pleadings claim in Missouri

2013We agree that the motion court applied an incorrect legal standard when it held that "[tjhere was no indication in the pleadings or at the hearing that had [Chacon] taken his case to trial, he would have prevailed.” Compare Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that in the context of a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”), with Strickland v. Washington, 4

2013We agree that the motion court applied an incorrect legal standard when it held that "[tjhere was no indication in the pleadings or at the hearing that had [Chacon] taken his case to trial, he would have prevailed.” Compare Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that in the context of a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”), with Strickland v. Washington, 4

2013We agree that the motion court applied an incorrect legal standard when it held that "[tjhere was no indication in the pleadings or at the hearing that had [Chacon] taken his case to trial, he would have prevailed.” Compare Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that in the context of a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”), with Strickland v. Washington, 4

2013We agree that the motion court applied an incorrect legal standard when it held that "[tjhere was no indication in the pleadings or at the hearing that had [Chacon] taken his case to trial, he would have prevailed.” Compare Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (holding that in the context of a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”), with Strickland v. Washington, 4

2003In Jackson v. Jackson, 655 S.W.2d 786 (Mo.App.1983), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to strike a husband’s pleadings and to bar him from presenting evidence for failure to appear for a deposition and for failure to answer interrogatories.

2003The court, citing Portell v. Portell, 643 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.1982), and Jewell v. Jewell, 484 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App.1972), stated that the conduct of the husband in his willful and deliberate disregard for the trial court’s authority served as a basis for the court to properly impose such sanctions.

2003The court, citing Portell v. Portell, 643 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App.1982), and Jewell v. Jewell, 484 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App.1972), stated that the conduct of the husband in his willful and deliberate disregard for the trial court’s authority served as a basis for the court to properly impose such sanctions.

1968State, On Information of Reardon v. Mueller, Mo., 388 S.W.2d 53 .

1968In overruling the Superintendent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the court stated: “* * * Nor was a motion for a new trial necessary to preserve for appellate review the allegations of error presented by appellant, since we construe the issues presented to be within the exceptions mentioned in Supreme Court Rule 3.23 (now Rule 79.03), including ‘questions of jurisdiction over the subject matter, questions as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to state a claim or defense, (and) questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment * * *.’ ” (Although the Morris case did not invo

1968In overruling the Superintendent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the court stated: “* * * Nor was a motion for a new trial necessary to preserve for appellate review the allegations of error presented by appellant, since we construe the issues presented to be within the exceptions mentioned in Supreme Court Rule 3.23 (now Rule 79.03), including ‘questions of jurisdiction over the subject matter, questions as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to state a claim or defense, (and) questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment * * *.’ ” (Although the Morris case did not invo

1968In overruling the Superintendent’s motion to dismiss the appeal, the court stated: “* * * Nor was a motion for a new trial necessary to preserve for appellate review the allegations of error presented by appellant, since we construe the issues presented to be within the exceptions mentioned in Supreme Court Rule 3.23 (now Rule 79.03), including ‘questions of jurisdiction over the subject matter, questions as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to state a claim or defense, (and) questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment * * *.’ ” (Although the Morris case did not invo

1946Since no error is found except such as relates to the amount of damages, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the issue of the amount of the damages only. [Zarisky v. Kansas City Public Service Company, 186 S.W.2d 854 , l.c. 857.] Boyer, C., concurs

1946Plaintiff says that no error was committed because when evidence tending to prove an issue not pleaded was admitted the petition could have been amended on motion to conform to the proof, and that, if not amended below, the petition will be treated here as though it had been amended. [Koonse v. Standard Steel Works, 300 S.W. 531 , l.c. 536 and Stevens v. Westport Laundry Company, 25 S.W.2d 491 , l.c. 497, are cited.] The rule stated in those cases by this court is well settled; but where objection is made to the reception of such evidence as is outside of and beyond the issues made by the plea

1946Plaintiff says that no error was committed because when evidence tending to prove an issue not pleaded was admitted the petition could have been amended on motion to conform to the proof, and that, if not amended below, the petition will be treated here as though it had been amended. [Koonse v. Standard Steel Works, 300 S.W. 531 , l.c. 536 and Stevens v. Westport Laundry Company, 25 S.W.2d 491 , l.c. 497, are cited.] The rule stated in those cases by this court is well settled; but where objection is made to the reception of such evidence as is outside of and beyond the issues made by the plea

1909But, where the plaintiff’s cause of action is not based on an infringement of rights under the exemption statute, a plea that the judgment sought to be recovered should, when recovered, be adjudged as exempt from execution, has no place in the office of pleading.” Exemption is a personal privilege that cannot be exercised until the officer comes to seize the property under a writ of execution or attachment. [Garrett v. Wagner, 125 Mo. 450 .] We must hold that the trial court committed error in attempting to adjudicate and establish a right of exemption to a part of the judgment and we turn now

1909As was said by the Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Ryan, 108 S. W. 533 : “There is no place in the pleadings for the claim of exemption from execution, except, of course, where the cause of action or defense arises out of the exemption statute, as, for example, where the plaintiff’s exempt property has been wrongfully seized, or where the attempt is to take from a defendant property which the statute of exemption allows him to hold.