 , 130 S.Ct. 1855 (observing that a trial court is not required to “issue a supplemental jury instruction” to break an impasse before declaring a mistrial if the jury is otherwise genuinely deadlocked). | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Dixon v. State, 64 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Daniell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 145,147 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Goss v. Stategreen2 sentences1996The Court said, for example, in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, at 134-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Opinion on appellant's motion for rehearing), that the defendant was not entitled to an additional instruction because "there is little or no connection between his background and character evidence and the facts and circumstances of his criminal acts in the instant case." Similarly, in Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, at 166 (Tex.Cr. 1996The Court said, for example, in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, at 134-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing), that the defendant was not entitled to an additional instruction because “there is little or no connection between his background and character evidence and the facts and circumstances of his criminal acts in the instant case.” Similarly, in Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, at 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), a plurality observed that “[njone of the evidence presented ... sought to explain the apparently isolated problems of [Goss’] childhood and the commission of the | 1 | 1 |
Lackey v. Stategreen2 sentences1996The Court said, for example, in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, at 134-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Opinion on appellant's motion for rehearing), that the defendant was not entitled to an additional instruction because "there is little or no connection between his background and character evidence and the facts and circumstances of his criminal acts in the instant case." Similarly, in Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, at 166 (Tex.Cr. 1996The Court said, for example, in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, at 134-35 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing), that the defendant was not entitled to an additional instruction because “there is little or no connection between his background and character evidence and the facts and circumstances of his criminal acts in the instant case.” Similarly, in Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, at 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), a plurality observed that “[njone of the evidence presented ... sought to explain the apparently isolated problems of [Goss’] childhood and the commission of the | 1 | 1 |
Allaben v. Stategreen1 sentence1993See Haliburton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (written communications between judge and jury during deliberations addressed as supplemental instruction); see also Article 36.16 V.A.C.C.P. (additional charge may be given after arguments at the request of the jury); but see Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (communication from the court that merely refers the jury to the original charge is not an “additional instruction”); Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) (communication from the court informing the jury that the court is unable to re | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Earnhart v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (concluding that “referral to the original charge is not considered an additional instruction”). 2012See Earnhart v. State, 582 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (concluding that "referral to the original charge is not considered an additional instruction"). | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2017Appellant states, "The trial court's additional instruction encouraged the mistaken belief he might be released from his life sentence for some reason in assessing his future dangerousness." Appellant argues that, because the trial court's supplemental instruction permitted the jury to find that "society" includes free society even though appellant's only alternative to a death sentence was life without parole, this created an impermissible "false choice" of the same type that was held to be unconstitutional in Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154 , 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). 2017Appellant states, "The trial court's additional instruction encouraged the mistaken belief he might be released from his life sentence for some reason in assessing his future dangerousness." Appellant argues that, because the trial court's supplemental instruction permitted the jury to find that "society" includes free society even though appellant's only alternative to a death sentence was life without parole, this created an impermissible "false choice" of the same type that was held to be unconstitutional in Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154 , 114 S.Ct. 2187 , 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Lynch v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2017In this direct appeal, appellant contends that the trial court's supplemental jury instruction "allowed the apparent belief that the appellant might be released from his life sentence for some reason in deciding his future dangerousness contrary to Lynch v. Arizona ." See --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1818 , 195 L.Ed.2d 99 (2016). 2017In this direct appeal, appellant contends that the trial court's supplemental jury instruction "allowed the apparent belief that the appellant might be released from his life sentence for some reason in deciding his future dangerousness contrary to Lynch v. Arizona ." See --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1818 , 195 L.Ed.2d 99 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Penry v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 797-99, 121 S.Ct. at 1920-22 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Guajardo v. State
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 405 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
1 sentence2010In response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,13 which had been decided approximately four months before appellant’s 1989 trial, the trial court also submitted a supplemental jury instruction, which instructed the jury to negatively answer any one of the three special issues if it found sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence less than death when deliberating “on the questions posed in the special issues.” 14 13 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (“Penry I”). 14 The supplemental instruction stated: You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Nishika Ltd.
green
1 sentence1996The court of appeals examined each of 3M’s contentions, but found reversible error only in the trial court’s application of Minnesota law concerning pre-judgment interest. 885 S.W.2d at 633 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.