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67 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1890–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2026The question we must answer in evaluating a pleadings challenge is “whether 8 the alleged facts ‘affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)). 2026Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26 ; see Jones, 646 S.W.3d at 325 (“At the plea to the jurisdiction stage, governmental officials may challenge jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings or may challenge jurisdictional facts.”). | 6 | 11 |
Texas Department of Transportation v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2015Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999); see Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating waiver of immunity under TTCA). 2014Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.1999); see Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.2003) (explaining that plaintiff bears burden of establishing waiver of immunity under TCA). | 5 | 17 |
Moseley v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2018See Moseley v. Hernandez, 797 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (observing that when the trial court sustains a special exception, “the party ordered to re-plead has [the option of] stand[ing] on the pleadings and test[ing] on appeal the validity of the trial court’s ruling”). 2018When, as here, the trial court sustains a special exception, the party ordered to re- plead has two options: “(1) amend the pleadings to cure the defect or (2) stand on the pleadings and test on appeal the validity of the trial court's ruling.” Moseley, 797 S.W.2d at 242 . | 4 | 4 |
Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Millergreen2 sentences2018Ctr. v. Jackson, 354 S.W.3d 879, 883-84 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2011, no pet.)(noting that TTUHSC could not be sued for negligence unless the plaintiff’s pleadings stated a claim falling within the limited waiver of immunity contained in the Act); see also Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001)(the Act creates an exception to the general rule of immunity “only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances”). 2004Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639 . | 3 | 3 |
Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitleygreen2 sentences2026“In a suit against a governmental unit, the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity.” Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 542 . 2015Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999); see Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating waiver of immunity under TTCA). | 2 | 3 |
Bland Independent School District v. Bluegreen2 sentences2010See Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 555 . 2010See Blue , 34 S.W.3d at 555 . | 2 | 2 |
Hubler v. City of Corpus Christigreen2 sentences2002Moseley v. Hernandez, 797 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)(citing Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 1990Hubler v. City of Corpus Christi, 564 S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). | 2 | 2 |
English v. Cobbgreen1 sentence2025The limitation does not apply to those cases being tried in the County Court at Law under its probate jurisdiction. 145 To negate jurisdiction in this matter, the movant must thus either challenge the pleadings or challenge the jurisdictional facts with evidence. 146 Appellant has not presented proof to counter any jurisdictional facts and pointed out nothing on the face of the pleadings that affirmatively negated jurisdiction for a County Court at Law sitting in probate jurisdiction. 145 English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
William Carl Wooley v. Randy Schaffergreen1 sentence2025“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 76 (internal quotations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
City of Magnolia 4A Economic Development Corp. v. Smedleygreen1 sentence2025Corp., 533 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. 2017) (“A pleadings challenge [to subject matter jurisdiction] argues that the plaintiff has not alleged facts that, if proven true, constitute a valid claim over which there is 15 jurisdiction.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson County, Texas v. Cherisse Jacksongreen1 sentence2023See Jefferson County v. Jackson, 557 S.W.3d 659 , 673 n.12 (Tex. App.––Beaumont July 26, 2018, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
in Re City of Dallasgreen1 sentence2023In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 423 ; see In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d at 74 (directing the county court to vacate its pre-suit deposition order and “to first determine its jurisdiction,” because the supreme court “[could not] say with certainty” from the pleadings and the hearing that the claim was within the county court’s jurisdiction); Vestal, 2016 WL 4045081 , at *5 (reversing trial court’s pre-suit deposition order and denial of the plea to the jurisdiction, and remanding the case to allow the petitioner an opportunity to replead). | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of T.L.R.green1 sentence2022“If the pleader refuses to amend, or the amended pleading fails to state a cause of action, the trial court may dismiss the case.” Id. at 677– 78; see Gatten v. McCarley, 391 S.W.3d 669 , 673–74 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Stategreen1 sentence2021A habeas applicant “bears the burden of ensuring that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal on appeal.” Washington v. State, 326 S.W.3d 701 , 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350 , 353 n.2 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Chandlergreen1 sentence2021A habeas applicant “bears the burden of ensuring that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal on appeal.” Washington v. State, 326 S.W.3d 701 , 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350 , 353 n.2 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Performance Aircraft Services, Inc.green2 sentences2018When a trial court sustains a party’s special exceptions, “[t]he nonexcepting party may then either 1) amend the pleadings to cure the defect or 2) stand on the pleadings and test the trial court’s decision on appeal.” Ford v. Performance Aircraft Servs., Inc., 178 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). 2018“If the pleader fails or refuses to amend the pleading, the trial court may dismiss the case.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Tech University Health Science Center v. Lisa Jacksongreen1 sentence2018Ctr. v. Jackson, 354 S.W.3d 879, 883-84 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2011, no pet.)(noting that TTUHSC could not be sued for negligence unless the plaintiff’s pleadings stated a claim falling within the limited waiver of immunity contained in the Act); see also Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001)(the Act creates an exception to the general rule of immunity “only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances”). | 1 | 1 |
Massey v. Armco Steel Co.green1 sentence2016See id. at 934 . | 1 | 1 |
| Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waller v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Solomon v. Steitlergreen | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Daygreen2 sentences2012See Stone v. Day, 69 Tex. 13 , 5 S.W. 642, 644 (1887); Pantaze v. Slocum, 618 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 2012See Stone v. Day, 69 Tex. 13 , 5 S.W. 642, 644 (1887); Pantaze v. Slocum, 618 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
| Lara v. Lilegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Kirk & Carrigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mowbray v. Avery
green
2 sentences2022“The party may then either (1) amend the pleadings to cure the defect, or (2) stand on the pleadings and test the trial court’s decision on appeal.” Id. 2005The nonexcepting party may then either 1) amend the pleadings to cure the defect or 2) stand on the pleadings and test the trial court’s decision on appeal.' Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 678 . | 4 | 2005–2022 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2012The trial court’s written order on Howard’s motion to suppress states in pertinent part that “[a]fter reading the pleadings and hearing the testimony, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED as the statements were a result of a violations [sic] of Miranda v. Arizona, [ 384 U.S. 436 ,] 86 S.Ct. 1602 [, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ] (1966).” The State filed its notice of appeal with this court the next day. 2012The trial court’s written order on Howard’s motion to suppress states in pertinent part that “[a]fter reading the pleadings and hearing the testimony, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED as the statements were a result of a violations [sic] of Miranda v. Arizona, [ 384 U.S. 436 ,] 86 S.Ct. 1602 [, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ] (1966).” The State filed its notice of appeal with this court the next day. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring
green
2 sentences1991While none of the points specifically contends that the use of summary judgment, rather than special exception, to contest the sufficiency of the pleadings was error, appellant does argue under three of the points that if the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the insufficiency of the allegations in the petition, then it was error to grant summary judgment without first giving her an opportunity to amend her petition, citing Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.1974). 1991While none of the points specifically contends that the use of summary judgment, rather than special exception, to contest the sufficiency of the pleadings was error, appellant does argue under three of the points that if the trial court granted summary judgment based upon the insufficiency of the allegations in the petition, then it was error to grant summary judgment without first giving her an opportunity to amend her petition, citing Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.1974). | 2 | 1991–1993 |
Montoya v. State
green
1 sentence2024Macy’s, 291 S.W.3d at 420 ; see also SSC Wimberley Operating Co., LLC v. Goodman, 665 S.W.3d 729 , 737 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (six defendants were entitled to compel arbitration under arbitration agreement between plaintiff and unspecified employer, in part because plaintiff’s pleading identified all defendants as her employer or an employee of her employer). 11 11 In her motion for rehearing, Keele argues we erred by engaging in “a pleadings analysis,” which she contends was waived in the trial court and on appeal. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Jorden
green
1 sentence2023In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d at 423 ; see In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d at 74 (directing the county court to vacate its pre-suit deposition order and “to first determine its jurisdiction,” because the supreme court “[could not] say with certainty” from the pleadings and the hearing that the claim was within the county court’s jurisdiction); Vestal, 2016 WL 4045081 , at *5 (reversing trial court’s pre-suit deposition order and denial of the plea to the jurisdiction, and remanding the case to allow the petitioner an opportunity to replead). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Friesenhahn v. Ryan
green
1 sentence2023Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658 ; In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d at 13. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrich
green
1 sentence2022Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 378 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Catherine Clark
green
1 sentence2020Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770–71. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bonilla, Rosali
green
1 sentence2019And while a district clerk may not deprive an indigent defendant of information about the cost to obtain his trial and appellate transcripts, Bonilla, 424 S.W.3d at 533 , this is not the basis of Read’s complaint. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
AC Interests L.P. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2015Lujan appealed and upon order of this Court, the trial court made findings of facts and conclusions of law on the two-part inquiry under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687– 94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-68 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)(whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different). 2015Lujan appealed and upon order of this Court, the trial court made findings of facts and conclusions of law on the two-part inquiry under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687– 94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-68 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)(whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Dallas v. Hughes green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Wilson v. Abilene Independent School Dist. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Marion v. Marion green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Hill v. Hill neutral | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Strickland Transp. Co. v. Atkins green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Robinson v. Glasse neutral | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Kerin v. Jones green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Buchanan v. Jean green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Brooks v. Temple Lumber Co. green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Grounds v. Sloan green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Oswald v. Giles neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Wagner & Chabot v. Westchester Fire Insurance green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Bell v. F. C. Vanzandt neutral | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.