13 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1928–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garris v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2025To the extent that defendants meant to argue that there was no jurat accompanying the plaintiff’s signature on the hearing transcript, the hearing transcript can be used without the plaintiff’s signature because it was certified as accurate by the stenographer (see Garris v City of New York, 65 AD3d 953, 953 [1st Dept 2009]). 450521/2022 MELENDEZ, JASON L. vs. | 1 | 1 |
Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharowgreen1 sentence2022"Arbitration is favored in New York State as a means of resolving disputes, and courts should interfere as little as possible with agreements to arbitrate" ( Shah v Monpat Constr., Inc. , 65 AD3d 541, 543 ; see Matter of Smith Barney Shearson v Sacharow , 91 NY2d 39, 49-50 ). | 1 | 1 |
Libertarian Party of Connecticut v. Lamontgreen1 sentence2021Because a "reasonably diligent candidate" could be expected to meet New York's requirements for independent candidates and gain a place on the ballot ( Libertarian Party of Connecticut , 977 F3d at 178 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see SAM Party of New York , 987 F3d at 276 ; see generally Munro v Socialist Workers Party , 479 US 189, 199 [1986]) and because those requirements do not unfairly discriminate against independent candidates ( see generally Burdick , 504 US at 434 ; Anderson , 460 US at 793-794 ), we conclude that Election Law § 6-158 (9) places only a minimal burden on the co | 1 | 1 |
Johnny Swanson, III v. The State of Alabamagreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
Browne v. Baylessgreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
Burdick v. Takushigreen1 sentence2021Because a "reasonably diligent candidate" could be expected to meet New York's requirements for independent candidates and gain a place on the ballot ( Libertarian Party of Connecticut , 977 F3d at 178 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see SAM Party of New York , 987 F3d at 276 ; see generally Munro v Socialist Workers Party , 479 US 189, 199 [1986]) and because those requirements do not unfairly discriminate against independent candidates ( see generally Burdick , 504 US at 434 ; Anderson , 460 US at 793-794 ), we conclude that Election Law § 6-158 (9) places only a minimal burden on the co | 1 | 1 |
SAM Party of N.Y. v. Kosinskigreen1 sentence2021Because a "reasonably diligent candidate" could be expected to meet New York's requirements for independent candidates and gain a place on the ballot ( Libertarian Party of Connecticut , 977 F3d at 178 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see SAM Party of New York , 987 F3d at 276 ; see generally Munro v Socialist Workers Party , 479 US 189, 199 [1986]) and because those requirements do not unfairly discriminate against independent candidates ( see generally Burdick , 504 US at 434 ; Anderson , 460 US at 793-794 ), we conclude that Election Law § 6-158 (9) places only a minimal burden on the co | 1 | 1 |
Christopher Graveline v. Jocelyn Bensongreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
The Council Of Alternative Political Parties v. Lonna R. Hooksgreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
George R. (\Tex\") Wood v. Bruce Meadowsgreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
David Lawrence v. J. Kenneth Blackwell, Secretary, State of Ohiogreen1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 1 |
Munro v. Socialist Workers Partygreen1 sentence2021Because a "reasonably diligent candidate" could be expected to meet New York's requirements for independent candidates and gain a place on the ballot ( Libertarian Party of Connecticut , 977 F3d at 178 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see SAM Party of New York , 987 F3d at 276 ; see generally Munro v Socialist Workers Party , 479 US 189, 199 [1986]) and because those requirements do not unfairly discriminate against independent candidates ( see generally Burdick , 504 US at 434 ; Anderson , 460 US at 793-794 ), we conclude that Election Law § 6-158 (9) places only a minimal burden on the co | 1 | 1 |
Sokol v. Leadergreen1 sentence2011In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Nonnon v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2011In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Leon v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2011In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the court must “ ‘accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory’ ” (Nonnon v City of New York, 9 NY3d 825, 827 [2007], quoting Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see Sokol v Leader, 74 AD3d 1180, 1181 [2010]). | 1 | 1 |
Leising v. Multiple R Developmentgreen1 sentence2008Moreover, it does not contain the signature of the party to be charged, and the presence of Carriage Hill’s printed name at the top of the written statement, along with the name of the purchaser of the property, does not satisfy the signature requirement (compare Leising v Multiple R Dev., 249 AD2d 920, 920 [1998]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hill
green
2 sentences1992The defendant acknowledged to the Grand Jury foreman that the signature on the waiver of immunity was in fact his own (see, e.g., People v Hodge, 141 AD2d 843 [2d Dept 1988]). 1988It is strict compliance if a defendant swears that the signature on the waiver of immunity is his own (People v Hodge, 141 AD2d 843 , supra; People v Rice, 93 Misc 2d 182 ). | 2 | 1988–1992 |
Shah v. Monpat Construction, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022"Arbitration is favored in New York State as a means of resolving disputes, and courts should interfere as little as possible with agreements to arbitrate" ( Shah v Monpat Constr., Inc. , 65 AD3d 541, 543 ; see Matter of Smith Barney Shearson v Sacharow , 91 NY2d 39, 49-50 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Aria v. United States, on Its Own Behalf and for the Benefit of the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe
green
1 sentence2021That combination of rules for independent candidates in New York—a signature requirement substantially similar to that applicable to party candidates and a petition deadline that falls two months after the deadline for party candidates and one month prior to the primary election—is similar to election regulations in other states that have been found not to impose a severe burden on the constitutional rights of candidates and voters ( see Swanson v Worley , 490 F3d 894, 905-910 [11th Cir 2007]; Lawrence v Blackwell , 430 F3d 368, 373-374 [6th Cir 2005], cert denied 547 US 1178 [2006]; Wood v Me | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Anderson v. Celebrezze
green
1 sentence2021Because a "reasonably diligent candidate" could be expected to meet New York's requirements for independent candidates and gain a place on the ballot ( Libertarian Party of Connecticut , 977 F3d at 178 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see SAM Party of New York , 987 F3d at 276 ; see generally Munro v Socialist Workers Party , 479 US 189, 199 [1986]) and because those requirements do not unfairly discriminate against independent candidates ( see generally Burdick , 504 US at 434 ; Anderson , 460 US at 793-794 ), we conclude that Election Law § 6-158 (9) places only a minimal burden on the co | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Stucchio Ex Rel. Hernandez v. Bikvan
green
1 sentence2019In light of the expert affidavits submitted by both Signature and the plaintiff in Action No. 1, there are triable issues of fact as to whether Signature was negligent in knowingly permitting Anthony—a nonattorney—to be a signatory on the Baron escrow account, and as to whether any such negligence was a proximate [*3]cause of the loss of funds deposited in the Baron escrow account ( see generally Stucchio v Bikvan , 155 AD3d 666, 667 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Moreover, the Signature defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff under the circumstances ( see generally Stiver v Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc. , 9 NY3d 253, 256-257 ; Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104 ; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. , 98 NY2d 136 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Church v. Callanan Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Moreover, the Signature defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff under the circumstances ( see generally Stiver v Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc. , 9 NY3d 253, 256-257 ; Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104 ; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. , 98 NY2d 136 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Moreover, the Signature defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff under the circumstances ( see generally Stiver v Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc. , 9 NY3d 253, 256-257 ; Church v Callanan Indus. , 99 NY2d 104 ; Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. , 98 NY2d 136 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Doe
green
1 sentence2014(See People v Doe, 151 Misc 2d 829 [Sup Ct, Kings County 1991].) Defense efforts to strictly construe the signature requirement have failed where there was alternate evidence of authentication of grand jury action in the record. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Stauber
green
1 sentence2014As the Court noted in People v Stauber ( 307 AD2d 544 [3d Dept 2003]), over a century ago the Court of Appeals found the grand jurors’ appearance in court to present the indictment on the record sufficient to authenticate the indictment. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pronti v. Hogan
green
1 sentence2005In Pronti v Hogan ( 278 AD2d 841 [2000]), the Court held, in the absence of prejudice shown to the defendant, the lower court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to strike the summons and complaint based upon a violation of the signature requirement set forth in 22 NYCRR 130-1.la. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Rupp
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, in People v Rupp ( 75 Misc 2d 683, 686 ), the court held "[t]he signature of the District Attorney is no part of the indictment itself * * * [t]he signature is simply evidence that the District Attorney is prosecuting an offense in compliance with his statutory duty”. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Gerald
neutral
1 sentence1988However, absent a swearing, the waiver is ineffective (People v Gerald, 91 Misc 2d 509 , supra). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Rice
neutral
1 sentence1988It is strict compliance if a defendant swears that the signature on the waiver of immunity is his own (People v Hodge, 141 AD2d 843 , supra; People v Rice, 93 Misc 2d 182 ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Critten v. Chemical National Bank green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.